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This research explores psychological therapists’ experiences of humour in sessions 
with clients diagnosed with a terminal illness. In considering the extensive research 
uncovered involving humour and death, comparatively little was found in the field of 
terminal illness, humour and the psychological therapies, and none specifically on 
therapists’ experiences of these phenomena. Bruner’s (1991, 2004) narrative approach 
is used to examine six psychological therapists’ experiences which elicited: 
participating therapists’ personal experiences of humour compared to those 
experiences with clients; how preconceptions of working in terminal care shaped their 
experiences of humour once they were experienced therapists; the nature of working 
with terminally ill clients; the nature of humour as a hindrance and/or help; the 
differences between humour with clients in terminal settings compared to other 
settings; and finally, what therapists have learned through their experiences. Analysis 
of the findings is conducted by looking at both the content and structure of 
participants’ narratives, paying close attention to character, plot, temporality, and 
situatedness. The nature of this research and the findings and their implications are 
discussed and critiqued, before further research is recommended and concluding 
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Prologue: Gauri(’s) Story 
 
When I first meet people, I often introduce myself as ‘Gauri, as in ‘gory story’’. This 
gets mixed responses from ‘Oh, I hope not!’ to ‘No, certainly not gory’, to 
inquisitiveness about the origins of my name. Whatever words are spoken, my 
introduction is always met with humour, a laugh or chuckle. In some kind of funny 
way, ‘Gauri(’s) story’ is the signifier that pieces this thesis together.  
But what is my story? And why put it down here? In many respects it would 
have been much easier to ignore this preliminary chapter or include it in the 
Introduction where it appeared in earlier drafts: a piece of writing that was, what I 
consider to be, academic clinical, succinct. However, it became increasingly apparent 
that this thesis would become a narrative study, and whilst the reasons for this are 
explained later (see Chapter 4), I decided that telling a story from start to finish in this 
way would provide some semblance of a coherent, rather than disjointed, structure to 
the whole of the narrative.  
When I first came up with the phenomena I wanted to study: humour and 
death, I was certain it was purely because I was curious in how the two were manifest 
in my work environment at a hospice. I was quite sceptical of humour; surely it is just 
to make the therapist feel better, to take away the angst of standing on the precipice of 
an abyss of finitude that any counsellor working with any terminal client is all too 
aware of? However, it was during a few days of wrought exasperation, trawling 
through the thousands of words of interview transcripts, wondering how I could 
present my findings in a creative, playful way that honoured, as much as it could, the 
spirit of humour, that I first heard the Rolling Stones (2005) song ‘Laugh, I nearly 




the wording of the verses that brought to full and immediate consciousness that this 
thesis is entirely about me: “I’ve been to Africa, looking for my soul/And I feel like 
an actor looking for a role…I’ve been down to India, but it froze my bones…I’ve 
been wandering, feeling all alone/I lost my direction and I lost my home.” The song is 
the story of my life! (At least so far.) Of Indian descent, I grew up in Kenya, taking 
for granted the sticky fruit, whistling thorn bushes and burning feet on hot tarmac. At 
14, the luscious Kenyan soil was stolen away from beneath me, and I found myself 
stood instead with soggy feet on the drenched tarmac of Heathrow airport. I 
remember clearly at that time pushing the pain away, sticking my chin up, breathing 
England in and resolving to be a new Gauri; a more confident, less pathetic, highly 
positive Gauri. Although my propensity to turn negative situations into positive ones 
began a lot earlier (‘what can I learn from this?’ or ‘everything happens for a reason’ 
– probably having grown up in a quasi Hindu family driven by the wheels of karma 
and dharma), this was the moment that anaesthetising myself from my own emotions 
was galvanised. (There are earlier ‘tragedies’ in my life that may have contributed to 
this, but it is not my intention to exploit them by writing about them here. I am indeed 
the author of this thesis and this is my story, but it is also not about me. More, I want 
to acknowledge my own personal response to the tragic and/or the comic, and how 
potentially this could impact how I address the research question.)  
Subsequently studying psychology, then working with learning and physically 
disabled people, and now as a counsellor in a hospice, my sense of ‘It could be 
worse!’ has only become stronger, much, I sometimes think, to my therapist’s chagrin 
– she often suggests to me that I do not acknowledge the pain in my life enough, I 
cover it up with pleasantry and good humour (or at least, that is what I hear!). I 




bright side of life’ and ignoring what I consider to be the counterproductive emotions 
of sadness, loss and anger? Existentialists might tentatively suggest that I have 
succumbed to an ‘inauthentic’ existence – after all, is it not through the heat of the 
flame that a metal’s impurities are burned off and gold is created?  
In considering whether I am living an ‘authentic’ (or at least, an authentic 
enough) existence, what comes to mind is what my terminal clients sometimes say 
about quality versus quantity of life. Why bother going through weeks or months of 
invasive treatment to live a longer life, but one of pain, sickness and fatigue? Why not 
just ride out the last moments of a shortened life being able to get out of bed and ‘feel 
ok’? I by no means am comparing the feelings of pain I disallow myself to the pain of 
my clients, but the question stands: do I live ‘authentically’, really acknowledging 
what angers me, depresses me, saying ‘no’ more, or live a happy life, blinkered from 
the gory? The Gauri. (I could potentially start introducing myself as ‘Gauri – with an 
AU as in the periodic element of gold’.)  
Covering up my pain with humour, a smile, a nod, appeasement, is something 
I am in a turbulent relationship with and one I am too scared to either break up with or 
get married to. Putting this down in words is, given the narrative method I have 
chosen, highly important not only in providing a coherent narrative, but also to ensure 
that in analysing my participants’ findings I do not unconsciously project my own 
thoughts, assumptions, beliefs, wishes, conclusions, onto theirs. Not only will this 
maintain some kind of authenticity in my research, but also feels the ‘ethical’ thing to 
do. As Loewenthal (2011:151) supposes that Levinas might contend: “I am only 
attending to myself in order to be helpful to you; I need to have some sense of myself 
in order to put you first – to be in touch with my own concern with death and my own 




present to you Gauri’s story of psychological therapists’ experiences of humour in 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“In literature we have the two basic genres, cultivated by the ancient Greeks and 
Romans, of tragedy and comedy, or the tragic and comic masks we wear on life’s 
stages and then internalize in the theaters of the mind, in the various scenarios 
created in the imagination and subsequently enacted with the therapist or analyst 
during therapy” 
- Lothane, 2008a:181 
 
1.1  Preface 
 
It is the dichotomy of tragedy and comedy on which this study will focus, where 
comedy will be explored through examining therapists’ experiences of humour; and 
tragedy, through clients with terminal illness. As such, the overarching research 
question is: ‘How do psychological therapists experience humour in sessions with 
clients diagnosed with a terminal illness?’. 
The idea for this study started with a consideration of humour in life in 
general, particularly those experiences where both sadness and joy are expressed 
through tears. These can also begin as one and end up as the other, such as when 
sorrowful wailing turns to uproarious laughter and vice versa. Freud (1927) 
acknowledged this association in his writings, where his use of the German word 
‘humor’, according to Bergler (1956:39) depicts “a series of painful emotions 
transformed in a manner that produces pleasure”. Whilst this connection is not as 
explicit in English, common parlance reflects the juxtaposition between comedy and 
tragedy, humour and pain: ‘I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry’, ‘it was painfully 
funny’, ‘I could have died laughing’. These expressions have implications when 
considering the use of humour, and the role of ‘pain’ in such interactions: “When we 
consider the nature of humour it quickly becomes apparent that it produces laughter 




metamorphosis of pain into a psychically more manageable form” (Jacobson, 1997, in 
Lemma, 2000:43).  
When the author started working in a hospice, the collocation of joy and 
sadness became more apparent. Humorous comments that were made about dying or 
death by patients, staff, families and friends felt like something greater than merely a 
flippant joke or quip; the laughter that accompanied such statements, whilst genuine, 
was also – at least for the author – slightly uneasy. From a general about the 
phenomenon, and considering the place of humour and death specifically in 
therapeutic sessions, to discovering a considerable dearth of previous research in the 
area, the idea to base a doctoral thesis on the experience of comedy and tragedy was 
born.  
With the relative lack of previous research, it was felt that this study would be 
timely and suitable in illuminating the notion of humour in therapeutic sessions with 
terminally ill clients. In doing so, it is aimed at not only enhancing the work in such a 
context, but also addressing a broader question of how lived experience is researched, 
with implications for both research and therapeutic practice, particularly in palliative 
care settings.  
1.2  Plot 
 
The scene is set for this enquiry in Chapter 2, which explores the difficulties in 
researching humour and death, and how initial sources were found, with a discussion 
on the criteria that were set for determining the relevance of the literature to be 
presented. Given the lack of sufficient research exploring terminal illness, humour 
and psychological therapy, the Literature Review in Chapter 3 is a historical account 
of death and humour, which serves to contextualise the relationship between the two 




Ancient Greek theatre, the case is put forward for the idea that comedy is borne from 
tragedy, and thus illustrates a potential human propensity to manage tragic situations 
through comedy. In attempting to explain how, literature on death is first explored.  A 
history is provided of societal reactions to death and dying through Illich’s (1976) six 
stages to gain a deeper understanding of the concept of death in today’s society and its 
place in the psychological therapies. Some consideration is then given to several 
theories of humour that illustrate its role and function in society and for the 
individual. Of these, the three that are particularly examined are the superiority 
theory, the relief theory and the incongruence theory. Together, these identify how, 
pertinently for this study, humour can be seen as a response to the idea of death. 
Finally, existing literature interlacing humour, terminal illness and psychotherapy is 
presented. Together, these elements offer a legitimate structure for the enquiry to be 
launched.  
Chapter 4 explores the values that route the journey to finding an appropriate 
method. These values are housed under an umbrella of relational, reflexive and 
contextual epistemology. The destination of this journey was to find a method which 
captured a rich enough description of therapists experiences, acknowledged the 
contextual nature of humour and therapy, and maintained as much of the vitality and 
spontaneity of humour as possible. Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), 
Discourse Analysis, Heuristics and Narrative Analysis are visited to assess their 
suitability, until finally the usefulness of Bruner’s (1990) approach to narrative as a 
vehicle for presenting and analysing the findings is stressed.  
Chapter 5 demonstrates the structure of the conducting the research, including 
data collection, a consideration of reliability, validity and generalisability, participant 




working in a variety of palliative care settings were interviewed for approximately an 
hour, the results of which can be seen in Chapter 6.  
In wanting to maintain Bruner’s (1991) call for plausibility and verisimilitude 
of the findings, and at the same time wanting to preserve the playful nature that 
humour inhabits, Van Maanen’s (1988:19) thoughts were kept in mind: “little need 
was felt to do much more than gather and arrange the materials, for they 
would…speak for themselves”. Thus, Chapter 6 uses the creative structure afforded 
by Bruner’s narrative method to portray a story of psychological therapists’ stories 
regarding their experiences of humour in sessions with clients diagnosed with 
terminal illnesses. By structuring the findings in this way, the author attempts to 
convey the subjective experience of being audience to what the participants spoke of.  
Chapter 7 tells a story of the results through analysing them with the narrative 
concepts of character, plot, temporality and situatedness. Attention is paid not only to 
the content of the interviews, but also the structure.  Hopefully, Chapters 6 and 7 
together provide a rich account of participants’ experiences of humour when working 
with terminally ill clients, as well as an exploration of the meaning that the therapists 
in this study have drawn from their experiences. 
Chapter 8 provides a critique of the research as a whole by exploring the 
challenges and considering what was found and what was missed through 
approaching the research question in this way. Recommendations for future research 
are made, before the story ends in the concluding Chapter 9. 
 
1.3  Definitions 
In order to clarify the context in which this research has been conducted, the key 




‘Psychological therapists’: those working with people using psychological, 
counselling or psychotherapeutic approaches to enhance their wellbeing, either short-
term or long-term (BACP, 2014).  
 
‘Experience’: rooted for the purposes of this enquiry in Husserlian philosophy (e.g. 
Husserl, 1931), this refers to the subjective and relative understanding one has of a 
particular phenomenon. 
 
‘Humour’: The tendency of something to provoke amusement or a comic reaction. 
For the purposes of this research, the Association for Applied and Therapeutic 
Humour’s official definition of therapeutic humour will be used:  
“Therapeutic humour is any intervention that promotes health and 
wellness by stimulating a playful discovery, expression or appreciation 
of the absurdity or incongruity of life’s situation. This intervention may 
enhance health or be used as a complementary treatment of illness to 
facilitate healing or coping, whether physical, emotional, cognitive, 




‘Sessions’: The time in which the psychological therapist and client meet for purposes 
of psychological support.   
 
‘Clients’: With an acknowledgement that clients are sometimes referred to as 
‘patients’ in literature and palliative care settings, ‘clients’ refers to those that are seen 
by psychological therapists for support. For the purposes of this study, clients will be 
those diagnosed with a terminal illness.  
 
‘Diagnosis’: The implicit medical determination of a disease or condition, of which 




‘Terminal illness’: A term that describes a disease or condition that has progressed to 
an extent where it can no longer be cured. Patients diagnosed with a terminal illness 
are generally expected to die within a relatively short period of time, though 
definitions vary from within six to twelve months (e.g. National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence, 2004). The term is commonly used for progressive diseases such as 
cancer, heart disease, and a number of degenerative neurological illnesses 
(McNamara, 2006).  Other terms that have been used include ‘chronic illness’, and 
more recently, ‘life-limiting illness’ (e.g. Department of Health, 2008).   
 
The chapters that follow are parts of a jigsaw, each coming together to offer a story 
that unfolds to describe the author’s journey from a starting place of relative 
ignorance regarding humour and death, and with voices of doubt, misgiving and 
hesitation when in these situations. The form and description of the journey takes a 
storytelling frame, consistent with the values of narrative, which requires the teller to 
set the scene for the telling. Each of the chapters, whilst standing alone, paves the 
path for addressing the question: How do psychological therapists experience humour 





Chapter 2: Setting the Scene 
 
“Life does not cease to be funny when people die any more than it ceases to be 
serious when people laugh.”  
 - Shaw (1906:130) 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter sets the scene for answering the question of how psychological therapists 
experience humour in sessions with clients diagnosed with a terminal illness by 
considering the complexities involved in searching for existing literature. This is 
followed by a discussion determining criteria for the relevance, inclusion and 
presentation of previous research in the Literature Review.  
 
2.2  Searching for literature 
Humour and death are vast topics, with their branches reaching into the realms of 
cinema, music, psychology, science, television, and many more. At the time of 
writing, a Google search of ‘death and humour’ elicited 27,400,000 results. These 
included articles on ‘gallows humour’, websites listing humorous death quotes, funny 
epitaphs and obituaries, and even the odd news story with the headline, ‘Cannibal 
killer beaten to death over sick sense of humour, says prison murderer’ (Papenfuss, 
2015).  With such a broad range of material, it was almost a relief to see that ‘death 
humour psychotherapy’ had only 420,000 results on Google. Interestingly, only 
25,200 of these results are on Google Scholar. What becomes apparent is an 
incredibly vast area of potential exploration, with relatively less published content.  
Given this expanse of research on humour and death generally, there was a 
requirement to focus the initial literature search for published items through not only 
Google Scholar, but also journal databases such as PSYCArticles, PSYCInfo, 
PSYCHBooks and PEP-Web. The key terms searched for included ‘psychological 




‘psychological therapy terminally ill’. To ensure the maximum amount of relevant 
literature was sourced, variations of the words were used, such as ‘psychotherapy’, 
‘counselling’, ‘comedy’, ‘life limiting illness’, and so on, as well as Americanised 
spellings of the words. The key terms yielded numerous results but it was found that 
by the sixth page of most databases, results seemed to be less relevant.  
Journals were accessed through Shibboleth and Athens and then read, with 
attention being paid to both the content and bibliographies, as these made reference to 
other potentially relevant journal articles and books. Books that had been identified as 
potentially useful were sourced through the university library or purchased, either as 
hard or electronic copies. Once it was decided that reading new articles and 
conducting further searches generated no new sources of information, it was decided 
that enough relevant existing literature had been discovered.  
2.3  Criteria for relevance 
In considering the literature to include, it was acknowledged that the plethora of 
literature allowed for a number of different avenues which could be followed, and as a 
result, a number of different doctoral theses that could be produced. For instance, one 
potential area of exploration could be looking at defining therapeutic humour; 
another, exploring the purpose of therapy for clients with terminal illness. Not 
knowing at this early stage which direction this thesis would take, and with the 
necessity to provide a focus to a broad, and potentially unfocused, topic in the mature 
fields of death and humour that have attracted a lot of attention, it was important to 
maintain strong boundaries in establishing the criteria for relevance. By so doing, the 
chance of being overwhelmed by the literature and therefore producing an overly 
saturated and ‘thin’ account of what already exists was avoided; therefore, a deep and 




research question was attempted. To only include what was immediately relevant and 
not tangentially related to the main focus of the investigation, it was necessary to get a 
clear idea of what was being asked and the platforms from which the study was being 
launched, namely: comedy and tragedy, death and dying, humour, and the relation to 
these three to the psychological therapies. Therefore, the criteria for determining the 
relevance of articles were that they should focus upon working with clients diagnosed 
with a terminal illness or refer to occurrences of humour in the therapeutic setting, or 
preferably both, and that they should explore the implications each of these have for 
therapeutic practice.  
Whilst space did not permit a thorough enough exploration of how the 
relationship between death and humour changes throughout time and culture, and in 
order to keep it relevant to the contextual and culturally dependent complexities of 
both humour and death (e.g. Fox, 1990), it was only Western notions of death, 
humour and the psychological therapies that were decided to be the focus of the 
literature review.  
Whittling down the results revealed a relative dearth of literature that explores 
the triadic relationship between terminal illness, humour and the psychological 
therapies. The majority of literature regarding these phenomena was disparate, 
anecdotal or quantitative, and largely written from a psychoanalytic perspective.  
There was no significant literature written specifically about psychological therapists’ 
experiences of humour whilst working with terminally ill clients, but humour was 
mentioned in some articles and books about counselling and terminal illness.  
The history of both terminal illness and humour were found by the author to 
contribute to current societal and individual attitudes to the topics and an attempt to 




suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006) was felt to jar with the content. In accordance 
with Hart (1998), a chronological presentation was deemed to work best for this 
literature review in allowing for a narrative to be produced that sufficiently 
encapsulates such a rich history and provides a framework for making distinctions 
between perspectives. What follows is an amalgamation of the two approaches by 
locating literature along a chronological line where possible and organising it loosely 
in themes, which enabled the researcher to identify work that is perceivably at the 
edge of the paradigm and can reveal something about the nature of originality. This 
resolved the issue of what felt like a heavily structured and somewhat rigid thematic 
analysis, and allowed for a critical position to be developed towards traditional 
assumptions.  
Furthermore, the majority of research has been carried out from a 
psychoanalytic perspective and hence cannot be ignored, despite the author’s desire to 
present the literature from an existential viewpoint. Existentialism, in giving import to 
subjectivity over objectivity (e.g. Sartre, 1956) lends itself well to the phenomena of 
exploration in this thesis as the subjective and diverse experiences of both humour 
and death have important implications on adequately researching such phenomena, 
particularly in relation to psychological therapy. Thus it is tentatively suggested that 
this thesis may inhabit an ‘existential-analytic’ (Loewenthal, 2016) space in which the 
exploration of these phenomena is arrived at from “one evolution of R. D. Laing’s 
approach to existentialism, including the influence of psychoanalysis, though this is 
preceded by giving a primacy to the existential relationship”. Hence, it is the 
individual relationship between death, humour and psychological therapy that is felt 




In considering the implications of this on adequately researching such 
phenomena, it is worth keeping in mind that attitudes towards death and humour both 
inhabit and are products of cultural and individual circumstances, borne of a distinct 
relationship, which have a distinct history, at a distinct place. Particularly, the nature 
of humour is intangible and not just found in the content of utterances, but also in the 
tone of one's voice or in a particular gesture or expression.  In relating this very 
contextual moment either verbally or textually, there is not only a risk of losing the 
essence of the phenomena, but the possibility of misunderstanding the humour and the 
reception it elicits is significantly increased (Lemma, 2000). Other authors have also 
pointed out the difficulty in retaining the funniness the moment humour is examined: 
“Just as sex research tends to shrivel romance, so pontifications about humour are 
death to amusement” (Dixon, 1980:287). This is an unavoidable limitation to be 
acknowledged, and kept in mind. That being said, the contradiction of writing a thesis 









Chapter 3:  Literature Review 
 
“A little perspective, like a little humor, goes a long way.” 
- Klein (2014) 
 
3.1  Introduction 
What is the relationship, if any, between humour, terminal illness and the 
psychological therapies? To offer an answer, it is necessary to examine the existing 
research that explores each three areas, which will further serve to contextualise this 
current study. This literature review therefore begins with a general investigation of 
the history of tragedy and comedy, where the case is put forward for the idea that 
comedy is borne from tragedy, illustrating a potential human propensity to manage 
tragic situations through comedy. To explore this in greater depth, literature on death 
and dying is first presented, followed by a more specific examination of terminal 
illness, and then the relationship between terminal illness and psychological therapy. 
An evaluation of humour and then its relationship with psychological therapy follows, 
before literature interlacing terminal illness, humour and psychological therapies is 
considered.  
3.2  Comedy and tragedy 
There has been much debate over the centuries over what exactly tragedy is (see for 
example, Kerr, 1967; Roche, 1998; Poole, 2005; Taplin & Billings, 2010). From 
around 500BC with the development of Ancient Greek theatre through to the 
Renaissance and Judaeo-Christian and Shakespearean tragedies, this debate has often 
focused on its form, or shape and plot (e.g. Cartwright, 2013). It is worthy to refer 
here to Aristotle’s ‘Poetics’ (trans. 2003), and the ‘Unities’ of time, place and action 




‘Poetics’ portrayed tragedies to typically depict a great character, serious, 
dignified and admirable, who experienced a reversal of fortune due to “hamartia”, 
which Taplin and Billings (2010) point out is often mistranslated as ‘flaw’, but more 
correctly depicts ‘mistake’. The hero suffered, there was a struggle, a combat between 
two contending forces, which ended in a lamentable death – lamented because he 
sacrificed himself in a necessary action that would in the end serve the common good 
of man. Through the process, the hero was rewarded and achieved revelation or 
recognition, in Aristotelian terms, “a change from ignorance to knowledge” (Aristotle, 
trans. 2003:33).   
Kerr (1967) points out that there are tragedies, however, that do not conform 
to this structure, nor the unities of time, place and action, but are nevertheless 
powerful and moving and appear to have the same ‘tragic effect’. In debating the 
definition or nature of tragedy therefore, it may be necessary to look at this tragic 
effect. The question regarding what it is about tragedies that compels audiences to 
continually return to watch them may be answered by how people experience 
tragedies, and it is here that the audience rather than the play itself becomes the 
central defining feature. Aristotle (trans. 2003) originally depicted tragedies as 
eliciting fear or pity in the audience, but also as a means of catharsis. Though he 
failed to define what he meant by catharsis, the original Greek word ‘κάθαρση’ 
(kátharsi) means ‘purification’ or ‘cleansing’ (Thomas, 2009), and the experience of 
watching tragedies can thus be seen as a purging of certain pent up emotions.  
Taplin and Billings (2010) however, argue that the idea of releasing something 
from the body in this way does not seem to encapsulate the experience entirely, and 
suggested that perhaps there is something that can be extracted from tragedies and 




which the virus strengthens our bodies, and proposed that watching tragedies may 
strengthen viewers for life outside of theatre, not in attempt to ward of suffering, but 
to increase understanding and insight. According to Taplin and Billings (2010), this 
idea corresponds well with the original ancient Greek terminology for playwrights as 
‘teaching’ tragedies rather than ‘writing’ them.  
Ancient Greek tragedies followed a particular structure of three plays in which 
a first ‘agon’ (implying agony) gave birth to a second, and the second to a third. The 
third “acted as an ultimate discharge of pain and responsibility and ended in 
reconciliation” (Kerr, 1967:22). These trilogies were followed by a fourth play, a 
‘satyr’, which made use of the original material of the tragic plays but almost made 
light of it and was considered comical.  
Lacan (in Zupančič, 2003) compared the structures of tragedy and comedy to 
the relationship between actions of desire. For Lacan, the essence of tragedy is the 
triumph of death, the willingness of the tragic hero to choose death as an expression 
of choice and dignity in a confrontation with the real. In contrast, he viewed comedy 
as an unconscious structure that expresses the individual’s capacity to choose life in 
an encounter with the real, within the limits of existence. Tragedy then, can be seen as 
an exploration of man’s freedom or limitations, which perhaps has important 
implications in working with people with terminal illnesses: on one hand, their bodies 
are bound – like Prometheus was, but chained, he was still free to challenge Zeus 
(Aeschylus, trans. 1961). It is a possibility that using comedy, or humour, is one way 
in which people can challenge their limitations. Roustang (1987:711), for instance, 
associates the comic with tolerating uncertainty, or as “freedom’s possibility to escape 




could be said to generate considerable anxiety, which can be worked through 
sublimation. Humour, it is argued, provides a vehicle for this (Lemma, 2000).  
Accordingly, Barwick (2012:165) discussing a ‘postlapsarian’ world, argues 
that humour has a role in managing life's multiple ‘falls’:  
“Free, but no longer provided for, mortality epitomises our desire 
to do more than we are capable of and to be more than we are. In 
‘the gap’ that characterises this world, aspirations and creative 
acts are inevitably shadowed by frustrations, losses and myriad 
‘falls’, and it is humour that is often used, developmentally and/or 
defensively, to lighten the shadow and to manage the psychic 
residue of these falls.”  
 
There is hence a strong indication of the human predisposition to use comedy 
to mitigate against the effects of tragedy, and theorists have deduced from this the 
possibility that, “comedy at its most penetrating derives from what we normally 
regard as tragic” (Kerr, 1967:17), akin to the sun and the shadow – the two are almost 
one and the second unthinkable without the first. The catharsis of tragedy could then 
be said to give way to a kind of consolation from comedy when it depicts the absurd 
and grotesque aspects of life in humorous ways. 
The idea that comedy emerges from tragedy and has an apparent underlying 
purpose that seems serious, despite its intention to make people laugh, is interesting 
and will be explored in what follows. Tragedy will be explored through reviewing 
historic and current literature on death, dying and more particularly being 
unavoidably confronted by these in terminal illness; comedy, through humour; and 
lastly, the significance and interrelationship of both these phenomena in psychological 
therapy.  
 
3.3  Death and Dying 
With the idea that comedy potentially emerges from tragedy, societal attitudes 




illness and its situatedness in the psychological therapies today is explored. Illich’s 
(1976) six-phase model illustrating the evolution of societal attitudes toward death 
and the role it has had in health and healing through history seems pertinent here in 
providing a context to current thoughts about terminal illness, and the extent to which 
this influences psychological therapists working with clients diagnosed with such 
illnesses. It must be acknowledged that this is particularly relevant to Western society, 
and may not necessarily be applicable to other cultures or communities. 
Illich (1976) claimed that the dominant image of death was shaped by 
institutional structures, myths and social constructions prevalent at specific junctures 
of time. According to Illich, the first stage of the evolution of ideas regarding death 
began in the Middle Ages, and followed a time when death was considered to be 
God's deliberate and personal intervention. Death began to be accepted as an 
autonomous part of human life and society was more accepting of it as a natural, 
rather than mystical, event.  
The second stage, starting in the twelfth century, demonstrated a move from 
conceiving death as a transition to the next life, to death being the end of one's current 
life. The Church was still powerful at the time, and whilst doctors could aid healing, 
attempts to prolong life were considered blasphemous (Illich, 1976). The Black 
Death, which peaked in the fourteenth century, brought around folk practices and 
superstitions that were believed to contribute to a ‘good’ death.  
The Industrial Revolution, which according to Foucault (1976) created 
employment and wealth, and hence a bourgeois culture that desired good health, 
formulates Illich’s (1976) third stage. Disease started to be considered a political and 
economic problem, and along with the desire for a ‘useful’ society, death became an 




gained distinction, old charitable institutions were dismantled by the state, and the 
classes that could afford it began to pay to keep death away (Foucault, 1976; Illich, 
1976).   
During stage four of Illich’s (1976) model, doctors, in being viewed as having 
the ability to control the outcome of diseases, were also believed to have power over 
death which afforded them new status (Shyrock, 1947). Supporting this idea, Reck 
(1977) describes other cultures, which are shown to value death, and compared them 
to Western tradition, where it is life that appears to hold import. Reck (1977) claims 
that this is largely shaped by Darwinian philosophy from the nineteenth century, 
where survival is the goal for all organisms.  
The fifth stage, which occurred towards the middle of the twentieth century, 
follows on from this, and demonstrates health as being a commodity. The sixth stage, 
according to Illich (1976) has been the time in which:  
“protected against dying and defeated by the victory of 
medicalization over society, the patient is no longer able to set the 
scene for his own death; nor can the professionals who have taken 
control of life and death agree amongst themselves what actually 
constitutes death”  
(O'Gorman, 1998:1130). 
Technological advances in medicine as well as a movement towards smaller, more 
nuclear families resulted in an increase of dying in institutions, a dramatic difference 
from the Middle ages and Renaissance when 
 “a man insisted upon participating in his own death because he 
saw it an exceptional moment – a moment which gave his 
individuality its definite form. He was only the master of his life 
to the extent that he was the master of his death. His death 
belonged to him and to him alone”  
(Illich, 1976:5). 
Added to this is the possible feeling that doctors and nurses have failed if the patient 




Illich’s (1976) model has received a lot of support from authors writing in the 
late seventies and early eighties (e.g. Taylor, 1977; Reck, 1977; Weir, 1980, 
Thompson, 1984) who highlight how the medicalisation of society resulted in an 
increase of people dying in hospitals or extended-care facilities such as hospices and 
nursing homes rather than at home, and how this contributed to a societal denial of 
death. They called for a more ‘realistic’ view of death to acknowledge the problems 
that confront everyone as death approaches including the inevitability of death, the 
finality of death, the untimeliness of death, the necessity of death-related decisions, 
and the complexity of death-related decisions (Weir, 1980).  
According to Taylor (1977:182), “institutionalized death rationalizes the 
process and, in doing so, turns dying people into objects”. Bodies are taken over by 
professionals, who prescribe their own rituals and often fail to satisfy the spiritual 
needs of the individual and their family (May, 1973; Illich, 1976): “When we get sick 
today, we end up in the bailiwick of the physician and nurse; when we are about to 
die, there is the clergyman; and when we actually die, there is the funeral director. 
Dying and death have become the province of the professional” (Feifel, 1977:7). A 
consequence of institutionalising death is the isolation of the patient, what Sweeting 
and Gilhooley (1992) refer to as a ‘social death’, which precedes the biological death. 
According to Taylor (1977), grieving often began after the death because the primary 
focus for relatives was to care for their loved one. When death is institutionalised 
however, grieving tends to begin from the outset because death is acknowledged as an 
inevitable outcome. This has been referred to as ‘anticipatory grief’ (see Reynolds & 
Botha, 2006), and can affect both dying individuals and those around them.  
Moreover, people have the option, and often do choose, to prolong their lives no 




Technological advances have also impacted society's attitudes towards death, 
with twenty-four hour news coverage of natural and man-made disasters, video 
games, television shows and movies. As Wong and Tomer (2011:100) state:  
“Our passive acceptance of the endless coverage of carnage 
and atrocity betrays a love-hate relationship with death: We 
are simultaneously repelled by its terror and seduced by its 
mysteries...The ubiquity of images of death may be seen as an 
opportunity. Lifting of the taboo may have paved the way for 
death to emerge as a popular subject for both psychological 
research and public education.” 
 
Current research supports the idea that there has been a return to society 
adopting more holistic views towards death and dying (e.g. Barry & Yuill, 2012). 
Hospices, for instance, are increasingly enhancing strategies to enable the individual 
to die at home with the right support, which includes a plethora of professionals from 
doctors and nurses to chaplains, complementary therapists, counsellors, psychologists, 
social workers, and so on, with aims to meet the psychosocial needs of the patient and 
not just the biological (e.g. Social Care Institute for Excellence, 2013). By so doing, 
they attempt to prolong the quality of life and enhance the experience of death. This 
change of attitude towards dying could be said to result from research conducted by 
Kübler-Ross (1970), who indicated that dying could be a peaceful and transformative 
experience, and the work of Dame Cicely Saunders (1978) who initiated the hospice 
movement.  
Literature (e.g. Aabom, et al., 2005) has identified that diagnosing someone as 
terminal is problematic; physicians either do not define their patients as being 
terminal or tend to provide optimistic prognostic estimates, resulting in inappropriate 
and untimely referral to specialist palliative care services or unintended acute 
hospitalisation. For this reason, this study intends to explore those therapists working 




subject to palliative care. Palliative care is defined by the World Health Organisation 
(2014) as “an approach that improves the quality of life for patients and their families 
facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness, through the prevention and 
relief of suffering...and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial 
and spiritual”. 
Kisner (1994) indicates the impact society has on an individual diagnosed with 
terminal illness. For instance, she refers to the metaphorical use of the word cancer, 
which according to her, “is used to represent insidiously destructive conditions in our 
culture…to denote some widespread evil process”. Phrases such as ‘it spread like a 
cancer’ equate certain phenomena with contagion, evil, punishment and death, which 
potentially serve to enhance its negativity. The World Health Organisation (Stewart & 
Wild, 2014), for instance, issued a warning referring to cancer as a ‘tidal wave that 
will threaten the world’ and refer to cancer as a ‘global burden’.  Kisner (1994:136) 
warns, “such moral overtones are dangerous because they can instil fear and guilt in 
one who may develop ‘cancer’”. Orbach, 1999:109) also states that: 
 “in most countries in the Western world there is now a growing 
realisation that modern medicine, increasing our span of living, has 
increased our span of dying too: and we all know of those who feel 
that because of cardiac resuscitators, antibiotics and so on, they are 
now being obliged to live longer beyond their natural term.” 
 
One can be reminded here of Foucault’s (1961) interpretation of the allegory, 
‘Ship of Fools’. Foucault points out that originally, lepers were excluded from society 
but that once leprosy physically disappeared, the space it occupied in society was 
filled by the concept of madness, and it was madmen that were isolated and expelled 
from communities. He likened madness to death: in the late middle ages when 
Foucault was writing, though death was not marginalised, it was seen as something 




reason, and became a means to express and locate concerns about the darker side of 
life and fear of obliteration. This raises the question as to what extent, if at all, 
terminal illnesses such as AIDS and cancer have now become the symbol for the 
projection of society's fears and negativity; or, as Kisner (1994:136) states, “‘Cancer’ 
(the person with cancer) becomes the scapegoat on which (whom) those problems 
most unacceptable to society are projected”. 
Society’s view of cancer could be related to the varying ways in which people 
face and accept the finitude of their existence. There is a wealth of literature from 
existentialist writers (e.g. Heidegger, 1927; Sartre, 1943; Yalom, 1980) who refer to 
individuals’ tendencies, through certain behaviours and preoccupations, to avoid and 
repress the awareness of life's finitude and the resultant isolation and angst. Echoing 
Foucault, Becker (1973) refers to this as a “collective madness” through which 
dieting, exercise and other attempts at ‘self-improvement’ – writing a doctorate, 
perhaps – are not only a guise for control, but also obscure awareness of impending 
death. Testament to this is recent advertising campaigns ‘personifying’ cancer as 
something that is the enemy that can be beaten. On one hand, phrases such as “Now it 
is cancer’s turn to be afraid” (Cancer Research, 2012), could be said to instil hope in 
individuals that cancer can be thwarted in the same way that terrible human beings 
may eventually be overcome and defeated through unwavering perseverance, more so 
than something abstract, devoid of reason and feeling, which mercilessly, 
unscrupulously and relentlessly causes suffering and death. Depicting cancer as a 
being transforms the abstract into something tangible, empowering people in the face 
of illness. On the other hand, doing so is also a means by which one can potentially 




Reck (1977) argues that technological developments that prolong life and 
avoid death have resulted in longevity being the main value. He also comments on the 
“unfortunate paradox” that has resulted in those instances where, in attempt to ward 
off death, the weeks or months that treatments provide are spent in considerable 
suffering or pain. Kisner (1994) suggests that those with terminal diagnoses, in being 
confronted with their mortality, are unable to perpetuate suppressing that which 
allows them membership in the ‘collectively mad’ society, living with a constant 
reminder of the existential realities of uncertainty, meaninglessness, isolation and 
finitude. In reference to AIDS, but able to be extended to other terminal illnesses, 
Guibert (in Orbach, 1999:126) states, it is  “an illness in stages, a very long flight of 
steps that led assuredly to death, but whose every step represented a unique 
apprenticeship. It was a disease that gave death time to live and its victims time to die, 
time to discover time, and in the end to discover life”. 
Whilst much of the research has focused on negative responses to mortality, 
Reed (1986) suggests that there are also positive responses. She argues that awareness 
of personal death enables the integration of its inevitability and an exhibition of more 
positive death perspectives than those who are not faced with imminent death: 
“confrontation with death is a confrontation with time. It is generally thought that 
there is an intimate relationship between the meaning of death and the meaning of 
time. The desire to know if and when the ‘end’ is near attests to this” (Reed, 
1986:468). 
 According to Reck (1977), the denial of death and the rejection of one’s 
absolute finitude, detrimentally influences the opportunity for personal growth. In 
comparison, “until the last moment of consciousness the dying may not only 




Personal value of this sort is achieved when an individual knows that death is near 
and accepts the fact” (Reck, 1977:319). Whilst this may not be the case for everyone, 
Reck goes on to highlight the pertinence of talking therapy in such occasions as a 
means to enhance psychological growth once “the biological course towards death 
cannot be averted by medical means” (Reck, 1977:319).  He quotes Weisman (1972), 
who suggests that this would result in a ‘purposeful death’, by which he means “a 
death that someone might choose for himself – had he a choice...one must realise that 
death is not an ironic choice without an option, but a way of living as long as 
possible” (in Reck, 1977:320).  
3.3.1  Terminal illness in psychological therapy 
A number of authors have highlighted the ‘uniqueness’ of counselling provision for 
clients diagnosed with life-limiting illnesses. Jackson (1977) for instance, refers to 
time factors and the intensity of emotional involvement being different to therapy 
with those who are not confronting death. Jackson also comments on the potential for 
repressed hostilities that arise when a healthy person (the therapist) moves into 
context with a dying client, and the grief that might arise:  
“Dying people are facing a bereavement that has to do with the 
essence of their own being. They are not only losing life, they are 
losing everything that life made significant. They are losing family, 
they are losing occupation, and possessions; they are losing the sense 
of identity that makes it possible for them to establish selfhood”  
(Jackson, 1977:28).   
 
Jackson claims that this may create feelings of aggression or hostility, which 
may be directed at the therapist but is therapeutically valid. He contends that “the 
more rational the approach to death on the part of the professional person the more 





Kisner (1994:133) also describes the nature of terminal illness as presenting 
the mental health professional with “a special challenge”:  
“treatment needs are unique because they share the following: 1) 
A diagnosis to which society reacts with hopeless negativity; 2) 
An approach or combination of approaches to treatment (surgery, 
chemotherapy and/or radiation) that often results in severe 
alterations in body image beyond the fact of having the illness; 
and 3) A confrontation with issues of mortality, uncertainty, 
aloneness and meaninglessness, i.e. existential concerns, because 
of treatment-free periods when one waits to see if the disease 
recurs”. 
 
Kisner (1994) goes on to describe how a patient with a terminal illness may 
view a mental health referral as either an indication of their insanity or a threat of 
abandonment by his doctor for not being ‘a good patient’ or what LeShan (1990) 
refers to as a ‘façade of goodness’. Kisner (1994) claims that this is compounded by 
the patient’s anxiety and fear of losing further control following their diagnosis. 
Rawnsley (1982) divides this fear into three categories pertaining to fears about 
relationships with significant others, fears about managing the illness, and fears about 
the loss of self.  
Lederberg and Holland (2011) have summarised key differences in the 
‘application’ of therapy for those with terminal illnesses. They indicate a requirement 
for the loosening of boundaries, for instance in location (e.g. home or hospital visits, 
telephone or email), length of the session (due to the client’s possible fatigue), and 
frequency of sessions (medical setbacks have the potential to ‘reset the cycle’). They 
also encourage the therapist to have a flexible approach in exploring feelings 
surrounding diagnosis, treatment and the end of treatment; an understanding of the 
disease, as the client’s subjective understanding can be different to reality; and an 
understanding of denial. The authors specifically refer to two levels of co-existent 




feelings of ambivalence of ambiguity. They also highlight how changes to the body 
can influence thoughts regarding their physical self versus their psychological self, 
before and during the illness. 
Working with a client diagnosed with a terminal illness can also confront the 
therapist with issues of mortality. Lederberg and Holland (2011) highlight the 
importance of psychotherapists’ awareness of countertransference reactions, comfort 
with their own subjective experience of death, and self-care.  The role of the therapist 
with terminally ill patients is then, according to Orbach (1999:72), to experience and 
acknowledge “a helplessness that both of them share: therapists may find themselves 
put in the position of ‘ultimate rescuers’, to relieve another person’s suffering, and 
must resist any temptation to ‘rescue’ either of them by a reassurance that would be a 
denial of the pain”. 
 
3.4  Humour 
Before the literature regarding humour is explored, it is important to draw a 
distinction between humour, which refers to something comic and/or amusing, and 
laughter, which is not necessarily a response to something funny (such as in instances 
of anxiety (e.g. Lemma, 2000) or tickling). Neither humour nor laughter are necessary 
for the existence of the other, though it could be argued that laughter may provide the 
‘catharsis’ that Aristotle (trans. 2003) spoke of, much in the same ways that tears are 
sometimes experienced as a release of energy or tension. Further, with humour being 
highly relative to time, location, culture, maturity, education, intelligence and context 
(Morreall, 2009), some consideration of the history of humour research to 
contextualise current thinking is necessary.  
There appears to be a rejection of laughter, amusement and humour in history. 




loud, frequent or unrestrained”. St. Benedict’s rules also enjoin a restraint against 
laughter, encouraging monks to “prefer moderation in speech and speak no foolish 
chatter, nothing just to provoke laughter”, and the Irish monastery of Columban 
warned against joking with the following punishments: “He who smiles in 
service...six strokes; if he breaks out in the noise of laughter, a special fast unless it 
has happened pardonably” (in Morreall, 2009:5). Friedman (2000) points out that 
instances of humour in the bible, too, are not depicted as happy and joyous, but as 
sarcastic and derisive: “He who sits in heaven will laugh, the Lord will mock them” 
(Psalms, 2:4); “My Lord laughs at [the wicked] for He sees that his day is coming” 
(Psalms, 37:13); “But as for You, God, You laugh at them; You mock all nations” 
(Psalms, 59:9).  
Whilst humour is more acceptable today, the word itself did not refer to 
‘funniness’ until the seventeenth century, but rather to ‘humoural medicine’, which 
purported that the balance of bodily fluids in the human body, ‘humours’, determined 
a person’s physical and mental qualities (Morreall, 2009). This lead to a sense of 
‘mood’ and ‘temporary state of mind’ that finally resulted in ‘humour’ being used to 
denote ‘amusing quality, funniness’ in the 1680s (Fowler, 1926). Humour is defined 
today in the Oxford English Dictionary as “the quality of being amusing or comic; a 
state of mind”.  
There has been an increasing interest in interdisciplinary humour research 
(e.g. McGuire, 1999; Buckman, 1994; Oritz, 2000), and Franzini (2001) reports on 
the scope of benefits of humour scanning multiple domains such as the medical (e.g. 
increasing the quality of life and alleviating pain in terminally ill patients; Kisner, 
1994), physiological (e.g. increasing endorphins levels and improving natural killer 




friends and contributing to a more pleasant social stimulus; Fry & Salameh, 1987; 
Ruch, 1998) and psychological (e.g. providing coping mechanisms for stress and 
enhancing personality traits; Fry & Salameh, 1987; Buckman, 1994; Kuiper & 
Martin, 1998). 
The complexity of humour as a concept is evident in the plethora of theories 
arguing what humour is and what functions it serves. Although many classical 
theories of humour and laughter may be found, contemporary academic literature (e.g. 
Morreall, 2009) focuses on three main theories: ‘incongruity theory’, ‘relief theory’, 
and ‘superiority theory’, each of which will be explored below and used as 
frameworks for relevant research. Amongst current humour researchers however, 
there is no consensus about which of these is most viable, though there is a general 
acceptance that many instances of humour can be explained by more than one theory.  
As Raskin (1985:40) notes, the three theories “characterize the phenomenon of humor 
from very different angles and do not all contradict each other - rather they seem to 
supplement each other quite nicely”. 
With regards to the ‘incongruity theory’, Hutcheson (1725, in Telfer, 1995) 
described laughter as a response to the perception of incongruity between a concept 
and the real object, an idea that has been supported by Beattie (1779), Schopenhauer 
(1819), Kierkegaard (1841) and Kant (1892). Humour through incongruity, it is 
argued, entails the assimilation of unexpected and sudden shifts in perspective, or 
absurdities, in instances where our normal expectations are violated by a given event. 
Kierkegaard (1841), for instance, purported that the ‘comical’ is intrinsic to life and 
emerges wherever there is a contradiction. The more thoroughly one exists, he claims, 
the more comedy can be discovered. The comic perspective, according to 




way out. Nietzsche (1883) supports this idea in his depiction of Zarathustra using 
laughter to liberate himself against the absurdity of life’s suffering: “Nietzsche’s 
higher men...will be joyful, dancing heroes who transcend the tragic stance; the lesson 
they offer is that facing a world without epistemological or ethical foundations, our 
highest and most authentic response is not pointless rebellion, but laughter” (Morreal, 
1990:132). In considering the absurdities of existence, Kant (1892) states:  
“In everything that is to excite a lively convulsive laugh there 
must be something absurd (in which the understanding, therefore, 
can find no satisfaction). Laughter is an affection arising from the 
sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing. This 
transformation, which is certainly not enjoyable to the 
understanding, yet indirectly gives it very active enjoyment for 
the moment. Therefore its cause must consist in the influence of 
the representation upon the body, and the reflex of this upon the 
mind”  
(in Morreall, 2009:11).  
Kant’s statement also implicates a paradox in our desire to constructively manage 
conflicts and contradictions. In other words, “we appear to seek out that which 
disturbs us at some level but which, through humour is transformed in such a way that 
anxiety is lessened and can be experienced as pleasure” (Lemma, 2000:40). 
The ‘relief theory’ can be attributed to Shaftesbury (1711), who referred to the 
relief afforded by humour: “The natural free spirits of ingenious men, if imprisoned or 
controlled, will find out other ways of motion to relieve themselves in their constraint; 
and whether it be in burlesque, mimicry or buffoonery, they will be glad at any rate to 
vent themselves, and be revenged upon their constrainers” (Morreall, 2009:16). 
However, Freud’s (1905) theory is referenced in, and appears to be the basis for, 
many publications on the topic. He initially formulated his conception of humour on 
the idea that the pleasure it produces allow the psyche to triumph over the 
impingements of repression or painful reality; the resultant laughter is an orgasmic 




unconscious process through which superfluous psychic energy is released. By this, 
he meant the energy that represses feelings (such as sex or hostility) rather than the 
energy of the repressed feelings themselves, arising “from an economy in the 
expenditure of affect” (1905:284).  
The relief afforded by humour can also be seen as a mechanism through which 
tension and emotional pressure are reduced (Stephenson, 1993; Erdman, 1994), and 
paradoxically to enable clients to access feelings of sadness and loss: “At certain 
times, laughter is more accessible than crying, and at times it is possible to feel how 
close hard laughter is to sobbing” (Pierce, 1985:70). Morreall’s (1983) theory that 
laughter, like crying, relieves built up energy can be likened to the catharsis of the 
Geek chorus in ancient plays. Thus, the potential satisfaction experienced in tragedies 
may not be from the grotesque or horrific content, but possibly from admiration for 
the hero and possibly even relief from boredom, but also maybe relief that it is not us 
who are the hero (MacHovec, 1991).  
Laughter has also been allied to the orgasm, as Lothane (2008a:186) states, 
“listening to a joke, whether sexual or hostile, is accompanied in the listener by a 
mounting tension, in itself pleasurable, leading to the climax of laughter upon the 
delivery of the punch line”. Mann (1991) purports that the release of repressed 
material also enables spontaneity: 
“In the genesis of a joke, a preconscious thought is given over for 
a moment to unconscious revision, enabling a partial, transient 
and involuntary release of some impulses or feelings ordinarily, 
or at least currently, repressed. The outcome is at once grasped by 
conscious perception. We experience a sudden release of 
intellectual tension, and then all at once the joke is there, ‘ready 
clothed in words’” 
(Christie, 1994:481). 
Considering the spontaneous nature in which humour can arise also implies a 




Barwick (2012:166) notes, humour is “both the promoter and the product of a 
flexibility of mind, of a capacity for spontaneity and playfulness, that is essential to 
creative living”. 
Many authors have used this creative nature of humour to highlight a sense of 
liberation or emotional freedom that arises from its use. Welsford (1935) in 
considering the history of fools and clowns, concluded that the fool had a function as 
the ‘creator of freedom’ by voicing truths that others refrained from contemplating: 
“The Fool is the primeval condition that churns and rumbles within us all as we seek 
to know and he represents the ground that assures us that we do not” (Janik, 1998:20). 
As Alvarez (1992:67) points out: “Pleasure should not be thought of as inferior to 
pain in its capacity to disturb, alert and enliven”. Baker (1993) provides further 
support for this notion arguing that humour potentiates vitality and optimism. 
With regards to the ‘superiority theory’, Hobbes (1651:36) can be seen to 
extend Plato’s original ideas that laughter was an expression of one’s superiority: 
“Sudden glory is the passion which maketh those grimaces called laughter”. This idea 
can also be seen in Freud (1905:122), where as well as being a release of psychic 
energy, humour is both borne of, and an outcome of, superiority:  
“By making our enemy small, inferior, despicable or comic, we 
achieve in a roundabout way the enjoyment of overcoming 
him…A joke will allow us to exploit something ridiculous in our 
enemy which we could not, on account of obstacles in the way, 
bring forward openly or consciously”. 
 
Ferenczi (1911) summarized Freud’s theory by stating that the humourist 
“rises above his own troubles...while the ordinary person abandons himself in sad 
emotion”. Freud (1927:63) revisited his theory and reconsidered the nature of the 




by humour triumphing over narcissism, “a victorious assertion to the ego’s 
invulnerability”.  
Poland (1990:199) comments on the developmental aspect of humour, which 
he likened to psychosexual development and the emergence of the maturity of object 
relationships, through a greater ability to appreciate the other, finitude and reality’s 
limits. Laughter is hence a means by which frustrations and disappointments are 
maturely acknowledged “with a humour in which bitterness is tamed but not denied” 
(Christie, 1994:485). Humour hence enables a capacity to deny painful reality, but 
also to deflate feelings of omnipotence (Bader, 1993) by providing a sense of power 
over uncomfortable or difficult situations (Ruxton, 1988) and mastering emotions 
(Goldin & Bordin, 1999; Lothane, 2008b).  
A number of psychoanalytic authors concur with these ideas, arguing that a 
‘mature’ sense of humour requires either ego strength, allowing one to rise above 
narcissism (Christie, 1994), or “sufficient skills of mastery for at least a partial taming 
of drive urgency...The quality is of acknowledgement and even acceptance of pain 
and loss without resignation to depressive hopelessness and hatred” (Poland, 1990:4).  
Lemma (2000:47) argues that a mature humour “conveys a willingness to share and 
be open about our vulnerabilities”. She contends that through humour we suspend 
emotional involvement and quotes Bergson who said that humour demands a 
“momentary anaesthesia of the heart” (Lemma, 2000:80). Pasquali (1986) suggests 
that under the pretext of ‘it’s only a joke’, an element of conflict within one’s nature 
is acknowledged. By so doing, inherent anxieties are transformed by humour to be 
more bearable, thus enabling the ability to confront and explain them. This can also 
be implicated as a means to manage self-worth and develop self-understanding 




The superiority one gains through humour can be extended to superiority over 
life events. For instance, Sartre (1938) and Bergson (1900) both link humour to 
subject and object, suggesting that laughter is a means by which the other is turned 
into an object, while in fact the humourist themselves are objects pretending to be 
subjects. Thereby when one laughs at themselves they are being traitors to 
themselves: “In Sartre’s view, humor has its purpose to save the spirit of seriousness. 
Ridicule denounces false seriousness in the name of true seriousness. Laughter is a 
panic reaction, he says, like shock, flight or terror, which blows the whistle on 
subhumans pretending to be human” (Morreall, 2009:132). This idea is supported by 
Stephenson (1993:175) who portrays humour as a means to gain control over fears by 
making light of situations in which people may otherwise be afraid that things are 
going ‘out of control’ or will be overwhelming. He claims that in its most extreme 
form, this sort of humour can take on a macabre tone, and states, “the word death has 
power in its meaning and its connotations. For many, it is a hard word even to say. 
However ‘how’ we say a word is often more important than the word itself. To say it 
within a humorous situation, or story, or joke, disarms it and renders it less 
‘powerful’”.  
Sartre’s view can be seen to lend support to Freud’s argument that humour 
enables an individual’s rejection of being “distressed by the provocations of reality” 
(1927:162). Phillips (1993:90) interpreted this as humour “rescuing our pleasure from 
the obstacles”, obstacles that are self-imposed, but also consist of the inhibited 
impulses created by the inescapable demands of society.  This feels to the author to be 
of particular pertinence when considering the nature of terminal illness, not least 
because of the large body of work in academia and popular culture that cites ‘gallows 




(2006a:560) claims, it “emphasizes the necessity to take pleasure in one’s 
circumstances to transcend the universal experiences of limitation, persecution, 
powerlessness, meaninglessness, and insignificance”. Lothane (2008a) points out a 
threefold purpose to jokes such as these: they allow an assertion of liberation from 
reality, provide a comic relief from the anxiety, and proclaim defiance against society.   
Barwick (2012:171) claims that this and other variants of the joke (e.g. in 
Bergmann, 1999) provide an irreverent omnipotence, that also suggests an element of 
choice, and bestow “some sense of self-respected dignity where otherwise there is 
only powerlessness, shame and humiliation”. In this way, humour propounds a 
temporary but illusory triumph over death. Similarly, Berlyne (1960) referring to 
those with terminal illnesses, notes that humour can contain a “healthy use of denial”, 
suggesting the ability to overlook fears of an uncertain future and Kisner (1994:149) 
states, “instead, this person with cancer would put his energies into doing what can be 
done to improve the situation. The ultimate goal of this use of denial is to preserve 
one’s intimate relationships, something which the inclusive form of humour can 
enhance”. 
Freud’s (1927) theory can also be seen to imply that humour as a means to 
transcend personal difficulties and become courageous. Thorson (1985:206) added to 
this that humour about death is an “offence mechanism”, a means by which one 
laughs in its face and gains control over the uncontrollable:  
“By making our own death unimportant, we make all death less 
important. This is a defence mechanism with teeth, and elevates 
humor to the level of two other areas of human endeavour, 
medicine and theology, that seek to have control over 
death…While it cannot deny the reality of death…it can deny the 
importance of the reality of death. Death personified with pie in 
its face has lost its power. Tomorrow we die, but at least for now 





Thorson (1985) claimed that rather than being a denial of death, this was an 
acceptance of the reality of death’s role in life. He added one additional element of 
death humour not found in Freud’s work, that of mocking others who have died or 
will die. He links this with the original idea of Greek wit in which those with unusual 
frailties were laughed at for not being like others, and where the dead were laughed at 
in celebration of those that were living, providing superiority in comparison.  
According to Barwick (2012:171):   
“an aspect of the empowerment the disempowered feel in 
utilising humour is often also derived from the diminishment, in 
their own minds at least, of the power of the oppressor. Although 
this is not entirely an unconscious maneouver, the manner in 
which primitive feelings – powerlessness, humiliation, shame – 
can be pushed, through humour, from oppressed onto and even 
into oppressor, suggests that projective processes are at work”. 
 
“Humour in such a situation insists that one is above the dangers that the external 
world can inflict, that even in extremities, one can use the situation to extract some 
pleasure” (Freud, 1927:162). Gallows humour hence allows the assertion and 
rebellion against “one’s helpless condition” (Lemma, 2000:85).  
3.4.1  Humour in psychological therapy 
The three humour theories, incongruity, relief and superiority, complement each other 
and illustrate how humour encourages one to access deeper feelings in addition to 
finding relief from pressure and mastery over the uncontrollable. It is now necessary, 
however, to consider what place these have in the psychological therapies.  
Literature (e.g. Bevis, 2012) reveals significant debate in determining a 
definitive definition of ‘therapeutic humour’, from Freud’s (1905:228) conception of 
humour as “a means of obtaining pleasure in spite of the distressing affects that 
interfere with it” to the Association for Applied and Therapeutic Humour’s official 




“any intervention that promotes health and wellness by 
stimulating a playful discovery, expression or appreciation of the 
absurdity or incongruity of life’s situation...[which] may enhance 
health or be used as a complementary treatment of illness to 
facilitate healing or coping, whether physical, emotional, 
cognitive, social or spiritual”  
(www.aath.org). 
 
Current research (e.g. Franzini, 2001) describes therapeutic humour as 
including a formal structured joke or riddle, a pointing out of absurdities, an 
unintended pun or spoonerism, behavioural or verbal parapraxes, examples of 
illogical reasoning, exaggerations to the extreme, statements of therapist self-
deprecation, repeating an amusing punch line, illustrations of universal human 
frailties, or comical observations of current social and environmental events. 
Typically, the result is shared by the therapist and the client, which could range 
anywhere from quiet empathic amusement to overt loud laughter, and overall, an 
emotional experience, mostly positive but also potentially negative.  
The relatively conspicuous sparseness of literature about humour in the field 
of psychological therapy could possibly be attributed to the complicated nature of 
researching the phenomenon (Baker, 1993; Lindenman, 1995; Lemma, 2000; 
Franzini, 2001; Lothane, 2008a). Of what does exist, the majority of papers are 
clinical anecdotes and subjective case examples (e.g. Haigh, 1986; Richman, 1996; 
Bader, 1993; Oritz, 2000), and are written from a variety of psychoanalytic 
perspectives (e.g. Mosak, 1987; Strean, 1994; Franzini, 2001), somewhat ironically 
due to the reputation of psychoanalysts to be serious, grave and sombre (Lemma, 
2000).  
Literature largely focuses on the implementation of humour and whether or 
not it should be used in psychotherapy, indicating potential benefits or pitfalls of its 




1979; Golan et al., 1988) depend on simulated or recorded sessions, which not only 
lack external validity (Oritz, 2000), but the contrived nature of the humour or 
therapeutic relationship portrayed may result in the humour being taken out of context 
and therefore seem insensitive or inappropriate (Lemma, 2000). As such, the literature 
review provided here will not rely heavily on quantitative data in its report of the use 
of humour in psychotherapy. Readers interested in such a discussion are encouraged 
to read Shaughnessy and Wadsworth (1992) and Saper (1987). 
The reported dearth of humour research could also be attributed to a lack of 
interest in the area, or, as some theorists (e.g. Baker, 1993; Lemma, 2000) have 
suggested, an anxiety about the fantasised reception of such research. Though it is 
acknowledged that humour is used in sessions, not many therapists seem to disclose 
their use of it openly in formal arenas. Pierce (1985:67) comments on his reluctance 
to share humorous moments with colleagues or students, as it felt “risky”: “Many 
humorous interchanges are particularly lively and personal, probably among the most 
personal moments shared in therapy. So while I don’t think most of us use humour in 
our therapy sessions, I think we use more than we let other people know”. 
Accordingly, Baker (1993) suggests that as therapists have a propensity to hear, 
respond to, and contain clients’ pain and suffering, they may feel more at ease with 
working with suffering than with pleasant and enjoyable content. He suggested that as 
a result, therapists might be dubious about the role of humour in sessions. This has 
been supported by Lemma (2000), who, in a pilot study researching psychoanalyst’s 
attitudes towards humour and laughter in psychotherapy, found that therapists were 
reluctant to openly discuss their use of humour due to possible disapprobation from 
colleagues due to feelings that humour was not useful or legitimate in psychoanalysis. 




“perhaps the use of humour in psychotherapy is generally thought to 
be best avoided due to a confusion between doing serious work and 
being serious. Serious work can be achieved without having to 
measure its seriousness through how many tears the patient has shed 
or how much anger or envy he has been able to express”  
(Lemma, 2000:5).  
 
The paucity of literature may thus both imply and compound the idea that “this is an 
area where analysts prefer privacy, as in other areas where they might attract criticism 
from their colleagues” (Baker, 1993:952).  
Of the literature that does exist, a plethora of writers have agreed with the 
notion that a client’s use of humour seems to: be an indication of a person’s being 
self-actualised (Maslow, 1954); help clients laugh at themselves, clarifying self-
defeating behaviours in a non-threatening way and puncturing grandiosity 
(MacHovec, 1991); aid personality integration (Mann, 1991); potentially diagnose the 
degree of progress they achieve in resolving many former and current life-stage 
developmental issues (Kisner, 1994); lead to improvements in the self-understanding 
and behaviour of clients (Franzini, 2001);  and provide a sense of authority of the 
client’s psychopathology and affective and cognitive development (Newirth, 2006b). 
Kisner (1994:149) reporting on group therapy noted that “those group members 
whose use of humor tend to include the leaders and others in a way that conveys a 
willingness to share the moment, have made peace with themselves which has 
enabled them to go on with their lives.” 
There is also a body of subsequent support for the usefulness of humour in 
enabling clients in therapy to: identify and express feelings (Pierce, 1985; Mann, 
1991), stimulating ‘unconscious metacommunication’ between therapist and patient 
(Bader, 1993); providing a ‘safe’ outlet in which ‘truths’ can be stated and emotions 
can be confronted (Stephenson, 1993); establishing a comfortable atmosphere by 




ambivalence, making intense, forceful and emotive interpretations more acceptable 
(Goldin & Bordin, 1999); breaking through resistance and helping the therapist to 
deal with difficult topics (Oritz, 2000); reaching the patient emotionally (Fabian, 
2002; Lothane, 2008b); and as a means of communicating painful insights within an 
affectively safe context (Newirth, 2006a).   
In relation to psychoanalysis, Klein (1961:243-4) suggested that the pain and 
distress aroused by the anxieties and conflicts explored are only tolerated because of 
the “longing for integration and insight”, including those anxieties in which the 
therapist is seen as a persecutory figure. She noted,  
“I have repeatedly observed that some patients – children and 
adults – also experience not only satisfaction but also amusement 
about some part of their mind, usually found to be bad or 
dishonest, being found out by the analyst and by themselves. In 
my experience these are people who have a sense of humour, and 
it occurs to me that one root of the sense of humour is the 
capacity to experience satisfaction about finding out in oneself 
something that has been repressed”.  
 
Christie (1994:485) assumed from this that the playfulness of humour allowed a 
momentary communication that enabled a contact with libidinal or destructive 
impulses and allowed a brief transformation of their hidden forces: “A creative thrust 
is released that can facilitate further ego-integration and broaden perspective and 
understanding”. 
Theorists have also connected feelings of surprise in instances of humour to 
the feeling of surprise in therapy. Reik (1913; 1936) for instance, likened humour to 
psychoanalytic insight, which he described as “the conformation of repressed 
expectation” (1933:325). He claimed that two responses followed. Firstly, the surprise 
of repressed material being brought to conscious awareness, and secondly, the release 
of affect (relief in analysis and laughter in wit): “The discovery is an exhilarating 




(Lothane, 2008b:233). O’Donovan (1985:62) commented that “this is where the Aha 
and HaHa feel alike, and make a difference that is alike...The insight may be 
unpleasant, but it still shares some physical dimensions with the act of laughter; there 
is a climactic moment similar to catching on to a punchline”. Further, Baker (1993) 
likened those clients that had fixed inhibitions and hence unable to experience 
surprise, to those who tend not to respond spontaneously to jokes and are equally 
unsurprised. 
Through the surprising and confrontational nature of humour, clients may be 
able to better recognise the absurdity, hilarity and enjoyability of life and hence 
discover new ways of looking at things (MacHovec, 1991; Goldin & Bordin, 1999). 
May (1953:53-54) described humour as being “the healthy way of feeling a ‘distance’ 
between one’s self and the problem, a way of standing off and looking at one’s 
problem with perspective”. In agreement, Pierce (1985) claimed that most therapists 
aim to facilitate their client's insight and humour can contribute to this diagnostically: 
assessing what the client finds funny can illuminate any potential conflict or defences, 
and can also be used as a means to gain perspective and move to a different level of 
experiencing. This is in keeping with Allport's (1955:56) view that humour is “a 
remarkable gift of perspective” that allows clients to recognise the “disproportions 
and absurdities…in encounters with the world”. Further, Bloomfield (1980:135) 
states, “humour is a direct expression of unconscious processes. It brings together 
opposites, highlights contradictions and shows up the absurdity of irreconcilable 
wishes. It is the paradox and the absurdity which makes us laugh”.  
O'Donovan (1985:62) also agrees that laughter is the physical manifestation of 
the realisation of a new perspective: “It is the joy of discovering that one’s story can 




support for functions of humour that relate to insight include the ideas that it helps 
clients experience their feelings in a different way (Pierce, 1985); demonstrates in a 
positive way how problems may become solvable (Fry & Salameh, 1987); transforms 
old dysfunctional thinking into paradoxical thinking through an objective distancing 
(MacHovec, 1991); develops new insight and learning (Mann, 1991; Christie, 1994; 
Franzini, 2001; Barwick, 2012); eases tension by allowing clients to view their 
problems in a different way (Erdman, 1994); highlights clients’ illogical or irrational 
thoughts by providing perspective (Sultanoff, 1994); creates distance and reflection 
upon, and hence relativises, pathology and illnesses (Fabian, 2002); and creates 
metaphors for transforming emotional experiences (Newirth, 2006a). 
Lemma (2000) further comments on how humour influences reason through 
facing incongruity with amusement, resulting in more objective and rational 
perspectives. Not only can humour provide a new perspective, but also the new 
perspective with its sudden and unexpected nature can itself be humorous: “The 
biggest joke I shall ever experience is me. And once I am liberated from attachment to 
my ego and can see myself with humor, the humor in all experience comes easily” 
(Morreall, 2009:137).  
Grotjahn (1971:238) claims that the therapist depicting humour gives an 
example of emotional freedom: “laughter in therapy is as welcome as any other sign 
of spontaneity, strength, mastery and freedom”. Lemma (2000:81) states that by 
broadening and enhancing the complexity and flexibility of one’s thinking, humour 
frees people from, for example, conformity, seriousness, reason and language, which 
in turn has implications for the role of humour in psychotherapy: “If humour 
encourages a loosening of the shackles of logical thought, it is in keeping with the aim 




Barwick (2012) points out that psychoanalytic theory suggests that life’s 
difficulties, such as losses, frustrations and disillusionments, promote development by 
awakening people to the impingements of reality and challenging us to develop the 
capacity to manage better. In keeping, Christie (1994:485) draws on Searles’ (1965) 
assertions, claiming that “humour is one of the great avenues by which 
disillusionment is sublimated in human development, and its appearance during 
therapy is one of the signs that patient and therapist have begun to master and 
integrate the disillusionment in their relationship”. 
MacHovec (1991:25) suggests that psychotherapy enables the individual to 
search for a truth of one’s self, others and life situations. Humour, he says, takes away 
the threatening and painful nature of some truths, or as Kayser (in Simon, 1990) 
states, “reality…is destroyed by humor…The laughter which humor evokes is not 
detached but contains a certain measure of pain”. Newirth (2006b) concurs, arguing 
that the core of humour and jokes consists of an acknowledgement of pleasure and 
acceptance of the unacceptable parts of us, which ultimately lead to psychotherapeutic 
transformation. This is in keeping with Lacan (in Dor, 1998) who viewed jokes as 
formed by combinations of metaphor, metonymy, condensation and displacement in 
order to assist addressing the limitations of the real. Such conceptualisations illustrate 
humour to have a somewhat nurturing or reassuring role, by conveying the idea that 
‘all is well’ (Kris, 1938; Leech, 1968).  
Poland (1990:198) further comments on how it is only once conflicts are 
analysed that clients are able to laugh at themselves and humorously appreciate irony 
and reflect on themselves: 
“It is a capacity for sympathetic laughter at oneself and one’s 
place in the world. Humor of this sort does not imply pleasure in 
pain but reflects a regard of oneself and one’s limits despite pain. 




is, and ease in being amused even if bemused...Such humor, often 
linked to an appreciation of irony, requires a self-respecting 
modesty based on underlying self-strength and simultaneous 
recognition of and regard for others”. 
 
In considering the analyst's use of humour, Rose (1969:928) refers to the Fool 
in Shakespeare’s ‘King Lear’, suggesting that it was through absurdity, caricature or 
“humor that, like some love, touches the truth lightly to avert madness” that enabled 
the analyst to reach those with ‘weak egos’. Bader (1993) research with patients 
diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder found that humour furthered the 
therapeutic work by temporarily reversing and providing a distance between the 
patient and the subject matter or object. Bader’s study can further be used as an 
illustration of how the therapeutic process can be facilitated: humour became a means 
through which the analyst conveyed information about their own mental state and 
attitude toward the patient which disconfirmed inhibiting expectations and thus 
increased the patient’s ability to be self-reflective and to face painful affects.  
In concordance, Mann (1991:166-167) reports on how his use of humour 
dispelled tension and allowed the client to explore what they might previously have 
bypassed, thus making “the seemingly impossible become surmountable”. Mann used 
group experiences, in which humour allowed members to express intimate thoughts 
by reducing anxiety, to conclude that humour indicated an evolution of transference in 
reaching new points of development and meeting resistances.  Kisner (1994:142) also 
uses anecdotal evidence to show how “we could laugh…together, which helped [the 
client] to begin to differentiate between some of her own uses and abuses of humor. I 
learned a great deal about this topic myself from her and used this information to 
reflect on my own uses and abuses of humor in therapy with her and with other 




and a client “by displacement…were able to discuss the fears of losing precious 
belongings for which she’d worked so hard, the lack of choice and control about this 
happening to her and the anger she felt about the lack of caring and support that ‘they’ 
showed to her while taking from her” (1994:148), illustrating how humour can be 
used as a device to maintain focus on the topic at hand in order to resolve it. Other 
ways in which writers have supported the use of humour in deepening analysis 
include allowing the therapist to open up and thus better connect with patients (Oritz, 
2000) and introducing the possibility of pleasure within an intense, intimate moment 
which allows for the transformation of unacceptable aspects of both patient and 
analyst as they become joined within a broader human experience (Newirth, 2006b). 
Existing research has highlighted the following ways in which humour can 
help deal with strong emotions: by enabling a detachment from traumatic thoughts 
and feelings (Kuhlman, 1994); as a source of ‘narcissistic gratification’, aiding 
recovery from the experience of shame, as a way of helping people get to feelings of 
disappointment or anger, and to help the client ‘lighten up’, particularly at the end of a 
session (Pierce, 1985); assisting the client to build self-confidence and self-esteem 
and thereby freeing the client from the erosive effects of stress, fear, guilt and anger 
(MacHovec, 1991); increasing psychological growth and a capacity to tolerate and 
analyse feelings and fantasies that have been warded off or compulsively enacted 
(Bader, 1993); as a ‘healthier’ way to deal with death-denial and to cope with 
unpleasant realties (Stephenson, 1993); to ease the mind, to cope with changes in 
clients’ lives or with the fear of the unknown, to ‘catch their breath’, to deal with 
tragedies, and as a defence mechanism that provides an outlet for escaping from 
negative feelings such as anger (Erdman,1994); to overcome anxiety when the ego is 




anxieties (Oritz, 2000); a way of reducing stress (Franzini, 2001); and to integrate 
conscious and unconscious, concrete and symbolic levels as well as emotions such as 
joy and suffering (Fabian, 2002). Poignantly, Barwick (2012:173) cites Thurber: 
“Humour is emotional chaos recollected in tranquillity.” 
What can be seen here is an overwhelming support for humour’s role in 
psychotherapy, however some have also demonstrated its more negative side. Fry and 
Salameh (1987), for instance have charted the contrasted characteristics of helpful and 
harmful humour in therapy. Further, Sultanoff (1994:34) depicted healthy humour as 
“that which brings people together, reduces stress, provides perspective, and feels 
good” and compared it to harmful humour, “which alienates others, increases hostility 
and ultimately feels bad”. Franzini (2001) points out that humour aimed at oneself is 
more likely to be healthy than that aimed at others, and acknowledged the importance 
of environmental conditions such as the nature of the relationship, timing and 
delivery.  
There are further examples in literature of destructive humour, including 
sarcasm, obscenity, cynicism and irony, which convey destructive aggression, and can 
be hurtful and insulting, particularly when deriding those with physical or psychical 
problems (Reik, 1936; Christie, 1994; Fabian, 2002). There is agreement that such 
humour should be kept out of therapy (Salameh, 1983) as those that have been 
exposed to sarcasm or mockery in childhood could possibly be oversensitive to such 
jokes (Fabian, 2002).  
Freud (1905:229) depicted humour as a displacement and deflection, “the 
highest of...defensive functions”. Whilst humour can provide a sense of safety by re-
routing strong emotions, Pierce (1985:68) describes a scenario in which humour 




maintained that “interrupting that defence allowed her to experience her underlying 
sadness”.  
Kisner (1994:142) provides an illustration of how one of her cancer patients 
used sarcastic and defensive humour to her detriment:  
“she would often use it as a way to make others comfortable with 
her cancer, which also made her angry as it tended to make her 
feel more isolated in the manner in which she’d use it. This use of 
humor – to keep people at a distance - was a problem that actually 
predated her diagnosis of cancer and was partly responsible for 
her failure to establish a satisfying intimate relationship”.  
 
Barwick (2012) uses the term ‘deflective’ humour to describe that which 
distracted an individual away from negative feelings rather than transformed them. He 
argues that this kind of humour can lead to desensitisation, or carelessness, regarding 
one’s self and others. Mann (1991:164-165) also describes how a defensive use of 
humour disguised painful feelings for his client: “for her, the jokes inhibited insight 
and kept away the deeper feelings and understanding, but they also helped her 
function and keep some semblance of a normal life.” He reports a danger in humour’s 
propensity to provide a ‘false train’ away from anxiety or tensions, and provides a 
further anecdote in which, “the humour had not only disguised the real anxiety, but, 
like a good decoy, had successfully allowed him to distract himself, and me with him, 
from the issue he felt to be dangerous. In this instance the contagiousness of humour 
led to unproductive avoidance in the therapy”. Mann goes on to suggest that humour 
potentially obscures aggressive attacks, and in defence against anxiety, the client may 
ridicule their symptoms thereby evading the acceptance of help. Caution is also 
advised for those instances where the client feels obliged to laugh at therapist’s jokes, 
particularly when the client perceives the therapist to be making light of the client, 
and when the therapist is using humour as a form of self-exhibitionism, or as Kubie 




There appears to be controversy in literature regarding the use of humour in 
psychotherapy. Some writers are clearly supportive of its potential, whereas others 
warn against its dangers (Oritz, 2000). Even in those instances where the therapeutic 
humour is accepted (Grotjahn, 1957; Pasquali, 1986; Poland, 1990; Baker, 1993; 
Christie, 1994; Frings, 1996), there is still debate surrounding what kind of humour 
should be used, when, and how (Fabian, 2002): “Any clinical technique or medication 
that is powerful enough to be helpful is powerful enough to do harm. Humour again is 
no exception” (Franzini, 2001:184). 
In exploring therapists’ attitudes toward the use of humour in psychotherapy, 
Block and McNab (1987, in Mann, 1991), found that therapists fell into either a 
strongly positive or strongly negative position with little middle ground. Mann (1991) 
concluded from this, the need for a flexible approach, with an understanding that 
humour has a place for some clients in therapy and not for others, and will also serve 
varying functions. 
MacHovec (1991:29) suggested that: 
 “the diagnostic test of effectiveness is whether or not it facilitates a 
healthy, positive response, whether it is therapeutic. Minimally, the 
effect should be a chuckle or a laugh. Optimally it should reflect 
some aspect of insight or therapeutic gain such as helping to develop 
the ability to laugh at one’s self, adapt or adjust to the life situation, 
or soften harsh reality”. 
 
The only author that is strongly against the use of humour in therapy is Kubie 
(1971) in which using humour in therapy is essentially forbidden. He highlights the 
aggression that humour is charged with, and claimed that even laughter is a means by 
which the patient seduces the therapist and subverts treatment. Humour, he maintains, 
reinforces defensiveness in both therapist and client and elevates the therapist’s 
narcissism: “Humor has its place in life. Let us keep it there by acknowledging that 




response, Poland (1990) argues that this warning should not lead to the conclusion 
that all humour is wrong, and reminds us that the fool in Shakespeare’s King Lear is 
the only one who is able to say to Lear what he could not hear from anyone else. 
 
3.5  Comedy, tragedy, humour and terminal illness in psychological 
therapy 
 
Lacan (in Zupančič, 2003:174) states that “tragedy is in the forefront of our 
experiences as analysts”, but there are also certain commonalities between therapists 
and comedians. The jokes, anecdotes, sketches and observations that comedians use, 
not only provide a particular kind of relief, but also facilitate a new way of looking at 
ourselves, events around us and other people, by confronting us with contradictions 
and incongruities. The same could be said of therapists. Whilst the therapist's role is 
not necessarily to entertain or amuse clients in the same way as the comedian, through 
their respective fields both encourage a certain re-examining, both rely on timing (the 
joke versus the psychoanalytic interpretation), and both find inspiration in what is 
flawed, lacking or painful. 
Pierce (1985) argues that humour in psychotherapy assists clients to attain a 
sense of mastery over reality's impingements, which enables them to further extend 
this mastery to other arenas in their life which feel uncontrollable. This also has an 
effect in equalising the therapeutic relationship. Fabian (2002:407) for instance states 
that: 
“Jokes may convey the point of a therapeutic conflict and relieve 
the transferrential tension by introducing a relativizing moment, 
enhancing the reality principle – just as do well-placed anecdotes, 
stories or fairy tales...Humour strengthens the contact bridge to 
and the confidence in the therapist, that is, it strengthens the 
reality aspect of the therapeutic relationship, beyond transference, 





This is in agreement with Poland (1971) who, reporting on his own spontaneous use 
of humour, found that rather than derailing the therapeutic alliance, it reflected and 
strengthened the analytic work. There are a number of authors that concur with the 
notion that humour facilitates a greater recognition of the intimate relationship 
between therapist and client, enabling the client to see the therapist is not immobilised 
by the client’s defences, and by becoming a marker of shared enjoyment within the 
alliance, establishing rapport (e.g. Pierce, 1985; O’Donovan, 1985; Mann, 1991; 
Bader, 1993; Goldin & Bordin, 1999; Oritz, 2000; Franzini, 2001).  Newirth 
(2006a:566) refers to this as a process of ‘symmetrising’ the relationship:  
“a merging or dedifferentiation of the unconscious experiences of 
both analyst and patient that results in a pleasurable moment of 
mutual identification, a diminution of the asymmetry of the roles 
of analyst and patient, and a symbol of the unconscious meanings 
of the transference-countertransference fantasy into the analytic 
dialogue”. 
 
He claims that even in instances where this symmetrisation fails, there is the 
opportunity for “reparation and greater mutual understanding and connection”. 
There is, however, noticeably little research exploring the relationship 
between humour, terminal illness and psychological therapy. That which does exist 
purports that humour is used to counteract the negative impact of death and dying, 
“we use humor because we see a situation that is so far beyond our control that there 
is little we can do but laugh” (Stephenson, 1993:173). The most notable work in the 
field of humour and terminal illness has been carried out by Allen Klein (e.g. 1989, 
1998), self-confessed ‘Mr. Jollytologist®’ who travels around America giving 
keynote speeches and workshops on therapeutic humour. His work started when his 
wife was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer and died aged 34. He said that telling 
jokes and stories lifted not only his wife’s spirits, but everyone else’s, including his 




from dark times, release of pent-up emotions, a change in the course of a situation, a 
vehicle that allows a view outside of immediate problems, a way to gain power over 
losses, encouragement in the face of setbacks, as well as a reduction of denial and 
anger. In these ways, he argues that humour ultimately decreases the negative impact 
of life events, providing a moment of respite and helping intolerable situations 
become more tolerable, for both patients and those around them.  
Thorson (1985) and Kisner (1994) both refer to their experiences of humour in 
group therapy sessions. Thorson described humour as functioning as a lubricant to 
displace grief, distract others from its grim realities and minimise death’s impact on 
other group members. Kisner draws attention to clients who were angry at society as a 
result of their diagnosis, and hence felt detached from others, using sarcastic humour 
that excluded group facilitators. According to Kisner, the ‘us-them’ split this implies 
suggested that their humour represents how separate their cancer makes them feel 
from the rest of society:  
“because of [the client’s] tendency to feel victimised by anyone 
without a diagnosis of cancer, the group leaders were exclude by 
his bits of caustic humor. I chose not to attempt to make a 
humorous response because of the likelihood that he would 
misunderstand it and feel further distanced from me…Another 
example of humor from M., an angry group member, seemed 
more like an attempt to include everyone in the group, inclusive 
of the leaders into an experience that all could share. I could 
respond with a humorous abstraction that made reference to a 
person’s attempts to find the right way to do something”  
(Kisner, 1994:149-150). 
Literature has also referred to humour’s potential as a coping mechanism to 
help professionals and caregivers deal with the intensity of feelings associated with 
terminal illness, such as for stress reduction and preventing burnout (Fry and 




1994), and as a means to allow others to confront arising existential issues and the 
concurrent intensity of feelings by providing a more balanced outlook:  
“To devote one’s career to the care of persons with cancer, which 
brings up some complex emotional and medical treatment issues, is 
often overwhelming. In addition, the frequency of being faced with 
watching patients whose death is painful raises a variety of 
universal (existential) concerns around the caregivers’ own 
morality, sense of helplessness, and purpose in their professional 
lives. Humor…has become an essential part of the healing process 




3.6  Conclusion 
In considering the opening question to this chapter, what has been uncovered here 
reveals a plethora of disparate research into each of these individual elements, as well 
the relationship between any two of them: humour and terminal illness; terminal 
illness and psychological therapy; and, humour and psychological therapy. However, 
what appears to be missing is what emerges when all three elements appear together, 
which, although anecdotally present, is significantly absent from empirical research. 
The relationship between tragedy and comedy as explored through the 
literature presented here strongly highlights the human predisposition to combat 
tragedy through comedy. However today, we do not live in a world of Gods and 
Kings and so the word ‘tragedy’ is rarely used for something that is actually ‘tragic’ 
as it was originally defined. It has become a word that is overused and often misused 
and it is heard of or read it in newspapers almost daily. There is a possibility that this 
study is guilty of doing the same in using the word ‘tragic’ in reference to terminal 
illness, which is something to be borne in mind. Having this awareness will hopefully 
discourage the propensity to fall into the common perception that Lemma (2000:43) 




“A painful psychotherapy session is one worth paying for. If we 
laugh we harbour, both as patient and as therapist, the secret 
concern that no ‘work’ has been achieved. Bound by the belief 
that the road to greater insight is earned through cathartic 
expression of our emotional pain, humour is all too often 
dismissed as of little therapeutic import”.  
 
Considering the ‘tragic’ then, death, “the one destruction that is certain, 
universal, unexceptional, the one Absolute that suffuses finite existence” (Eckardt, 
1996:10), could be seen, in keeping with Nietzsche, as the final incongruity of life. 
Since comedy deals with the incongruous, death may be also studied from this point 
of view. Changes in attitudes towards death are seen throughout history and their 
effects upon society, different professional groups, individuals and their families can 
be demonstrated. The image of a ‘natural’ death in old age after years of good health 
is a recent ideal. Reck (1977:317-318) contends that dying provides the possibility of 
growth, both for the dying and the surviving people around them. “A basic value in 
life”, he states, “is growth, and growth is possible for the dying no less than for the 
nondying. Worse than dying is that death in life, which so many of the nondying, 
closed to growth, live”.  
Similarly, although humorous responses sometimes represent an attempt at 
denial, this is not always the case, and at times a temporary degree of denial may be 
adaptive  “by conceptually resolving the incongruity in its capacity to tolerate the pain 
without extolling it and retaining the sense of selfhood in a world of pain and 
ambiguity” (Lemma, 2000:43). As Schelesinger (1979) points out, a tragic response 
could also be said to involve denial of impotence by conferring an illusory sense of 
self-importance by viewing defeat as somehow lending meaning to the conflict.  
This literature review reveals that there has been an increasing volume of 
work that is largely evaluative and attempts to justify humour’s role and potential in 




implementation of humour appearing as ‘how-to guides’ indicating how it should or 
should not be used, or whether or not humour should be used in psychotherapy 
indicating potential therapeutic benefits or caveats associated with its applications 
(Franzini, 2001). Cutting across the varied conceptualisations of humour reviewed in 
this chapter is the positive value of humour and the belief in humour’s healing ability 
has lead to a growth of ‘laughter clubs’, laughter therapy and clowning, where clowns 
visit hospitals and hospices to cheer people up (Killeen, 1991). Humour, used 
judiciously, and for the benefit of the patient and not the therapist’s own self-
aggrandisement, has been depicted as a powerful, yet subtle, form of communication 
which may ease the difficult exchanges that take place with a terminal diagnosis 
(Warner, 1991; van Wormer and Boes, 1997; Du Pré, 1998). It has been shown to 
contribute to the healthy functioning of society and a critical tool that aids learning 
and possibly promotes individual and social change. However, if it is so central to 
cognitive, emotional or social adaptation, the ‘critical’ role it plays in our lives must 
also be looked at, particularly the role and potential it has in the context of the 
therapeutic relationship. There has also been literature that has addressed the negative 
side of humour as an intervention that lacks sympathy or is insulting.  Oritz (2000) 
however, reports that the findings of humour research are difficult to condense into an 
unequivocal recommendation.  
There has been little research regarding humour in terminal illness, however 
(Killeen, 1991). Klein (1989) is one of the few authors to examine humour and the 
dying process. Joking about death and the ambiguity surrounding death diminishes 
the mystery and decreases the fear, oppression, anxiety, and threatening nature of 
death. Humour also makes it easier to bear the unbearable: “Humor may not alter the 




death is neither intrinsically sad nor funny, however, the period of time leading up to 
death is stressful and communication can be difficult. At times such as this, it is easy 
to lose sight of the benefits of humour in lightening interactions and providing stress 
relief. Klein points out that laughing at death provides a triple pleasure: “the pleasure 
of the joke itself, the malicious joy of laughing at death’s expense, and the pleasure of 
taming Death and fraternizing with him” (1989:188).  
Making fun of death, and specifically one’s own death, helps one face death 
by accepting the insignificance of life, while diminishing the awesomeness of death 
(Thorson, 1993). Thorson (1993) shows that such a displacement often can be seen in 
humour at another’s expense, and so humour about death may be used as a hostile 
attack on death. For those living with a terminal illness, it can also provide balance:  a 
way of focusing on the problems experienced when living with cancer and diverting 
attention away from issues of mortality, aloneness and worry (Buckman, 1994). In 
accordance, Gruner (1997) purports that joking about death offers superiority over 
death, which, while transitory, can lessen the fear of the inevitable; and Paskoff 
(1998), examining terror and comedy, states that by turning the terror of death into 
comedy, one can confront and conquer death symbolically, if temporarily.   
While humour can be useful in dealing with the pain, anxiety and inevitability 
of death, caution is advised. Humour and death are often seen as mutually exclusive 
experiences, and laughing at death can be seen as in bad taste (Klein, 1986), or 
uncaring (Thorson, 1993). Discomfort or confusion can result from a forced attempt 
to look at the “badness” of death in a “good” way through joking or humour (Mager 
& Cabe, 1990). Further, given the nature of terminal illness, there are good days and 
bad days; days when humour is essential and days when it is intrusive (Klein, 1989). 




The domination of psychoanalysis in the fields of both humour and terminal 
illness is noteworthy, and calls for a need to strengthen, develop and enrich the 
exploration of these phenomena in therapy without any set theoretical position. By 
qualitatively exploring therapists’ experience of humour as it arises in sessions with 
clients diagnosed with terminal illness, this research will hopefully contribute to the 
existing literature on comedy and tragedy in relation to psychological therapy and 
counselling, as well as humour and death. In doing so, it will hopefully address a 
broader question of how lived experience is researched, with wider implications for 








Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
“What we choose, we value simply because we have chosen it (and apparently we 
remain scot-free at any moment to nonvalue it by simply un-choosing it)” 
      - Polanyi (1975:2) 
4.1  Introduction 
Existing literature on humour has focused on theories that attempt to explain it, 
producing almost manualised guidelines of its processes, and has highlighted great 
debate in its effectiveness. Very little research however has sufficiently explored 
psychological therapists’ experience of humour, particularly in sessions with clients 
diagnosed with terminal illnesses. As such, the aim of this study is to explore 
therapists’ subjective and lived experiences of their own and their terminally ill 
clients’ humour as it arises in sessions to address the overarching research question: 
“How do psychological therapists experience humour in sessions with terminally ill 
clients?”.  
The close relationship between methodology and philosophy has been 
explored by Carr (2006:422): “methodology cannot be derived from research but 
instead has to be grounded in that form of a priori theoretical knowledge usually 
referred to as ‘philosophy’”. With this in mind, two key positions need to be borne in 
mind: the epistemological, which refers to the knowledge pursued through this 
research; and the ontological, which regards the philosophical notions of being, 
existence and reality. This chapter therefore considers theory, philosophy and 
methodology to explore how most effectively, if possible at all, to research 
experiences of humour and their relation to terminal illness in the therapeutic 
encounter. Specifically, it examines a variety of ways to collect and analyse research 




the phenomena in relation to the concepts of humour and terminal illness explored in 
the previous chapter.  
The implications of researching humour were briefly discussed in Chapter 2, 
which alongside the Literature Review (Chapter 3), raised primarily three core aspects 
that are important to consider in choosing a suitable method for the research question: 
1. The method should, as accurately as possible, capture a rich enough 
description of therapists’ experiences.  
2. The method ought to allow for the contextual nature of humour, including the 
context of society, temporal context, and also the context of the individual 
and the relationship – that is, the relationship between humour and terminal 
illness, the relationship between therapist and client, but also the relationship 
between researcher and researched. This last point is particularly important 
because it felt pertinent to acknowledge the researcher as part of the research 
- especially given personal experiences of being a therapist experiencing 
humour with terminally ill clients – but also a method that would 
acknowledge this without pulling the research in a way that bolstered the 
researcher’s views over those of the participants.  
3. The method should maintain as much of the vitality of humour, spontaneity 
and playfulness of humour as possible.   
The approaches considered below for the suitability of this particular research, and to 
ascertain the extent to which they meet these three considerations, include 
quantitative research methods; interpretative phenomenological analysis (Smith, 




(Moustakas, 1990) and narrative analysis (Labov, 1972; Ricoeur, 1984; Bruner, 
1991). 
4.2  Quantitative research methods 
In considering the aims of this research, it is necessary to ascertain whether a 
quantitative or qualitative method would be most suitable, and to consider the 
ontological differences that these two methods offer in terms of how the individual or 
self is understood and constructed. Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest that in order to 
do this effectively, an exploration of the distinctions between positivism, the 
philosophy underpinning quantitative, scientific approaches, and interpretivism, its 
alternative, is worthy.   
Positivist researchers work from a perceivably dualistic ontology in which 
reality, or the phenomena being considered, is distinct from and external to the 
subject, or researcher. Statistical and mathematical techniques are adopted to provide 
a scientific and definitive testing of hypotheses, in keeping with a nomothetic 
epistemology that portrays knowledge as objective and measurable to determine 
external realties and hence provide context-free and universal explications (see for 
example Carson et al., 2001). As Skedi (2005) points out, the positivist discourse of 
consistency and non-contradiction establishes structured categories, identifies causes, 
collects facts and manipulates variables in controlled conditions to establish verifiable 
‘truths’ in methods that are well defined, routinized, and ultimately, replicable.  
Interpretivism on the other hand, adheres to an idiographic epistemology that 
purports ‘truths’ to be relative, and reality and knowledge to be intersubjective and 
contextual, with an underlying belief that social action has meaning. Researchers use 
qualitative methods to interpret phenomena and maintain an awareness of reciprocal 




objects. The interpretive epistemological position hence calls researchers to 
acknowledge the lived experience of themselves and of the research participants, and 
as purported by Guba and Lincoln (1994), not to base knowledge on measurable 
phenomena or observable experiences, but on beliefs, values, reasons and 
understandings.  
In determining a suitable method, this research has to acknowledge that both 
positivism and interpretivism seek to enhance our shared understanding of the world. 
Whilst both appreciate the role of bias in the research, the quantitative methods drawn 
from the positivist paradigm appear to stand alone from those that are more 
interpretive, where the former quantifies experience (De Castro, 2003) and the latter 
explores it and acknowledges the existence of ‘multiple realities’ (see for example, 
Kvale, 1996; Voce, 2004). Quantitative research therefore, is arguably reductionist in 
that it appears to summarise descriptions for a group of people by closing down or 
distorting phenomena through measurement and quantification rather than being open 
to participants’ rich descriptions of their lived experiences. It was felt that research 
grounded on positivism, with the assumption that reality is easily accessible and 
therefore graspable, would run the risk of abstracting the experience of humour and 
terminal illness. Positivistic research could potentially be derivative and narrowing, if 
not closing down completely, possibilities through pre-established categories and pre-
defined criteria to measure participants’ experiences, with no space for inconsistency 
or uncertainty in responses. However, from the Literature Review chapter, it is 
possible to see that it is the very inconsistencies of perspective, language and action 
that was found to be an essence of humour, as purported, for example, by those 




Interpretivism’s acknowledgement of a dynamic, complex and relational 
reality appears to lend itself well to the current understanding of humour, not as 
something that can be empirically measured and validated, but something more 
transient, spontaneous, contextual and intersubjective. Therefore, in staying open to 
exploration and possibility, a qualitative method was deemed the most applicable to 
that aspect of humour which may be lost in the speaking of it, to the uncertainty that 
an experience of humour which may never fully be uncovered, and importantly, to the 
acknowledgement of the phenomena as an individual yet dialogic experience that may 
not be easily generalised.  
A further consideration of a suitable method regards its aim to unearth general, 
or ‘nomothetic’ aspects of phenomena, compared to more particular or ‘idiographic’ 
essences. In qualitative research, nomothetic methods are likely to disregard the more 
specific or particular details that research would uncover in favour of more 
generalised, whilst eidetic, understandings of participants as a group to effectively 
“come up with a typical essence” (Giorgi, 2008:37). Considering the epistemological 
underpinnings of this particular research, it was felt that a method that explored both 
the individualised experiences of humour and terminal illness, as well as the 
relationship between this and the more general contextual notions of these 
phenomena, would be most suitable. Here, Finlay’s (2009:10) explanation of 
Halling’s (2008) middle ground is worthy of mention: researchers can be focused on 
both the particular and the general by “moving back and forth between experience and 
abstraction” by first examining particular experience, then assessing common themes, 
before looking at the larger philosophical and universal implications. 
Finally, the Literature Review showed that researching humour is challenging 




given to the nature of knowledge, namely the differences between tacit and explicit 
knowing and how this might implicate researching such an experience as humour. 
Polanyi (1958) first indicated that tacit knowledge refers to that which we know but 
cannot explain symbolically through text or language, or as he states, we “know more 
than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1967:18). Whereas explicit knowledge is relatively 
objective, easily transferred and can be deduced logically, tacit knowledge is argued 
to be intuitive and consisted of values, beliefs, ideals and experiences, and therefore 
difficult to articulate and share. This description of knowledge fits well with the 
description of humour in Chapter 3, as being something that is difficult to verbalise 
(e.g. Lemma, 2000). The requirement for a method that effectively addressed the tacit 
dimension of an experience gave further credence to the choice of a qualitative 
methodology that captured a rich description of participants’ lived experiences. 
Hence, a qualitative method, overall, better suits the three core considerations of 
finding a suitable method: the ability to establish a rich description of experiences, 
flexibility, and the acknowledgment of contextuality and relationship.  
4.3  Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) 
With the intention of this research being first and foremost the exploration of 
therapists’ experiences of humour in sessions with terminally ill clients, and the 
appropriateness of a qualitative method, it was felt that phenomenology would be a 
suitable starting point. The aim of phenomenology is to ascertain the meaning and 
essence of experiences through the researcher's work in capturing, understanding and 
reporting participants’ own individual construction and shared understanding of 
reality and worldview (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998; McLeod, 2001), “how they perceive 
it, describe it, feel about it, judge it, remember it, make sense of it and talk about it 




 Using qualitative methods, phenomenological researchers gather descriptive, in-
depth and embodied descriptions of phenomena as it is concretely experienced: 
“Phenomenology is a low-hovering, in-dwelling, meditative philosophy that glories in 
the concreteness of person-world relations and accords lived experience, with all its 
indeterminacy and ambiguity, primacy over the known” (Wertz, 2005:175).   
 Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) informed by phenomenology, 
hermeneutics and idiography is a systematic, qualitative analysis that aims to explore 
the essence of individuals’ conscious experiences of phenomena (Smith et al., 2009). 
Rather than speculating on causes of experiences, IPA aims to describe it as 
interpreted by both participant and researcher. In analysing data, the researcher is 
encouraged to suspend their own preconceptions to allow for a fuller focusing on the 
participant’s experience, and works from a ‘bottom-up’ stance in which codes are 
generated from the data rather than being based on pre-existing theories that are 
applied to the data. Emergent codes are formed into themes and then superordinate 
themes that consist of recurring patterns of meaning, and in the researcher’s attempt 
to explore the meaning of participants’ exploration of meaning of the given 
phenomena, a ‘double hermeneutic’ is created.  
 In responding to Husserl’s call for researchers to “go back to the things 
themselves” (Smith et al., 2009:1), IPA initially appealed as a potential method with 
which to explore the experiences of humour and terminal illness; it was considered to 
have clear guidelines coupled with a solid methodological grounding, which informs 
both the quality of interviews as well as the sensitivity and depth of analysis. IPA 
therefore clearly meets the requirement for the method to capture data that would be 




nature of humour to emerge. To what extent then does it acknowledge the relationship 
between researcher and participant? 
 Finlay (2009) indicates that a key element of IPA is for the researcher to set aside 
external frameworks and preconceptions about the trueness of a phenomenon. 
However, whilst the implications of researcher subjectivity are acknowledged, as is 
phenomenology’s characteristic realisation of the intersubjective relationship between 
researcher and researched, there is debate surrounding the extent to which researcher 
subjectivity can and should be deployed in research (Finlay, 2009). Consideration of 
the notion of epoché, or bracketing, and subjectivity is crucial for this study, 
particularly due to the researcher’s personal experiences of providing therapy to 
terminally ill clients.  
 Some researchers (e.g. Ashworth, 2007) uphold the view that they should 
maintain neutrality through an attitude of epoché. Here, researchers build awareness, 
identification and set aside presuppositions of previously established theories or 
explanations, participants' claims of truth or falsity, and the researcher’s personal 
views and experiences, all of which potentially obscure descriptions of the 
phenomenon. Giorgi (1994) posits that in this way, the researcher is more able to look 
at the data with relative openness and “is prepared to admit and deal with 
imperfections in a phenomenologically messy and methodologically imperfect world, 
but still believes that objectivity is worth striving for” (Patton, 2002:93).  
 In line with Halling et al. (2006) however, it is argued here that it is not possible 
or even desirable to set-aside or bracket researchers' experience and understandings. 
Indeed, Finlay (2009:17) suggests that researchers ought to place a “critical self-
awareness of their own subjectivity and how these might impact the research process 




to the researched (Gadamer, 1975).  In this way, the research becomes dialectic and 
intersubjective – just as humour and psychotherapy are – or as Finlay (2003:108) 
writes, “a process of continually reflecting upon our interpretations of both our 
experience and the phenomena being studied so as to move beyond the partiality of 
our previous understandings”. The key to reducing a preoccupation of the researcher’s 
own emotion and experience, which could pull the research in a direction which 
bolsters the researcher over the researched, lies possibly in embracing the 
intersubjectivity in a fundamentally relational approach which maintains a “reciprocal 
insertion and intertwining of one another” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:138). Data collected 
in this way would therefore be more co-created. Critically, the necessity for IPA 
researchers to bracket their experiences was felt to jar with the key aims of this study. 
 Lastly, a large number of qualitative research methods ascribe to a fundamental 
descriptive reflection of a phenomenon (Wertz, 2005). Within these methods, there 
are variations as to the extent in which the focus is on a general description of a 
phenomenon, say ‘humour’, or on expounding a more individual experience. 
Typically, phenomenological researchers reflectively analyse and synthesise concrete 
descriptions, rather than explanations, of synthesised accounts. Themes are identified, 
which enables the researcher to go into a more interpretative dimension beyond the 
surface of explicit meanings into more implicit intuitions.  
 Descriptive phenomenological researchers (e.g. Giorgi, 1985), inspired by 
Husserl, aim to “reveal essential general meaning structures of a phenomenon and 
stay close to what is given to them in all its richness and complexity” (Finlay, 
2009:10). In contrast, interpretative phenomenological researchers (e.g. Smith, 2007), 
inspired by Hermeneutic philosophers, maintain that all understanding is an 




relationships. What we experience has already been interpreted, and interpretation 
therefore is considered an inevitable structure of our existence as beings-in-the-world 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962).  
 Given the nature of the phenomena under question, it is potentially helpful to see 
description and interpretation as a spectrum. Langdridge (2008), for instance, argues 
that separating the two opposes the fundamental phenomenological foundations. In 
keeping, Van Manen (1990) suggests that a stronger element of interpretation is 
needed when description is stationed by expressions such as non-verbal signs, actions, 
art and text, and highlights the difference between interpretation pointing to 
something versus pointing out the meaning of something from an external framework. 
Ricoeur (1970) makes similar distinctions between ‘hermeneutics of meaning-
recollection’, which provides a greater understanding of the analysed phenomenon in 
its own terms, and ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ which need deeper interpretations to 
go beyond the surface. Wertz (2005:175), in commenting on the former, states: 
“‘Interpretation’ may be used, and may be called for, in order to contextually grasp 
parts within larger wholes, as long as it remains descriptively grounded.” The nature 
of humour, as has already been established, shows that it can indeed be mediated in 
expression and not just language, and in exploring humour’s role in terminal illness, a 
method which challenges surface accounts and therefore utilises description and 
interpretation, rather than just interpretation as in IPA, would be more suitable. 
 Overall, whilst IPA met the requirement for the chosen method to effectively 
explore the rich description participants might offer, it was felt that the rigid structure 
of conducting the research and extracting themes seemed to conflict with the way in 
which previous writers describe the spontaneous, creative and playful nature which 




Christie, 1994; Fabian, 2002). The means of analysing the data through IPA 
potentially fails to allow for the intricate role that language has to play in the 
formation of humour; and further, IPA was not deemed to give enough consideration 
to the cultural, historic, linguistic or relational contexts that appeared so important 
when working with humour and terminal illness in psychotherapy. As such, IPA was 
not considered a suitable enough method to explore the research question. 
 
4.4  Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis (e.g. Foucault, 1984) was a further qualitative method considered 
for the exploration of therapists’ experiences of humour in working with clients with a 
terminal illness. Fairclough (2003) and Flick (2006) indicate that discourse analysis 
critically focuses on issues such as the construction of social reality and how it is 
described through language through an exploration of the subject’s position and their 
negotiation with power and ideology within a given discourse. In situating language 
in social, cultural, political and historical contexts, discourse analysis assumes that 
“examining it can help reveal layers beneath taken-for-granted meanings and 
practices”, which in turn, “displays forms of control, persuasion and manipulation in 
the meanings inherent in the discourse” (Bradbury-Jones, Irvine & Sambrook, 
2007:83). This seemed pertinent in considering the ability for a method to challenge 
surface accounts explored previously, particularly given Freud’s (1905) depiction of 
humour as a displacement and deflection.  
Discourse analysis’ engagement with and intense sensitivity to power relations 
potentially highlights imbalances and subtle forms of oppression previously 
overlooked, which had initial appeal in considering Kisner’s (1994) perceptions of 
society’s reaction to terminal illness, as well as the nature of humour depicted in the 




the requirement to gather a rich description of participants’ experiences and allowed 
for the contextual nature in which humour arises, as it would acknowledge the milieu 
in which participants exist, with a view that the self is created through language and 
interaction with others in the world. However, it is considered by the researcher to 
also be a method that does not necessarily see us as subjects capable of creation 
independent of the discourse in which we stand. As Madill and Doherty (1994:266) 
state, in a pseudo-objective manner, discourse analysis potentially “[negates] the 
personal agency of individuals through tying subjectivity so closely to context”. 
Ultimately, while discourse analysis would be helpful in explaining the nature and the 
construction of a joke for example, humour’s playfulness and spontaneity run the risk 
of getting lost with this method. Discourse analysis potentially refutes our ability to 
construct language and one’s own meaning, whereas the aim of this research is to 
explore the experience of the nature of humour and jokes in the intricate gap between 
life and death, into which people dive and something new is created. The nature of a 
joke is, in essence, the playful creation of something new, which discourse analysis 
does not allow for.  
Overall, whilst discourse analysis would provide a valid and interesting means 
to explore the way in which participants might use language to understand their 
experiences of humour and terminal illness, it was felt that it would be inappropriate 
for the aims of this research, which is to gain a broader picture of the experience of 
humour and terminal illness in the psychological therapies. Further, discourse analysis 
does not necessarily allow for the integration with a phenomenological position, in 
that personal meaning making may be under-valued in this particularly social-
constructionist approach. For these reasons, discourse analysis was discounted as an 




4.5  Heuristics 
On the other side of the spectrum, Moustakas’s (1990) heuristic research, which 
focuses on the discovery of nature and meanings of human experiences, was 
considered as a suitable method for the research question and aims of the enquiry. 
Given heuristic’s acknowledgement of the role of the researcher in the exploration, it 
is a highly subjective method and one that stands in stark contrast to discourse 
analysis for this reason.  
Moustakas (1990) indicates the essential element of the heuristic method as 
being the researcher, and is therefore autobiographical in that both researcher and 
participant explore phenomena as a means to develop self-knowledge. With a 
requirement for the researcher to have first-hand experience of the phenomena, this 
method allows for a dialogue with the self and follows a course of initial engagement 
and then an immersion in the research question, followed by the phase of incubation 
and then illumination, in which new meanings are elicited into conscious awareness, 
thereby allowing for a universal significance through dialogue with others into a 
creative synthesis (Moustakas, 1990).  
With the heuristic focus on meaning and the relationship between researcher, 
participant and phenomenon, and the creative nature of the method that would allow 
for the playfulness and spontaneity of humour, heuristics had initial appeal as a 
suitable method. However, at the point of conducting the research, the researcher’s 
own personal experience of being a counsellor working with terminally ill clients was 
not sufficient enough to meet the heuristic requirement of having substantive 
experience of the phenomena being explored. 
Further, it was felt that heuristics, in bolstering the researcher’s experience 
above that of the participant’s, runs the risk of losing some of the relational aspects of 




self – either researcher or participant – is experiencing. In other words, heuristics 
potentially quashes the possibility of the emergence of different unique meanings, 
which is contrary to the initial aims of the research to remain open to alternatives. 
Lastly, in being primarily autobiographical, heuristics did not fit well with humour’s 
dialogic nature. The literature review repeatedly illustrated (e.g. Freud, 1905; Erdman, 
1994; Franzini, 2001; Newirth, 2006a) humour’s essentially relational and dialogic 
nature. Though the nature of a ‘solipsistic’ humour is worthy of greater consideration 
elsewhere, the argument here is that humour only becomes humour through 
somebody else hearing it and their relation to it. Humour is, therefore, a dialogue 
between a speaker and a hearer, and potentially in solipsistic humour, a relationship 
that emerges from the inner dialogue. A heuristic methodology was not felt to address 
sufficiently this dialogic nature of humour, or potentially the dialogic nature of being 
a therapist working with such clients.  
4.6  Narrative Analysis 
Of significance is narrative analysis, which was felt to not only meet the three core 
requirements for a suitable method, but also to speak to a number of characteristics 
contained in humour, terminal illness and psychotherapy:  temporality, contextuality 
and relatedness. Using a narrative method was also felt to be harmonious with the 
acknowledgement of the role that ancient Greek tragedies and comedies have played 
in shaping current thought on terminal illness and humour.  Considering the key 
epistemological and ontological considerations explored above, it was felt that an in-
depth understanding of humour and terminal illness in psychotherapy can only be 
achieved by obtaining a detailed account of psychotherapists’ lived experiences, and 
with it their unfolding sense of understanding and the related factors that contribute to 




Heidegger’s depiction of life as embodying a distinctive temporal structure, and the 
extent to which life therefore may have a narrative structure (Guignon, 1998).  
Heidegger (1927/1962) identified human beings as thrown into social, cultural 
and linguistic contexts and therefore unable to completely extricate from these 
constraints. Polkinghorne (1988) interlaced these themes together into a narrative 
construction of reality in which the essence of human existence is an on-going 
meaning-making process, ordered and expressed according to linguistic 
characteristics. Just as Heidegger (1927/1962) depicted the interacting trinity of past, 
present and future, Polkinghorne (1988:126-7) depicted a narrative’s ability to 
“structure and organise time according to hermeneutic principles…through multiple 
levels of interpretation”. The social, cultural and linguistic domains are thereby used 
to understand ourselves, others and the world as meaningful and stories are models 
for the link between actions and consequences: “narrative is the discourse structure in 
which human action receives its form and thorough which it is meaningful” 
(Polkinghorne, 1988:135). In this way, narrative can be seen to reject ideas of 
fixedness and permanence, which resonates with both the fleeting nature of humour, 
and the constraints of a terminal diagnosis. The view that self-identity is created 
through an unfolding narrative therefore gives credence to the dismissal of objectively 
measuring lived experiences through positivist methods, and instead acknowledging 
the construction of experiences as intrapersonal and co-constructed by one’s social 
and cultural context (Golomb, 1995; Spinelli, 1996; Guignon, 2002; Guignon, 2004). 
As Polkinghorne states, “if the unity and uniqueness of the self is achieved through 
the process of narrativity and if one conceives of one’s particular existence as a 
special story and not as a physical or mental thing then more adequate, 




Narrative analysis is based on three key tenets: the centrality of stories as 
meaning-generating activities; the facilitation of awareness and understanding 
through stories; and, the storied nature of human existence in which reality is a 
narrative construction (Ricoeur, 1984; Polkinghorne, 1988; Bruner, 1991; McAdams, 
1993). Narrative analysis therefore aims to explore and understand the 
multidimensional and dialogic processes of individual experiences in collecting, 
analysing and contextualising human stories: “people create stories out of the building 
blocks of their life histories and culture, and at the same time…these stories construct 
their lives, provide them with meaning and goals, and tie them to their culture” 
(Lieblich et al., 1998:168).  
Murray (2003b) argues that through the stories we tell others and ourselves, 
we shape our identities and interpretations of the world, and in this way, narrative can 
be seen as a reflexive method exploring both the events and subjective experiencing 
(Angus & McLeod, 2004). Bruner (2004:3) offers a similar explanation of the way in 
which “we constantly construct and reconstruct ourselves to meet the needs of the 
situations we encounter”. The exploration of the given phenomena therefore, is 
particular to the specific time and context in which the story is being told, just as 
humour has been described previously.  
There exists a range of narrative methods, and although interlinked, each has 
different outcomes and accomplishments (Brockmeier & Harré, 2001; Gimenez, 
2010). Structural and event centred approaches, such as Labov’s (1972), focus on the 
interaction and changeability of constituting elements of narrative, in comparison to 
Ricoeur’s (1984) experienced-centred approach, and lastly Bruner’s (1990) functional 
narrative analysis, which focuses on the purpose of narratives in a more pragmatic 




which potential outcome is most valid to the research question, it is worth exploring 
these in greater depth. 
4.6.1  Structural Narrative Analysis  
Labov’s (1972) approach focuses on the sequential arrangement of narratives. He 
illustrates a number of different types of clauses that maintain temporal sequence, the 
structure of which determines the function of the clauses, namely the ‘abstract’ at the 
beginning announcing a story will be told, ‘orientation’ which depicts the context, 
‘complicating action’ which orients the listener to the series of events, ‘evaluation’ 
which portrays the narrator’s attitude, and ‘result’ or ‘coda’, in which the story ends 
with resolution and returns to the present through the narrator’s verbal perspective at 
the moment of narrating. This focus on the beginning, middle and end of stories 
resonates with the nature of jokes, terminal diagnoses and psychotherapy, all of which 
are arguably structured in the same way.  
A further approach to narrative analysis that was considered for this research 
was that of Ricoeur (1984), who purports that it is through the creativity of language 
that the human subject is revealed, and the self and therefore life, is like a text 
unfolding into a meaningful story articulated in and through language. The sequential 
nature of life is thus not only characteristic of humans, but also what makes us human 
(Ricoeur, 1984). The understanding of an individual through looking at the story 
harkens back to Saussure’s (1916/1966) claims that a story needs to be decoded to be 
understood.  
Walsh (2003) points out that Ricoeur’s narrative approach weaves together St. 
Augustine’s analysis of time and Aristotle’s depiction of emplotment in presenting a 
self that is understood through ‘mimesis’. He portrays narrative as a means by which 




desires, the configuration of which is through emplotment. Grasping and 
understanding these as a meaningful whole occurs through plot which, according to 
Ricoeur (1992), imitates action. Ricoeur further draws comparisons between the 
narrative and metaphor in allowing a self to emerge into the world outside of direct 
description. Through narrative, he claims, the temporal dimensions of human 
existence, including action and temporality, are illuminated.   
More than Labov’s approach, Ricoeur can be seen to acknowledge the cultural 
and temporal context and nature of action, and the relatedness between a past that is 
always in relation to the present, and a present that is always in relation to what is 
hoped for in the future. The configuration of the activity gives the sense of 
followability and thus conclusion, in which there is a resolution of the problem 
unfolded in the plot. The text is then completed in its fusion with the reader, who in 
turns experiences a change of character through the cathartic effect of learning his 
actions through narrative. The approach therefore gives import to the interaction 
between speaker and hearer, writer and reader (Ricoeur, 1992).  
Examined in more detail, both Labov’s (1972) and Ricoeur’s (1992) 
approaches consider narratives to be isolated and independent versions of past 
experiences, however in doing so, potentially overlook the sociolinguistic contexts 
that frame and sustain the narratives (Gimenez, 2010). The prescriptive nature of 
these structured approaches arguably reduces the potential for other possibilities in 
overly concentrating on subjective experiences at the expense of a socially 
constructed subject. With this being the main focus, the impact of the interaction 
between researcher and participant, and storyteller and listener, is neglected (Andrews 
et al., 2008). The unity and coherence that is assumed in both of these approaches is 




both humour and terminal illness – in which it is the incoherence and disunity that is 
so central: 
“Post-modern thinking would tend to favour diversity, multiplicity and 
uncertainty, over system, ideology and generalisation; play, decoration 
and idiosyncrasy, over coherence and transparency; irony and 
questioning, over received wisdom or established authority…Subject to 
contingency and, in the end, to our own deaths, that over which we have 
no control, it would see ‘autonomy’ and ‘wholeness’ as illusions; we are 
displaced, split, fractured and changeable, our messages to each other 
never leading to any finally consensual meaning, always open to slippage 
and variable readings.”  
(Loewenthal and Snell, 2003:5) 
 
Essentially, “narrative constantly reproduces the phantom of a whole, 
articulated system, where even the concept of a system is a product of a narrative” 
(Roof, in McQuillan, 2000:213). It is believed instead that incoherence and 
incompleteness can potentially produce a narrative, and the diversity, multiplicity, 
uncertainty, play, decoration and idiosyncrasy depicted above, are all quintessential to 
the subject being researched here. The ‘slippage’ is indeed often the humorous. 
Further, in considering the use of a structural approach to narrative, Heidegger’s 
(1971:5) comment is pertinent: “the language of the dialogue constantly destroyed the 
possibility of saying what the dialogue was about”. What comes to mind here is the 
quote from Dixon (1980:287) explored in Chapter 2: “pontifications about humour are 
death to amusement”. Therefore, the prescriptive nature of Labov’s and Ricouer’s 
approaches and their failure to sufficiently acknowledge the contextual and relational 
nature of the story being told, ensured that neither of these would suit the nature of 
this research. One of the authors to address these shortcomings was Bruner (1990, 
1991), whose functional approach to narrative analysis was fundamentally found to 




4.6.2  Functional Narrative Analysis  
Epistemologically, Bruner (1986) distinguished between a logico-scientific mode of 
knowing to a narrative mode of knowing (Czarniawska, 2004). The latter organises 
experience through the way in which narratives are told and conceptualised by 
“laying down routes into memory, for not only guiding the life narrative up to the 
present but directing it into the future” (Bruner, 2004:708). The approach therefore 
stipulates a means of conveying a sense of self through relating to others (Elliott, 
2005) that is shaped through symbolic systems such as language that are produced 
from culture. Hence, meaning is created through the language we use to tell stories 
about our world. From this focus on human action we can already see an 
acknowledgement of self-agency and the potential for creativity in a way that other 
approaches previously explored (such as DA) do not.  
To galvanise the reasons why Bruner’s (1991:6-18) method was considered 
the most appropriate for this study, it is perhaps important to examine the ten features 
that are believed to be core to his narrative approach: 
1. ‘Narrative diachronicity’: the unfurling of events over time. Here, Bruner 
acknowledges Ricoeur’s (1984) difference between both ‘clock’ time and 
‘human’ time, “whose significance is given by the meaning assigned to the events 
within its compass”. Time, for Bruner, is distinct from Labov’s description of 
time, which was mainly dependent on the sequence of clauses and hence 
“obscures an important aspect of narrative representation” (Bruner, 1991:6). This 
depiction of time can be seen to be highly relevant to the nature of humour and 
joke-telling, the temporal constraints foisted by terminal illness, and the fifty-
minute psychotherapeutic session.  
2. ‘Particularity’: the embededdness of a story into a genre or the emblematic nature 




3. ‘Intentional state entailment’: the measure of agency in the narrative that is 
determined by the character’s beliefs, desires, theories, values “and so on”, and 
guides the way characters perceive situations as Bruner states: “agency 
presupposes choice – some element of ‘freedom’” (1991:7). Here, he 
differentiates between ‘causality’ and the ‘reason’ for the subsequent action. 
Rather than providing causal explanations, narrative’s role is to be the basis of 
interpreting why. 
4. ‘Hermeneutic composability’: where the intended meaning of the text coincides 
with the reader’s extracted meaning from the text, with the acknowledgement that 
what is expressed may be different from what is meant, and crucially that there is 
no one given meaning. To address the issue where there is neither a rational 
means of securing the ‘truth’ of the text, nor an empirical means of establishing 
the verifiability of the elements that constitute the text, Bruner (1991:8) claims 
that it is necessary to examine the interaction between interpreting the meaning of 
the text as a whole, and as a composition of individual components and their 
intended meanings: “A story can only be ‘realised’ when its parts and whole can, 
as it were, be made to live together”. In referring to hermeneutic composability, 
Bruner also highlights ‘intention’, how and why the story is being told as well as 
how and why it is being interpreted, and ‘background knowledge’ of both 
storyteller and listener and their interpretations of the background knowledge of 
each other.  
5. ‘Canonicity and breach’: Bruner (1990) posits that through interaction with each 
other, individuals create an appreciation of what is canonical against a 
background which gives meanings to deviations from the norm. The breaches, 




involved in narratives, which according to Bruner (1991:9) who uses Jakobson’s 
phrase, makes “the ordinary strange” and hence a story worth telling. Such 
breaches, he claims, can be linguistic as well as contained in the plot. The 
assumption here is that the story or expression will not end in the manner that it 
might be expected to when it started. As illustrated in Chapter 2, particularly in 
the discussion around the incongruity theory of humour, this is often how jokes 
are constructed too. Further, Bruner claimed that “such breaches are readily 
recognizable as familiar human plights” (1991:12), and terminal illness may be 
one such plight, as might be the therapist’s experience of being with such clients 
in humorous encounters. Additionally, for Bruner (2001), narratives serve the 
function of entrenching us within our culture and we therefore tend to present 
ourselves as typical of the culture. A violation of the canon, or norm, then is done 
in a way that is coherent within our culture, through the culture’s “narrative 
resources...its myths, its typology of human plights, but also its traditions for 
locating and resolving divergent narratives” (1990:68). This has important 
implications when considering current society’s perceptions towards terminal 
illness and humour.  
6. ‘Referentiality’:  the requirement for the narrative to be identifiable with some 
reference to reality. Bruner (1991:13) states, “narrative ‘truth’ is judged by 
verisimilitude rather than verifiability”. Narrative research involves a co-
construction of a story between researcher and participant, where there is a teller 
of the tale and someone to whom the tale has been told. Due to this subjective 
experience of hearing, telling and re-telling stories that depends on narrator and 
audience, it is the reality of the speech in the plot and not the story’s truth or 




and validity are less important. Bruner purports that rather than merely referring 
to reality, narrative allows for the creation and constitution for reality and that 
distinction between narrative fiction and narrative truth is questionable but can be 
answered through hermeneutic composability. Bruner also considers there to be 
no difference between factual and fictional narratives as they are situationally 
negotiated or arrived at through contingency. This has implications for research, 
and Czarniawska (2004:9) references Todorv to sum this up:  
“…in this tacit contract between author and reader, the authors 
plead: suspend your disbelief, as I am going to please you. In 
what can be called a referential contract, the researcher pleads: 
activate your disbelief, as I am going to instruct you. It goes 
without saying that if the scientific author manages to please the 
reader as well, it is a bonus. In the meantime, the lack of 
structural differences between fictional and factual narratives is 
suspected to account for most of their power.” 
 
As breaches in canons are socially sensitive, a story that is not built upon the 
difference between fact and fiction allows for one or many alternative meanings 
to emerge. As Bruner (1990:67) states, this “method of negotiating and 
renegotiating meanings by the mediation of narrative interpretation is on of the 
crowning achievements of human development in the ontogenetic, cultural and 
phylogenetic sense of that expression”. 
7. ‘Genericness’: the telling of conventional human plights told through language in 
a particular way. Here he notes the importance of cultural context and posits, “to 
translate the ‘way of telling’ of a genre into another language or culture where it 
does not exist requires a fresh literary-linguistic invention” (1991:14), and: 
“while [genres] may be representations of social ontology, they are also 
invitations to a particular style of epistemology. As such, they may have quite as 
powerful an influence in shaping our modes of thoughts as they have in creating 




8. ‘Normativeness’: the way in which the construction of the narrative breaches 
what is culturally considered as normal, and how this shapes the reader’s 
interpretation and processing of the breach. When the breach is considered by the 
degree of its validation, it becomes ‘Trouble’, “and it Is Trouble that provides the 
engine of drama” (Bruner, 1991:16). Bruner also states that the normativeness of 
a narrative changes as temporal and cultural contexts do, and is not dependent on 
how the Trouble is resolved. Indeed, “narrative…is designed to contain 
uncanniness rather than to resolve it. It does not have to come out on the ‘right 
side.’…the ‘consoling plot’ is not the comfort of a happy ending but the 
comprehension of a plight that, by being made interpretable, becomes bearable” 
(1991:16). The strength of the story thus is not dependent on its bond to the world 
outside the story, but in its openness for negotiating meaning. What this narrative 
approach thrives on then, is the possibility of leaving open the nature of 
connection: “What is considered a vice in science – openness to competing 
interpretations – is a virtue in narrative” (Czarniawska, 2004:7).  
9. ‘Context sensitivity and negotiability’: the negotiation of meaning between the 
presumption of what a text might mean, and what the reader potentially means it 
to mean. As Bruner (1991:17) states, “the notion of totally suspending disbelief is 
at best an idealization of the reader and, at worst, a distortion of what the process 
of narrative comprehension involves”. The lens through which these are 
negotiated depends on background knowledge and cultural significance. This 
point addresses a number of the key aims of this chapter, particularly in wanting a 
method that acknowledged contextuality and relatedness.  
10. ‘Narrative accrual’: the way in which the narrative is accumulated into a coherent 




narratives that become cultural references with which to understand the new 
narrative; an intricate dance illustrating how old stories become new stories: 
“What creates a culture, surely, must be a ‘local’ capacity for accruing stories of 
happenings of the past into some sort of diachronic structure that permits a 
continuity into the present” (Bruner, 1991:19-20).  
 
Bruner’s method acknowledges an almost primitive sense of readiness for the 
narrative organisation of experience, where children are told stories over the course of 
their life which are “encouraged and elaborated in the course of life, exploiting the 
richness of the existing repertoire of stories and plots” (Czarniawska, 2004:9). Adults 
then enrich, challenge and continue the repertoire, and science too is a story of 
another story. This methodology chapter, for instance, is a story of how the method 
was chosen, based on stories that previous methodology books and articles were 
richly illustrated with.  
Bruner’s approach to narrative can be encapsulated with this:  
“Th[e] hermeneutic property marks narrative both in its construction and 
in its comprehension. For narratives do not exist, as it were, in some real 
world, waiting there patiently and eternally to be veridically mirrored in 
a text. The act of constructing a narrative, moreover, is considerably 
more than ‘selecting’ events either from real life, from memory, or from 
fantasy and then placing them in an appropriate order. The events 
themselves need to be constituted in light of the overall narrative – In 
Propp’s terms, to be made ‘functions’ of the story” 
Bruner (1991:8) 
 
What we have is a method that thrives on dialogue, flux and relatedness, in which 
truth is relative, intersubjective and contextual, and in which the researcher can stay 
open to exploration and possibility. Bruner’s narrative method appears to provide the 
balance between description and interpretation, as well as between the epoché and 




requires something approximating a narrator’s perspective: it cannot, in the jargon of 
narratology, be ‘voiceless’” (Bruner, 1990:77). The cultural discourses in which 
individuals reside are acknowledged, but so is agency and creation – particularly in 
the creation of meaning. In returning to the three considerations for a suitable method 
– the capturing of a rich enough description of therapists’ experiences; the allowance 
of societal and temporal context as well as for the relationship between humour and 
terminal illness, therapist and client, researcher and researched; and the ability to 
retain the vitality, spontaneity and playfulness of humour – Bruner’s approach to 
narrative analysis fits best.  
To finish with Czarniawska’s (2004:10) statement, then: 
“A student of social practices re-tells narratives of a given practice and 
constructs them herself, first and second hand. Nevertheless, she cannot 
stop here as, by doing that, she will be barely competing with the 
practitioners themselves, and from a disadvantaged position. She must go 
further and see how the narratives of practice unfold. This interest can 
lead her to a stance espousing the ideas of logico –scientific knowledge, 
as formalism and structuralism intended to do, or those closer to the 
poststructuralist edge of the spectrum of narratology.”  
 
It is with that in mind that Bruner’s method has been chosen for the research question, 
‘how do psychological therapists experience humour in sessions with terminally ill 
clients?’, to tell a story which may end tragically or comically. 
4.7  Conclusion 
The Literature Review raised what were thought to be three key considerations to be 
borne in mind when finding a suitable method: 1) the ability for the method to capture 
a rich enough description of therapists’ experiences of humour in counselling 
terminally ill clients; 2) the ability of the method to allow for sociolinguistic and 
temporal contexts and the various relationships involved in the research question; 3) 





Quantitative research methods were considered first for their elicitation of 
results that would be more generalisable and applicable to the psycho-oncology 
community a whole, however they failed to address any of the three key 
considerations. Qualitative methods were thus deemed best, with IPA being 
considered a natural avenue to follow with its primary focus on experience. Its clear 
and solid methodological guidelines, which would allow for a sensitive and in-depth 
analysis, addressed the first concern. Secondly, IPA does not aim to speculate on the 
cause of experiences but to describe the experience as interpreted by the participant 
and researcher, which more or less addressed concern 2. However, its rigid structure – 
not only with conducting the research but also in extracting themes, was felt to jar 
with the way in which previous writers described the spontaneous, creative and 
playful nature which humour and language seems to inhabit and was therefore 
rejected as a suitable method.  
Discourse analysis engages with power relations and has a sensitivity to 
language that was overlooked in IPA, which can highlight imbalances and subtle 
forms of oppression previously overlooked. This was ideal considering point 2, but 
the social-constructionist groundings of the method were not felt to be appropriate for 
point 1 or 3 as it does not allow for the personal meaning-making and contextual 
nature of humour, terminal illness, psychotherapy and research that a more 
phenomenological method might have space for.  
To address these issues, heuristics was considered for its focus on subjectivity. 
This was particularly important given the researcher’s personal experience of therapy, 
humour and terminal illness. However at the point of conducting the research, the 
researcher’s personal involvement was not sufficient enough to meet the requirements 




allowing for the relational aspects of the research question to emerge, as well as 
neglecting the cultural context in which the ‘self’ (either the researcher or 
participants) are experiencing. Where points 1 and 3 were sufficiently addressed by 
heuristics, point 2 was largely eschewed. 
Narrative analysis then, particularly Bruner’s functional approach, seemed to 
fit best with the three considerations. The focus in this method is on the ways in 
which individuals construct and make sense of reality, as well as the ways in which 
meanings are created and shared. Consideration is given to how narratives serve to 
help individuals make sense of experiences, particularly through shaping random and 
chaotic events into a coherent narrative, making events easier to handle by giving 
them meaning. This last point is particularly well fitting with what was found in the 
literature review to be humour’s role in death. Bruner’s method is predicated on the 
view that the self is not a ‘thing’ but is storied and multi-storied, and the data that is 
generated is then also in the form of stories. Temporal unity is maintained through 
plot, for instance, which provides structure for how people make sense of their 
experiences. Further, the analysis is not so much about whether stories are true or not, 
but that narratives are social products that are produced by people in the context of 
specific social, historical and cultural locations. Bruner also claimed that a narrative’s 
function is to problem solve, allowing for the possibility of dealing with and 
explaining mismatches as well as for a full dialogue between speaker and hearer. 
Together, these aspects were felt to sufficiently preserve the complexity and temporal 
context of humour, death and the relationship between them both and the therapist, 







Chapter 5: Method 
 
“A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting  
entirely of jokes.” 
- Wittgenstein (in Dribble, 2004:87). 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this enquiry is to explore the experience of humour in psychological 
therapists working with clients diagnosed with a terminal illness. Rather than retain a 
focus on strategies of implementation and how humour should be utilised, or not, in 
therapeutic encounters, the primary interest in this research is to elicit information on 
therapists’ lived experiences of the phenomena under consideration. Accordingly, and 
as discussed in Chapter 4, Bruner’s (1991, 2004) narrative approach has been chosen. 
The aim of this chapter is to describe how data collection, participant recruitment, 
interviews and data analysis were conducted, with some consideration given to ethics, 
reliability, validity and replicability.  
5.2  Data collection 
In accordance to Bruner’s (1991, 2004) narrative method, narrative interviews were 
chosen as the means to collect data. Narrative researchers primarily gather material 
for analysis through interviews, which allow participants to provide in-depth accounts 
of particular experiences. Chase (1995) and Murray (2003a) argue that in narrative 
interviews, the researcher’s responsibility is to shift the responsibility of the interview 
back to the participant to allow them to shape and control the interview agenda. 
Standard in-depth interviewing can be said to be different to narrative interviewing in 
the questioning process and the responses elicited, where the former invites ‘reports’ 
and the latter invites ‘stories’. In report-style responses, Chase (1995:5) contends that 
the burden of interpreting the significance of participants’ responses rests with the 




successful narrative interviews are those in which the participant feels the researcher 
values and is interested in their stories. This has been termed as ‘empathic 
attunement’ by Josselson and Lieblich (2001), in which the interview is experienced 
by the participant as an ‘encounter’ where the researcher accepts the story respectfully 
and without judgement or evaluation and is therefore grounded in the hermeneutic 
tradition as it “affords the possibility of interpreting others who themselves are 
engaged in the process of interpreting themselves” (Josselson & Lieblich, 2001:281).  
There can be said to be two main types of narrative interview, the ‘life-story 
interview’, which aims to educe in-depth biological explorations of participants’ life 
experiences so far (Murray 2003b), and the ‘episodic interview’, which is more 
directed in eliciting participants’ everyday knowledge about a specific experience 
(Flick, 1997). The latter was felt to be more appropriate for the research question as 
the aim for this study is not to get participants’ life histories, but a deeper 
understanding of their specific experiences of humour. 
Fundamental to narrative’s approach to collecting accounts is ‘reflexivity’ and 
the researcher’s role in co-creating narratives though the dialogic act of interviewing 
(Lieblich et al., 1998; Murray, 2003b). Mishler (1986) suggests that questions in the 
narrative interview can be thought of as circular processes through which their 
meanings and those of the answers are jointly and continually created through the 
mutual discourse of both researcher and participant. Consequently, researcher-
participant bias is present from the beginning of the interview process, from stating 
the purpose of the interview through to asking questions and relating to responses, 
which according to Lieblich et al. (1998) and Flick (2002), ought to be acknowledged. 
To avoid the context of the narrative creating a false sense of coherence or 




interviewers are called by Gergen (1999) and Murray (2003b) to encourage 
participants to reflect upon the roles of others in their experiences, thereby articulating 
the relational and contextual constructions of their experiences.  
 
5.2.1  Reliability, validity and generalisability 
Qualitative research is often criticised for lacking reliability, validity and 
generalisability. Grounded in social constructionism and hermeneutics, qualitative 
approaches to epistemology adhere to the position that there is no fixed or knowable 
reality; and, the signification of experience is through words, which are open to a 
greater degree of interpretation than numbers (see McLeod, 2001). With specific 
reference to narrative research, Loh (2013:2) claims that it is 
  “vital for a narrative researcher to ask the following: How valid is 
this narrative approach? How valid is the analysis of the data? 
How valid and reliable is the collection of these ‘stories’, and how 
can a story be valid as an analysis? If the data is collected through 
the participants’ telling of their ‘storied experiences’, how do I 
know if they are being truthful? What if they made up a story or 
embellish the retelling? Will the research be valid then?”  
 
To answer these questions and ensure that this study maintains empirical 
rigour, it is worthy to explore the four general guidelines that have been outlined by 
Yardley (2000), and reflected by Riessman (2002) and Lieblich et al. (1998) to assess 
the quality and validation of narrative analyses. First is ‘sensitivity to context’, which 
refers to the extent to which the phenomena under exploration is strongly grounded in 
the philosophical and intellectual tradition of the topic, allowing for a foundation 
upon which to explore the range of perspectives and therefore an analysis that is more 
profound and comprehensive.  
‘Commitment and rigour’ focuses on the researcher’s prolonged engagement 




terms of size but in terms of its ability to supply all of the information needed for a 
comprehensive analysis” (Yardley, 2000:221).  
‘Transparency and coherence’ is the third guideline, in which transparency 
refers to the adequacy of the contentions of the analysis providing a convincing 
version of reality, which also results in greater comprehension and insight for the 
reader (Lieblich et al., 1998). This is akin to Bruner’s statement that “narrative ‘truth’ 
is judged by its verisimilitude rather than its verifiability” (1991:13). The believability 
and trustworthiness of the narrative allows for deeper insight, empathy and 
understanding of the subjective world of the participant through the congruence that is 
felt by the reader resonating with the story. This is deepened by the coherence of the 
narrative, which Yardley (2000:222) describes as “the ‘fit’ between the research 
question and the philosophical perspective adopted, and the method of investigation 
and analysis undertaken” and can be evaluated by the relationship between the 
researcher’s interpretations with previous theories and research (Lieblich et al., 1998).  
Lastly, ‘impact and importance’ concerns the ability of the research to become 
the basis for others’ work (Riessman, 2008). According to Yardley (2000) and 
Mishler (1986), qualitative studies that make the greatest impact are those that present 
a new and challenging way of understanding the topic, rather than being generalisable 
to the larger population as in quantitative methods. Eisner (1998) provides three ways 
in which a study can be measured for its utility: comprehension, where an otherwise 
enigmatic or confusing situation can be understood; anticipation, where descriptions 
and interpretations go beyond the information provided; and guide/map, which 
deepens and broadens experience by providing a direction the reader can consider.  
For the purposes of this study, and in consideration of the above, Altheide and 




make public [the researcher’s] claims, to show the reader, audience or consumer why 
they should be trusted as faithful accounts of some phenomenon” and a “pragmatic 
utility of validity as ‘good for our present intents and purposes’”. As Loh (2013:11) 
states, “narrative research traditionally addresses the perspectives of both the 
researcher(s) and the researched; however, by not seriously addressing the issue of 
trustworthiness of its analysis and findings, it does not seem to be fully addressing the 
perspectives of its utility and audience.”  
With this in mind, the findings of the study are presented in a way that 
acknowledges the researcher’s experience as informing the research, and thus as a 
range of possibilities rather than truths, which was felt to adhere to the 
epistemological aims of the study. In keeping with Bruner’s (2004:702) assertions, the 
analysis of the data will retain an ‘authorial voice’ and employ direct extracts of the 
text to illustrate interpretations. The reliability of the study will hence be provided 
through making explicit the process in which the research was conducted, with the 
intention that, as Giorgi (1975:96) stated: “…a reader, adopting the same viewpoints 
as articulated by the researcher, can also see what the researcher saw, whether or not 
he agrees with it”.  
5.3  Participant recruitment and selection 
5.3.1  Sample size  
The number of participants chosen for this study was in accordance with the 
idiographic aim of qualitative research methods to provide a depth of understanding 
for new and challenging perspectives to emerge, rather than to extrapolate findings to 
a generalised population for an objective truth (Yardley, 2000; Charmaz, 2003; Smith 
et al., 2009). A purposive sample of six participants was felt to correspond with the 




participants ensured enough data for a range of information specific to participants to 
be collected without sacrificing the depth of the investigation to the number of 
participants, and without being so small that the phenomena are not sufficiently 
explored (Sandelowski, 1995).  This was in keeping with Smith and Osborn’s 
(2003:51) argument that a smaller sample size “should provide sufficient cases for the 
development of meaningful points of similarity and difference between participants, 
but not so many that one is in danger of being overwhelmed by the data generated”. 
5.3.2 Criteria for selection 
The sample for this research was primarily purposive, in line with Polkinghorne’s 
(2005:139) position that participants “are not selected because they fulfil the 
representative requirements of statistical inference but because they can provide 
substantial contributions to filling out the structure and character of the experience 
under investigation”.  The initial criteria for selection were therefore that: a) 
participants were psychological therapists with experience of working with clients 
with terminal illness; b) participants would have access to support from professional 
colleagues, supervisors and/or personal therapists for any issues arising from the 
interview process; and, c) participants were members of the BPS, BACP or registered 
with UKCP. At the point of recruiting participants however, it was felt unnecessary to 
ask that participants were accredited or registered with a professional body as this 
might have placed too much of a restriction on the selection to no great purpose. With 
many experienced practitioners yet to become accredited or registered, and some 
choosing not to be, it was considered that students – as long as they were 
psychological therapists with experience of counselling terminally ill clients – fitted 




distress, this last point gave import to ensuring the criterion regarding support from 
colleagues, supervisors and/or therapists was met.  
 
5.3.3 Recruitment 
Recruitment for participants only began when ethical approval was granted (see 
Appendix 1). Services that were local to the researcher and offered counselling to 
terminally ill clients, which included hospices and out patient services, were emailed 
with an invitation letter (see Appendix 2), which included an introduction to the 
research and contact details of the researcher. For purposes of confidentiality and 
given the sparseness of such services, the locations of these services will not be 
identified here. Directories such as Counselling Directory and the British Association 
for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP)’s Find a Therapist were searched for 
counsellors that claimed to have experience of working with clients diagnosed with 
terminal illnesses and had their email addresses available to the public. Those who 
indicated that they wished to be excluded from canvassing were not contacted. Some 
recruitment ‘snowballed’ with one participant/service recommending another. 
Interviews with the first six suitable respondents were scheduled either via email or 
telephone at an appropriate and convenient time and location for the participant.  
Although participants were largely self-selected, which therefore eliminated 
researcher bias, they could not be described as a random sample since they clearly had 
some reason for volunteering for interview, whether altruism, curiosity, or a sense of 
something to contribute to the discussion. They were nevertheless a diverse group 
with regard to the level of training and experience, theoretical orientation and client 
base, which was considered by the researcher to be beneficial, bringing a variety of 
experience to the enquiry. A further benefit of this research was that participants were 




to reflect upon their practice, which for many was an important aspect of on-going 
continuing professional development. With particular reference to narrative analysis, 
a task of the research is to make sense of the meanings and understandings individuals 
attach to their experiences and when working with dying patients, and particularly 
discussing humour which many had not had the opportunity to do in a formal setting, 
this was possibly an invaluable opportunity to explore and understand these aspects of 
therapeutic practice. 
5.3.4 Participants selected 
All the participants were employed in palliative care settings, and aged between early 
forties and early sixties. Two were female and four were male, with theoretical 
backgrounds based mainly on humanistic principles. Five of the participants were 
counsellors and one was a clinical psychologist. All six were qualified psychological 
therapists and had registration with professional bodies.  
5.3.5 Ethical considerations 
A risk assessment (see Appendix 3) was carried out and approved before interviews 
commenced. Prior to interviews starting, participants were given the consent form to 
sign and return (see Appendix 4). All six interviews took place at participants’ places 
of work and the local guidelines and regulations in regard to the University’s Lone 
Worker Policy, and any health and safety procedures when working offsite where 
identified and followed. Participants were informed that their interview data would be 
used as part of a thesis, some of which could be subsequently published. Therefore 
each participant was assigned a pseudonym and any information that referred to 
recognisable people or places was changed or removed to preserve confidentiality and 
anonymity. Participants were informed verbally and in writing that they could 




be in September 2015, without giving reason. They were also informed that if they 
withdrew before the end of December 2014, at which point the data would be 
analysed and form part of the PsychD thesis, it would only be used in collated form. 
Further, in accordance with the University’s Code of Good Research Practice, data 
would be retained for up to ten years from publication. All participants consented and 
none subsequently withdrew. As all participants had experience of working with 
terminally ill clients and were in regular supervision, it was assumed that personal 
distress due to the subject matter would be minimal; however attempts were made to 
conduct interviews with ethical attunement (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008).  
5.4 Interview procedure 
Each participant was interviewed once and interviews lasted between forty and ninety 
minutes, and in accordance with Bruner (1990) were relatively informal with no pre-
set questions, other than an opening statement inviting participants to recount their 
experiences of humour in sessions with terminally ill clients. In keeping with 
Murray’s (2003a) description of an active listening process, the researcher closely 
reflected on participants’ stories and offered minimal interventions, which were aimed 
at either opening up a topic for further discussion, clarification, or maintaining focus, 
though the latter was not often necessary. This provided both participants and 
researcher with the opportunity for greater reflection on and deeper understanding of 
the particular experience. 
The participants were also asked to present a joke or quip related to the 
phenomena with which to potentially introduce their narrative during the presentation 
of findings in the thesis. All six participants said they would get back to the 
researcher, yet none of them did. This was a noteworthy observation as it harkens 




spontaneous and impulsive. The idea of presenting a joke, therefore, potentially 
seemed contrived.  
Interviews were audio-recorded on two recorders to minimise technological 
failures, and conducted under conditions of uninterrupted privacy. The audio 
recordings were deleted from devices once they were uploaded onto a computer and 
backed up on a USB stick, both of which were password-protected and accessible 
only by the researcher. The subsequent transcriptions were stored in the same way. 
Interviews were heard only by the researcher, who was also the only one to transcribe 
in order to develop data familiarity and improve interviewing skills concurrently, as 
suggested by Saldaña (2013). The process of transcribing was therefore reflexive and 
“require[d] the transcriber’s cognizance of his or her own role in the creation of the 
text and the ideological implications of the resultant product” (Bucholtz, 2000:1440). 
A transcript in its entirety (with identifiable information changed or blacked out) can 
be seen in Appendix 5.  
During transcribing, attention was paid to silences as well as the words used 
and instances in which the participants and researcher laughed, as this was felt to be 
poignant to the study, as will be discussed further in Chapter 8. The grammatical 
structure of participants’ speech was also preserved in transcription, as this was felt to 
indicate the interrelationship between structure and content.  
5.5 Findings and analysis 
With no clear guidelines and very few published articles on how to present the 
findings on research conducted using Bruner’s narrative research, the researcher felt 
that she was in a position to be relatively creative with how participants’ accounts 
were portrayed to the reader, so long as the ethos of Bruner’s narrative theory was 




intrigued by what humour and death, were they to be characters in a story, would 
think of this piece of work, and in developing that thought it felt almost impossible 
not to include them in the story as part of a narrative framework.  
In considering presenting the findings and subsequent analysis, narrative can 
be employed as a means of telling a story in order to convey meaning and render a 
difficult experience safe; the functions of narrative include reducing tension, finding 
solutions to problems and resolving dilemmas (Bruner, 1990) and so the researcher 
feels this is an appropriate method for allowing participants to explore their 
experiences of working with terminally ill clients. 
Following the interview and transcription, the stages for conducting the 
analysis in accordance with Bruner (2004) start with organising data by reading each 
transcript with the research question in mind, making notes in a column with 
reference to line numbers. Stories will then be created with a plot, scenes, characters, 
beginning and ending, with direct references to the transcript as required. These 
stories will then be analysed with regards to Aristotle’s (trans. 2003) depiction of the 
structure of Greek theatre discussed in Chapter 3. The reason for this is to afford the 
analysis of plot with a structure that does not appear to have been conducted in any 
other narrative research, and is particularly poignant here given the argument that 
comedy is a response to the tragic.  
The identification of similarities and differences of themes present in these 
narratives will be identified, as will breaches of these themes, as “a tale must be about 
how an implicit canonical script has been breached, violated, or deviated from in a 
manner to do violence to ... the ‘legitimacy’ of the canonical script” (Bruner 1991:11). 




The language used by participants, and how it is used, will also be explored in 
order to identify the meanings created through their construction of themselves with 
the intention to provide a holistic dimension to the analysis. By doing so, the story 
will be taken as a whole, with sections being interpreted in the context of other parts 
of the narrative, and will allow for the development of multi-layered interpretations 
(Camic et al., 2003).  
Overall, data will be interpreted by looking for patterns, themes and 
regularities as well as contrasts, paradoxes and irregularities, and narrative forms will 
be created by constructing a coherent story from the data and by looking at the data 
from the perspective of the research question. In doing so, participants’ experiences of 
humour in their work with terminally ill clients, as well as the meanings created in 






Chapter 6: Results 
 
“Stories are a parasitical life form, warping lives in the service only  
of the story itself.” 
- Pratchett (1991:14) 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the findings, following a thorough reading and re-reading of 
interview transcripts.  It was during this period that the researcher was struck by how 
the participants spoke about the phenomena of enquiry and wondered how humour 
and death, were they to be characters in a story, would consider what was being said. 
In mirroring what was found in the literature review with regards to the changing 
attitudes towards both death and humour through time, and in homage to the notions 
of comedy and tragedy arising from theatre that have been discussed earlier and could 
be said to be a foundation of this thesis, the decision was made to portray participants’ 
narratives as a play. Van Maanen’s (1988:19) thoughts were also felt to be 
appropriate here: “little need was felt to do much more than gather and arrange the 
materials, for they would…speak for themselves”, however one full interview is 
provided in Appendix 6 to maintain Giorgi’s (1975) contention that the point of 
qualitative research is not that readers agree with the findings, for it is a given that 






DEATH: Death  
HUMOUR: Humour  
THERAPIST: Any one of us 
HELEN: Has worked in terminal care for 25 years, initially as an auxiliary nurse 
before training as a counsellor, with practice hours at a GP surgery. Has been a 




HERMAN: ‘got involved in lots of different areas around HIV, around private practice 
and all sorts of things’ and has been working as a counsellor for carers and 
relatives in a hospice for 5 years, with the last 2 of these including terminally ill 
patients.  
TED: Chose to begin counselling training after a redundancy from a background that 
‘has got absolutely nothing to do with counselling and palliative care’. Started 
volunteering in a hospice, which led to employment as a counsellor and 
supervisor.  
CAM: A patient and family therapist at a hospice for 2 years, working with patients in 
the community and on the ward where they are admitted for symptom control, 
respite or end of life. Describes himself as an integrative practitioner, matching 
interventions to presenting issues and personalities of the patient.  
PENNY: Has been working at a hospice for 10 years in ‘a mixed role’, managing a 
team and seeing patients, relatives and children.  
RUPERT: A clinical psychologist with a history of working in adult mental health, 
before being asked to specialise in terminal care, which he has been doing in 
hospices and palliative care centres since the 1990s as a counsellor, trainer and 
supervisor.  
RESEARCHER: A doctoral student and counsellor in a palliative care setting and 
hospice for nearly 2 years.  
 
Scene 1: ‘What brings you to my door?’ 
 
[DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST are stage left. Stage right is in darkness. DEATH 
and HUMOUR enter a therapist’s office and sit down a distance from each other. There 
is clearly some tension between the two.] 
 
THERAPIST: Thank you both for coming today. From the telephone conversation we 
had, you told me that you’re having some problems in your relationship. 
Perhaps you can tell me what brings you to my door? 
HUMOUR + DEATH: Well the problem starts… 
THERAPIST: It would be helpful if you could speak one at a time and not interrupt each 
other. 
HUMOUR: [To DEATH] Seeing as you always get the last word, perhaps I should start? 
DEATH: [Rolls his eyes] There you go again. 
HUMOUR: What do you mean?  
DEATH: You always try to diminish me. 
HUMOUR: You diminish everything! 
DEATH: Can’t you take this seriously, just for a minute? 
HUMOUR: Jeez, sorry for trying to lighten the mood. [To THERAPIST] He can be such a 
moody so and so sometimes. No fun at all.  
DEATH: [Defensively] Actually, I can be funny.  
HUMOUR: Really? 
DEATH: Yes. I have a joke. Ahem. Death walks into a bar. He orders a pint of beer.  
[HUMOUR + THERAPIST look at each other perplexed] 
HUMOUR: And? 
DEATH: Death was thirsty.  
HUMOUR: …and did Death order a bucket and a mop? 




THERAPIST: I think we might be veering off subject. What brought you both here 
today? 
DEATH: I’m having one of those mid-life things…you know, an…existential crisis? I 
get some pretty bad press, and frankly, I don’t think [looks at HUMOUR] she 
helps.  
HUMOUR: I’d ask if you’re joking, but I know you’re not. I can’t believe you’re 
blaming this on me. [To THERAPIST] Do you know how hard it is to be funny 
when he’s near me?  
THERAPIST: What makes you think it’s hard to be funny around him? 
HUMOUR: The two of us are hardly a natural couple. It takes a lot of work to make us 
work. 
DEATH: I do not make it hard work. I simply am.  
HUMOUR: You are so passive. 
DEATH: I cannot help it if people come to me naturally. How do you think I feel? I 
know you don’t want me around when you’re doing what you do. It is not as if I 
make it hard to be funny.  
HUMOUR: But you do make it so hard for me. I’m only trying to make people feel 
better.  
THERAPIST: Can either of you give me an example? 
DEATH: Very well… 
 
Scene 2: ‘A personal experience of humour’ 
 
[Lights up stage right. HERMAN, TED and CAM sit opposite RESEARCHER. DEATH, 
HUMOUR and THERAPIST watch the scene but HERMAN, TED and CAM and 
RESEARCHER are unaware they’re there] 
 
HERMAN: That whole thing of death and humour, you know, black humour and all the 
rest of it…it can be uncomfortable for a lot of people and culturally it can be 
very difficult as well… 
(HERMAN pauses). 
 
HUMOUR: See? Straight off the bat; he feels uncomfortable about me! 
DEATH: You of all people should know to wait for the end and the punch line. 
HUMOUR: That’s rich coming from you. 
DEATH: Just listen, will you. 
 
HERMAN: I passed my personal boundary and have laughed in loads of situations that 
are very black such as at funerals…I’ve had bereavement in my family, and 
humour was an everyday part of what we did and actually it helped cope, it was 
normalising…But my personal experience of humour doesn’t translate quite so 
easily when you’re with a client. The prior is fine because that was about me, 
but with clients, it’s constantly being aware of those boundaries and trying to 
hold them. 
TED: My sense of humour was important when I started working here…what I did 
have was my personality…I always like to bring a bit of fun, a bit of humour 
into things because I think, well, life is funny…life’s too short, you know, make 
fun of things, enjoy it, see the funny side. Like Life of Brian’s, ‘always look on 





DEATH: [Sarcastically] Or even, ‘always look on the bright side of death’ 
 
RESEARCHER: [Laughs]  
CAM: When my mother died, we found a letter that she’d left, ‘instructions for mum’s 
funeral’. There were all sorts of things on the list, ‘these are the song’s I’d like’, 
and in brackets, ‘not that version because I always hated that one’, and there 
was humour there, so humour from beyond the grave. 
 
[Lights down stage right - DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
DEATH: See? I remember the good old days when…[gets lost in reminiscence]  
THERAPIST: You said earlier you’re feeling diminished. What’s that like for you?  
DEATH: [Ignoring THERAPIST] I remember the good old days when I was taken 
seriously, there was none of this [looks at HUMOUR] joking about me.  
HUMOUR: And don’t I just know it. You’ve made it very clear that I shouldn’t make 
jokes about you.  
THERAPIST: Perhaps you can give me an example of what you mean? 
 
Scene 3:  ‘Capital S Serious’ 
 
[Lights up stage right - HERMAN, TED and CAM, who sit opposite RESEARCHER.] 
 
HERMAN: There’s a preconception that we have about humour being taboo. When 
people are dying, you can’t be humorous…I think there’s something about this 
profession that we have, and all the training can sometimes give us this sense of 
having to present this certain face, but it’s not about putting on the mask and 
being the therapist, it’s about being Herman! 
 
 
HUMOUR: See, I’m a taboo! 
DEATH: Actually, I think you’ll find I am… 
 
 
TED: There can be an element of ‘I have to be deadly serious here’…the situation that 
patients or families find themselves in is not a laughing matter, it’s not what the 
humour’s around but I do think sometimes counsellors don’t demonstrate 
something which is quite a human side of working with another human being...I 
think generally speaking in the public, certainly in this culture in this country, 
we don’t talk about death…most people in the community don’t deal with 
people that are dying, they can’t imagine where humour perhaps would come 
into it…they don’t want to say anything wrong and upset them so therefore ‘I 
won’t say anything, I’ll stay away’.  
CAM: I really ramped it up before I started working here. I thought the work was, you 
know, capital S Serious…I remember when I had my interview, I showed no 
humour in it whatsoever, I was so…clinical and existentialist and 
Freudian…But it was on my first day here that I noticed the warmth in the 
building and the camaraderie and laughter…At first, I thought ‘oh god, that’s 




the presumption that this is über serious because it’s about death, but you can’t 
maintain that…you have to temper it with humour. 
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
HUMOUR: I can see that people like me being around, but I can’t help but feel they 
aren’t sure when it’s ok for me to be there. 
THERAPIST: What might you mean by that? 
 
 
Scene 4: Being guarded with the first client 
 
[Lights up stage right - HERMAN, TED and CAM, who sit opposite RESEARCHER.] 
 
HERMAN: I felt the need to be guarded with my first terminal client, not saying 
anything that might be offensive or make light of the person’s situation, and so 
being humorous felt uncomfortable. The presence of humour somehow 
undermined the seriousness of what they were going through. I got very anal 
with that first client, wrapped up in the devastating situation that client was in, 
you know, with their life passing by…I think my resistance in those early days 
were more based around my fear, not really around the client’s fear because he 
was clearly attempting to communicate something in a different way, and trying 
for it to be allowable and old me said ‘no’ [Laughs] in a very subtle way just by 
not responding to him, thinking ‘what the hell do I say?’ It happened three times 
and bless him, he kept trying…I wanted to laugh because it was humorous and I 
felt guilty for wanting to laugh. 
RESEARCHER: How did it leave you feeling? 
HERMAN: Well, I just kept a blank canvas and felt very uncomfortable knowing that 
I’d missed something that could have been really embracing and holding…and 
recognising that perhaps it disallowed them from engaging with their own state, 
their own way of being because I felt so closed off. But having worked through 
this with the first client, with the other clients, it almost became an 
expectation…that humour could be there, you know, in that way. 
CAM: I don’t think I’d have dared using humour straight away here, but as I’ve 
learned, there needs to be a light touch to it. 
PENNY: I don’t think humour’s always been there. I think I’ve got better as I‘ve 
become more experienced. I’m pretty sure that in the early days, I would have 
allowed myself to be distracted by it, so a funny story or whatever, I would have 
listened to it and it would have taken up ten minutes of the session, but now I 
might allow that once or twice but I think I’ve got better at it over the years. 
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
HUMOUR: They resist me. You make them resist me. 
DEATH: That’s only when they started working there. You’re only choosing to look at 
the bits you want to look at.  
HUMOUR: Am I?   
DEATH: Yes. Besides, do you think it is appropriate for you to be there all the time? 




HUMOUR: I see your point. It is simply that…I don’t like to be discarded because 
people don’t think they should use me. I might even be helpful. It hurts to be cut out.  
THERAPIST: How might that be? 
 
Scene 5: ‘Humour in the early days’ 
 
[Lights up stage right - HERMAN, HELEN, RUPERT and CAM, who sit opposite 
RESEARCHER.] 
 
HELEN: Humour’s not really there at first…because you’re only gauging where you’re 
at with them and where they are…you have to be more cautious…I certainly 
wouldn’t be wanting to use something that I thought was funny or would help 
when that wasn’t where they were coming from with that. 
RUPERT: I think after that initial putting someone at ease, and the next session, I will 
assume that I don’t need to do quite so much of the putting at ease, sometimes 
you do but often you don’t so I’m much more going to follow their lead in terms 
of how we start off. 
HERMAN: Humour in the early days can be quite challenging because you don’t really 
get the other person just yet. Once the trust and understanding has been 
established, then it works really well. With clients who are terminally ill, they 
use humour much earlier…It comes in the very first session sometimes and they 
make some sort of glib comment and I know they’re waiting for a 
reaction…Quite often in the early stages of your engagement with therapy, 
there’s a distancing that happens, and it’s about testing the waters as well, it’s ‘I 
can joke about this and you can accept that and if you can joke about it and I 
can accept that then maybe there’s something we can do that’s, you know, 
positive here’. 
 
DEATH: Cam sums it up well… 
 
CAM: It doesn’t happen straight away. Sometimes it does. 
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
THERAPIST: I think we’ve made some good progress [Looks at DEATH] and I’m 
wondering how you feel about what’s been said? 
DEATH: I’m as much a part of life as anything, yet people feel the need to joke to 
make me more acceptable.  
HUMOUR: Knock, knock. 
THERAPIST: Who’s there? 
HUMOUR: Death! [Laughs] 
DEATH: [Sulks] 
THERAPIST: I can see you’re not happy with that, what does it mean to you? 
DEATH: I’m jealous that people would rather have Humour around than me.  
Scene 6: ‘Working with the terminal’ 
 






HELEN: I think having something so, you know, life-limiting, from diagnosis, whether 
it be the patient, carer, relative, from diagnosis everyone’s world has been 
flipped. It’s a change that has to happen, even just to adapt to the news…and I 
think that’s the real leveller. That’s when you get real bare bone, that’s almost 
the worst situation that could happen.  
HERMAN: Working with the terminal, you see how people actually live with their 
illness, with the fact that they are dying and that acceptance and 
understanding...We’re looking to improve the client’s understanding of himself, 
their ability to live with themselves, make the appropriate decisions for 
themselves and afford a better quality of life that they can embrace much more 
wholly. It’s not like that with terminal clients…For me, it’s about how to allow 
them to reach an end that they feel happy with...You’re not trying to make it 
better because you bloody well can’t. Client’s gonna die. They know they’re 
gonna die… and I can’t make it better. I can’t even pretend that we can try and 
quote unquote fix… The difficulty for me is the lack of hope you have in terms 
of being able to go on and lead a full life, because that always comes from our 
own reference point. A full life for me is another 10, 20, 30, 40 years…that isn’t 
the way for the client…for me, it’s about allowing them to be how they need to 
be…so that they get a sense of something, what that something is I can’t tell 
you…But there’s part of those people gets lost, that’s how it feels…You lose 
the vitality and you lose the ability to be humorous.  
TED: You know, there’s deathly sad, sad, desperately sad, all the various emotions 
and things that go with the circumstances they find themselves…Some of the 
circumstances are so different to what they ever anticipated when they got 
married, when they had children, when they did whatever they did, and 
suddenly they find their partner or whatever is dying of a life-limiting illness, it 
throws up a different type of life they never knew even existed. 
CAM: For these clients, death is knocking at the door every night. And you get those 
that are pragmatic or clinical in their presentation and they’re holding 
something back and therefore keeping you as a therapist away. That’s not to say 
that it’s a permanent position, but it’s worrying because that’s when existential 
anxieties can happen and with the families the complex grieving can happen 
because the work that can be done now sometimes isn’t allowed.  
RUPERT: I’m always very careful because the clients I work with are often highly 
distressed…by definition, that’s why they’re going to see you or I. You see 
these people going through quite significant mood swings, so even though 
physically the situation may be the same or deteriorating, we may still find that 
from session to session they’ve changed from being quite low to quite high, and 
certainly within sessions as well.  
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
DEATH: I understand their fear. It would be nice if people didn’t hate me for being 
who I am. I can’t help that.  
HUMOUR: Then why be upset with me? I only try and help people see you in a 
different light.  
DEATH: But sometimes when you do, you can make it much worse if you’re not 
careful.  
HUMOUR: Sure, go ahead. Criticise me. Everyone else does.  





Scene 7: ‘Humour’s actually risky’ 
 
[Lights up stage right - HELEN, HERMAN, TED, RUPERT, PENNY and CAM, who sit 
opposite RESEARCHER.] 
 
HELEN: If someone was completely struggling with complex grief and they were 
telling you something, you certainly wouldn’t come back with a quip that was 
meant to be humorous.  
HERMAN: Some clients use humour to distance…I think certainly in British culture, 
there’s something about humour being often annihilating for some people…and 
that can be uncomfortable in therapeutic sessions, because if you come in with 
that sort of remit…how can you do something that’s possibly insulting?…It’s 
like this one client: whilst I was just making an aside comment as a way of 
reflecting back how we could look at this in different ways…she took it very 
much as a major insult that what she was feeling wasn’t right, and that’s where 
that belittling sense comes in I think. She did lighten up after a while but it took 
two or three sessions to actually get over the rupture, but it also allowed her to 
reflect on where she was at and what she wasn’t doing or allowing herself to do, 
i.e. humour. I guess that’s an argument for saying maybe its right but, I don’t 
know, it’s a hard judgement call. 
TED: It makes me think of this client I recently saw where there was no humour at 
all…and I wouldn’t have brought any in because she was in the depths of 
despair and there was no place for it…But at the same time, there are some 
counsellors that can be too counsellory and not human enough. 
CAM: Sometimes laughter and humour mask pain…I wonder sometimes whether it 
can be smoke and mirrors. As a therapist, I have to sense the incongruence of 
it…it’s just about listening first of all that you can hear, can’t you sometimes, if 
a laugh is not natural, if it’s almost like, ‘no, everything’s fine’…and that can 
make me feel really uncomfortable because immediately I’m thinking…‘you’re 
really, you’ve got a lid on your pain’. 
PENNY: I don’t use humour as a way of wanting to be buddies, because it isn’t that, or 
that I use humour as a way of lightening the mood because actually it was too 
heavy to hold, I don’t mean that either. Humour’s actually risky because the 
message isn’t…lets laugh about it because that’s a way of avoiding it, or we’ll 
laugh about it because it’s better than crying. The laugh isn’t humorous, the 
laugh is, ‘I’m going to laugh because actually I want to cry’, or ‘I’m going to 
laugh because maybe I don’t really know what’s going on but I’m overwhelmed 
by something and I don’t know how to behave in this moment so I’ll laugh’. 
That can be quite distracting to the therapist.  
RUPERT: There are times you are really needing to sit on somebody because they may 
be making too light of things, using it too much as a protection or perhaps 
distracting…obstructing progress…There’s a danger with more elaborate 
humour, in that to some extent you will start to worry whether the session has 
been started to engineer around it [laughs] you almost set your patient up so that 
you can tell a particular story in a certain way….I do hope that clients don’t feel 
an obligation to make me feel more comfortable, but you get that, don’t you, 
clients that  take a lot of responsibility for the emotion that’s in the room and the 




have to look after everybody else as well as themselves….I do have a 
cautionary note too, in fact. I think humour’s fine at the beginning - if you’ve 
misjudged it, you’ve got plenty of time to sort that out, but humour at the end of 
the session is potentially quite dangerous because you’re not getting the 
opportunity to fully judge the impact…and also because you’re relaxing too 
much yourself at that point, you’re more likely to misjudge it.. 
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
[DEATH and HUMOUR sit in a sullen silence.] 
 




DEATH: [To HUMOUR] Don’t be too sad. It’s not all bad.  
HUMOUR: [Looks at DEATH in a surprised way] Really? 
DEATH: Of course. Where would people be without you? 
HUMOUR: What do you mean? 
DEATH: Well for Helen, for example – she says you help make a bond with clients, 
and that you diffuse heavy sessions… 
HUMOUR: How do you know that is what Helen said? 
DEATH: One of the perks of the job.  
 
Scene 8: ‘Humour helps treat the client like a person, not like a dying person’ 
 
[Lights up stage right - HELEN, HERMAN, TED, CAM, PENNY and RUPERT, who sit 
opposite RESEARCHER.] 
 
HELEN: Like this one client who had this whole series of misfortunate events [Helen 
goes on to list what happened] [laughs] 
RESEARCHER: [Laughs] 
HELEN: [Laughs] So as you’ve just laughed there, that was the nature of the session. I 
was laughing with her, I was empathising with ‘oh dear,’ you know, ‘oh gosh’, 
‘well, you wouldn’t have known’…Using the humour with it softened her 
embarrassment…and my laughter was with her not at her….But humour also 
breaks the ice. I think if you were visiting somebody that was dying, that 
literally only had a few days or what have you to live…if they instigate humour, 
I’m not sure…whether they do that to break the intensity, or whether because 
sometimes we can, it’s like taking pot shots at yourself, people that make 
humour about their own situation…often that is to relieve tension.  
HERMAN: For some, I think it’s a really good observation on life…a point where they 
say…‘I can say whatever I like because I’ve earned the right to do it’…Humour 
helps treat the client like a person, not like a dying person. Actually for me, 
humour goes past the situation and touches the person…It feels more genuine, I 
can be me. And that also I think helps the client to be them…Humour is also a 
liberation, it actually feels quite refreshing…I feel liberated as well, to be able 
to experience that with [clients] but I felt more that it [is] about the client being 




they’re allowed to laugh, and can maintain the vitality, and I know that’s a 
really strange word to use in terms of death, but it is a vitality. Just because I 
have this, why does it mean I have to die before my time? And not die. And not 
die. And not die prematurely. Not die in their personality and their way of 
being. Humour means my client can be more than a shell of expectation that 
people place upon them, or even that they place on themselves.  
TED: We need to be inclusive of all of that the client brings, excluding humour would 
be a bit like excluding conversation or excluding facial expressions, it is part of 
us, isn’t it? The therapeutic relationship is important to me and it’s about a 
relationship and that relationship can reflect the relationship with others in the 
community…and life has humour in it so why would you come into the room 
with another human being and it be excluded? Why would you?...Humour 
makes the sessions a bit more enjoyable and it also deepens the relationship and 
shows a level of trust…by showing that they’re seeing the funny side of 
something that’s to all intents and purposes a very, very serious situation, they 
are maybe feeling a level of trust with what’s in the room for them to be able to 
joke about it…By sharing in that humour, you’re acknowledging where they are 
in that situation, where clients can recognise the absurdities of their lives…They 
can laugh about it, and laughing with them, it’s a laughing together…it’s like an 
acknowledgement…it’s potentially just acknowledgement of another feeling.  
CAM: All the patients have something in common, which is that they’re at the end of 
their life and we don’t have time sometimes to work out how to pitch the work, 
so it’s a bit of a gift when humour is used by the patient…it feels like they’re 
giving you a bit of an invite, ok this is how I can work…At the end of life, 
people are laughing at what it means to be human. Most of my patients aren’t 
afraid to die but rather want more of this. Life. And normally it’s because 
they’ve enjoyed it and it’s been fun. They don’t want more misery but they 
want more fun…And it’s alright in these sessions to smile with them, to laugh 
with them, because that type of reminiscence can be really, really 
therapeutically powerful for them…in remembering, they can depart from their 
current experience for a while…It’s like they’re saying ‘remind me what being 
well is like.’ And if we treat people as they are, we make them worse. If we 
treat people as they ought to be, we help them to become what they are capable 
of becoming. And that’s the thing, don’t treat them as they are, miserable, treat 
them as they ought to be treated, as that full, holistic, yeah…When clients wrap 
what they’re feeling in a bit of humour, they’re actually being kinder to me as a 
therapist…And the other thing is, humour makes therapy more open. It almost 
moves quicker, which is more important when working in end of life care 
because the sands of time tend to be running quicker. Again, it’s about 
permission, ‘ok, I’m letting you in. I’ve opened the gate, you can come in’.  
RESEARCHER: An invitation, almost 
CAM: I’m going to let you in, come and sit next to me. Let’s have a talk but lets have 
a laugh as well…One client was pushing buttons all the time via a sense of 
humour, really pushing the boundaries, um almost like a teenager so I wondered 
whether the sense of humour reminds the person of how they used to be, makes 
them feel a bit young again, when I was cheeky…it is playful…Now when this 
patient died, I was more affected than I would be had the relationship been 
purely clinical. I was really upset because I really enjoyed her. She made me 
laugh. And um because of the sense of humour, I really respected her as well. I 




being at ease with it…I’d go on record as saying that those who congruently use 
humour in their sessions are going to have a good death because they had a 
good life.  
RESEARCHER: A good death? 
CAM: A lot of the patients who have a sense of humour, I do imagine them dying with 
a smile on their face. Those who use humour more in their sessions it feels to 
me as though they’ve had a happier life and therefore they may have an easier 
death, or be more at ease with it…When humour happens, it’s quite astounding. 
It really astounds me sometimes. I think it’s quite brilliant. It’s like that quote, 
‘whilst the fighting spirit cannot cure, it can prolong life’ and I feel that the 
fighting spirit is, well humour is needed in it.  
PENNY: I end up curious really sometimes about what clients are telling you in the 
humour because you can get some quite useful information by actually what 
they say…But it isn’t about let’s make a joke of this its more about it’s a way of 
making contact with people, isn’t it? And particularly when you can feel there’s 
a tension and I’m wanting to put across that actually I’m just a normal human 
being. So I think I do use it as a way of trying to um help someone relax or as a 
way of making connection. I think I only use it as a way of getting on 
someone’s wavelength. And building a relationship, because they have to 
connect to me as a person and I think that’s how I would use it. And actually 
those people that use humour are easier to work with  
RESEARCHER: I wonder if you can say a bit more about that? 
PENNY: It’s almost as though humour just gives a bit of respite in the 
conversation…and it kind of just for a moment you can take a breath…And it’s 
not just despair. Because there are some that are just despair and you come out 
feeling completely drained.  
RUPERT: I will always try with people to put them at their ease by being as friendly 
and relaxed as I possibly can, therefore little bits of humour about the situation 
we find ourselves at this point, something that might raise a smile or whatever 
might just help with that rapport building, it is essentially about establishing that 
engagement, that rapport um so whatever does that…it’s self soothing isn’t it, 
so they relax themselves, like I do when teaching, it’s me I’m putting at ease 
with a little bit of humour with my audience and I think similarly quite a lot of 
our patients will use a little bit of light hearted banter of some sort or another to 
put themselves at ease in my company 
RESEARCHER: Does it feel as though you’re putting yourself at ease when you use it 
with clients? 
RUPERT: Well obviously some patients, you feed off their anxiety, so um so yeah it 
probably is actually, it’s about settling myself in as much as, yeah you’re quite 
right…But of course because on the whole it does tend to be at the level of the 
in the moment banter, um rather than anything more than that, then a lot of it 
just comes and goes…Like in a group I ran…they were saying important things, 
but they were also using humour as a way in which they could actually cope 
with saying it I think. It was really, it was soothing them at the time, it was 
stopping them from feeling overwhelmed by emotion…there was a sense of 
coming together and exploring how they adjusted to this new situation, this set 
of circumstances, how it made them feel about themselves, how it impacted 
upon their relationships with others…If there’s some laughter in the room, um 
then to me it feels like it’s balancing the session. Like the idea that within a 




able to cry it’s also possible for them to laugh, then I really feel like we’ve 
covered the range and it’s saying something quite positive about our 
relationship that it can actually have both of those in it  um and its also 
something about the emotional flexibility of the individual, that they’ve been 
able to make that sort of switching around within a session, because that’s what 
we do normally after all. And there have been a number of occasions where 
people have said to me, ‘that’s the first time I’ve been able to laugh in weeks’ or 
whatever and I’ve really liked it when people have said that. 
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
THERAPIST: That is the first time in this session that you’ve supported each other and 
I’m keen to explore how you can both keep going with it.  
HUMOUR: I’m happy to try. I want this relationship to work.  
DEATH: Me too.  
THERAPIST: That’s a start.  
HUMOUR: Perhaps I’m too fixated on looking at one issue?  
DEATH: I think we both are.  
THERAPIST: So how do we get past that? 
 
Scene 9: ‘I don’t think it’s necessarily unique to this setting’  
 
[Lights up stage right - HERMAN, HELEN, RUPERT, TED, PENNY and CAM, who sit 
opposite RESEARCHER.] 
 
HELEN: In my general nursing, I don’t think humour really played a part. My work at 
the hospice, I don’t know if it’s something different where if someone is 
terminal or has a life-limiting or life-changing illness or situation, that whether 
that in itself makes a meeting of minds. I don’t know if humour’s more there, 
but it’s different… 
RESEARCHER: What about in the general practice you did?  
HELEN: Probably less, I think. It was probably slightly different because I see people 
at home as well so I think you’re a bit more relaxed in that sort of environment 
um, a GP surgery I worked in, I think humour didn’t really enter any of those, it 
was a more formal sort of structure. 
RESEARCHER: So it felt more structured in private practice, or at the GP surgery, than 
it does here?  
HELEN: I think in private practice if it was instigated by the client, then I wouldn’t 
block it, I would be allowing of it…but certainly in the my GP practice that I 
worked in, I don’t recall any sort of humour. It was very much a formalised sort 
of session that we had. 
HERMAN: I think personally, the only difference that strikes me immediately is that 
working with clients who aren’t terminally ill, I encourage humour, I’ve got bits 
and pieces that allow a bit of fun to come in, um and I think humour is always 
really important…I think the humour is more raw with terminal patients and I 
think it’s more honest 
TED: the placement that I had was a private 6
th
 form college, 16-19 year olds 




TED: Well, yes and no, I think it’s the same. I don’t think it’s necessarily unique to 
this setting, I really don’t…I always describe my placement as…a baptism by 
fire. Here it’s very controlled, you know generally speaking what you’re 
getting. I think the humour was definitely there because I think again it’s the 
same thing, I think it’s the absurdities that people find they can laugh at 
something that’s happened to them. 
CAM: I’m not sure that there is, I can’t think of anything [pauses]. Nothing jumps out. 
It wouldn’t be right to say yes. Here, it’s darker sometimes; definitely darker. 
You know what it reminds me of, it reminds me of European art house films - 
they’re funny, but in that dark kind of, you squirm a bit, it’s uncomfortable but 
it’s not unpleasant, it’s not nasty or malicious, or but it’s close to the bone. I 
think French movies do that really well and the humour in a session with 
someone whose at end of life reminds me of that.  
PENNY: I’m not sure that there is a difference. I wonder if it’s more noticeable or feels 
more significant if it’s a patient that uses humour because they’re dying and so 
it’s further away from where you might expect them to be, to be laughing and 
making a joke about something…I think it’s more about the person, some use it 
quite a lot and some don’t even crack a smile. 
RUPERT: I’ve not noticed a difference, actually. There may be, but…no I think the 
things I’ve just said would’ve applied in the past with my with adult mental 
health patients and will apply with the distressed relative as much as it will with 
the patient. I think there may be some changes in the kind of humour. I think 
that somebody for whom death is getting reasonably close, may actually find 
that they are more inclined to dare to use a bit of black humour than they would 
have perhaps done previously, or certainly in my company would have dared to 
do previously, because there’s something about the appropriateness of that they 
sometimes struggle with so even though it might cross their minds, they might 
censor it…So I think there may be a little bit more evidence of black 
humour…‘I’ve gained the right to do this’. It’s going to be more situation-
bound - the idea that somebody being close to death, that may be causing them 
more distress, but as we know, that isn’t necessarily the case. Sometimes the 
certainty that that provides is actually quite reassuring to people…so there may 
be other reasons why the person will find it harder to be humorous much more 
linked to other events that are going on in their life. 
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume]. 
 
DEATH: Perhaps it isn’t down to just you and me? Are we putting too much pressure 
on ourselves?  
HUMOUR: Maybe we are being too hard on ourselves. And each other. 
DEATH: I’m sorry if I’ve been mean to you. 
HUMOUR: Me too. I really shouldn’t be so serious about things. 
DEATH: It is a bit of a contradiction.  








Scene 10: ‘I may well use humour as well’ 
 
[Lights up stage right - HERMAN, HELEN, RUPERT, TED, PENNY and CAM, who sit 
opposite RESEARCHER.] 
 
HELEN: I can tell when it’s going to be ok to use it so whether it is something that the 
client instigates first, I think probably so because I’m not so sure I would just 
throw humour in. No I think it’s something that the client instigates, and you 
know if that’s then comfortable or alright to do so, based on the response. 
HERMAN: Certainly when it comes to the clients we’re talking about, I will always 
allow them to bring it in rather than me bringing it in, because that actually feels 
more respectful and more being there for them…A lot of it’s spontaneous, and 
often, thinking about clients, you know it isn’t like a ‘boom boom’, it isn’t that 
sort of jokey humour that’s coming through, it’s very, very, very, very much 
rooted in reality and personal experience…For me I think my stance on it is it 
all being about relationship, if I can be in a relationship with a client and hold 
them, hold them in a way that allows them to be them, um then something good 
happens. I often don’t understand what or why um but something good always 
seems to happen, actually for the both of us…I go with my gut feeling. I had 
one client who found it very difficult just to touch base with his feelings, it was 
just anger, anger anger, anger. It took a while before humour was allowed…it 
was very measured. I’m sure it was spontaneous but it didn’t feel that somehow 
and I think it would have been wrong for me to introduce it because of where he 
was. And actually I think it’s right for the client, the patient to take the lead in 
that. I think it’s more about me responding in an open way, allowing the 
possibility, without pushing it. 
TED: In my view, you can’t just laugh about something, it has to be something that is 
brought to you by the client…I work with where they are. I don’t come in 
saying, ‘right then ok, lets cheer this situation up then, you know, let’s have a 
laugh’…in the counselling room it’s definitely client led. Because you could 
just be going down a route that they don’t think is at all funny and I don’t like to 
assume that just because I find it slightly amusing that they may not, whatever 
the subject would be that I might be bringing, they have a very symbolic 
meaning to them that’s very, very upsetting…that’s where I think doing it first 
is inappropriate…You’re not there to make jokes. 
CAM: I think the other difference depends on the demographic…This is going to be a 
generalisation, but when someone is from a working class background, there’s 
more humour than if they are from middle, upper-middle and even upper 
class…those people who are of working class, that’s been their way of 
communicating most of their life that they were brought up in a household 
where there was banter, and um mocking within the family, all done in quite a 
light-hearted way, the family units tend to be quite tight around the person 
whose dying and therefore that gives you an indication that this is a family 
that’s been together for a long time. I would imagine that they’ve had jobs 
where they’ve been in organisations where it’s not about being intellectual and 
talking about world affairs, politics, the latest play that’s on at the Garrick 
theatre, and it’s more about it’s about humour and comedy and making each 
other laugh…It’s a means of communication, I wonder if it’s their own form of 
cheap entertainment as well because they don’t, um, you know, do other 




tend to be more serious and more pragmatic and matter of fact and what they 
can do very well is tell you what the consultant has told them but its then very 
difficult to access them at that emotional level, that ‘what is this like for you?’  
PENNY: I know this particular client very well now, so I know that she uses humour, 
and because I know her well, I may well use humour as well with her. If I don’t 
know them very well…I wouldn’t go ‘you said something awful and yet I 
notice you laugh’ because actually that’s quite a challenging remark, but I 
would clock that, that these are emotions that they’re clearly struggling with and 
they don’t know what to do with them and I’m getting what could be considered 
as an inappropriate response…and then when I get to know them better if 
they’re still doing it, then I’d say whatever would seem appropriate. I think I use 
humour though, or might use it, as an ice-breaker. It might be from when I meet 
them to where we end up sitting down…I mean certainly if they bring it up then 
it’s an invitation to either join in the humour or not, whichever feels more 
appropriate. I can’t think of examples but I don’t think I could categorically say 
that I don’t, that I always wait for the client. I think, I think I might if it, but 
then I’m thinking so when might I, um, I don’t know because it’s in the moment 
isn’t it? 
RUPERT: Often my opening remark to somebody is, ‘what brings you to my door?’ 
and sometimes they will take that in a humorous way and sometimes they will 
take it very seriously, and I just take my cue from them at that point. 
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
THERAPIST: It occurs to me that you are finding a middle ground to discuss your 
issues. How are you both feeling now? 
DEATH: I’m feeling better.  
HUMOUR: What doesn’t kill us makes us stronger. 
DEATH: Ahem.  
HUMOUR: Sorry, I couldn’t resist.  
DEATH: It’s fine, I like seeing you back to your old self. Maybe we should stop 
blaming each other? 
HUMOUR: I agree. There’s only so much we can control. I think we need to let go of 
what we cannot.  
DEATH: Maybe we need to look at how we are in other situations – outside of what 
these people are doing with their clients, or how their clients experience us 
when they’re not with their therapists? 
THERAPIST: There’s a world outside the consulting room?  
HUMOUR: [Smiles] Very good.  
 
Scene 11: ‘Out there, it’s not counselling’ 
 
[Lights up stage right - HERMAN, HELEN, RUPERT, TED, PENNY and CAM, who sit 
opposite RESEARCHER.] 
 
HELEN: There’s almost an expectation about humour, and in that respect I know even 
at the hospice we used to refer to it as a black humour because we could find 
humour in a situation that actually anyone on the outside might think ‘what on 




RESEARCHER: Do you mean with the client, or more generally at work? 
HELEN: I think as a work team. If someone was listening in or perhaps a fly on the 
wall, they might think ‘oo’.  
HERMAN: With one patient, he’s always been the joking one at work and at home, but 
I don’t think he can do that or be that anymore, so he has to use humour in a 
different way I think…what I understand from what he was saying is that they 
still find it quite difficult to engage at that level as they would have done before. 
I’ve been in the family unit at home so it sorta becomes more apparent that 
humour in the family home doesn’t exist, it all feels very heavy, very serious, 
you know, lots of anger, lots of despair, lots of pre-empted loss feelings…and 
I’m not sure he has the outlet or permission to be humorous….actually I think 
he finds it very difficult with his wife to be humorous because you know their 
relationship has changed so enormously because of her becoming the carer, him 
becoming totally incapacitated, and that takes something away with the fun of 
life, I think, because that translates into the inability to be humorous…in the 
same way that with that very first client I was talking about that I was protective 
of, not wanting to upset or distress by being humorous disrespectfully, I think 
he has the same approach with his family…It’s interesting ’cause as a team, 
we’re very humorous. I think there’s a lot of banter that goes around but it’s sort 
of safe because it’s away from people who might become distressed by that sort 
of humour. But I think that’s true of every sort of role that involves death and 
dying. I mean when you come away from the actual front line, I think there is a 
lot of black humour. There’s a sort of way of being able to cope with the 
feelings that are attached and normalise…and that’s a similar thing around sex, 
there’s almost a taboo. Humour and death [winces].  
 
DEATH: Ouch! 
HUMOUR: I know, right? We’re not that bad!  
DEATH: And the sex isn’t either.  
 
TED: Outside of the counselling room, of course I will because then that would be 
completely normal, because out there, it’s not counselling. We could be talking 
about the car parking walking down the corridor to the room at the time and 
‘bloody hell it’s raining again’ and you know it’s a little bit of banter in humour, 
being a human being…I suppose because I’m quite a chatty sort of bubbly 
person anyway, I’ve watched counsellors walk down the corridor in absolute 
silence, and I think ‘oh can’t you just be human’ you know, ‘hello, how are 
you?’ just be human, you know, ‘is your path alright? Isn’t the weather rubbish, 
cor it’s wet today’ you know, do you have to walk past with a ‘did you get wet 
on the way here?’ ‘oh yeah, you know, I left my brolly at home as well and’ it 
just humanises then you come in and sit down…And then it changes. Then we 
get out again, we might walk out that door, and it’s a sort of barrier it changes 
the atmosphere out there. 
CAM: Of all the different settings I’ve worked in, the hospice has the best sense of 
humour amongst staff and volunteers and as an organisation. There’s so much 
laughter on that ward in the different rooms that I go into, both patient rooms 
and staff rooms and clinical meetings and so I think it is important. I sprayed air 
freshener once, and a colleague commented, ‘smelt like death?’ [laughs]. So 
there’s lots of death jokes. When I first started working here and there were 




for a pound. In fact in some ways, it’s almost like, who can out shock the other. 
There’s often talk, people will say things like ‘god, I ought to get on and get 
married’, ‘oh have you got anyone in mind’, ‘no but I’ve gotta have kids, whose 
gonna look after me when I’m dying?’ I don’t know what you call it, but we’re 
laughing at ourselves. But are we, as well? Because as a therapist, there’s an 
unconscious process there as well. You’re laughing but you do mean it is as 
well. Shit, who is going to look after me when I’m older ’cause I see what it’s 
like when people don’t have family. So there’s that fine line sometimes where 
the laughter is…Clients find it difficult to use humour outside of therapy 
sometimes though…a lot of them talk about how they become their illness, 
they’re defined by that, so their families treat them very differently and so do 
their friends, there’s a bit of avoidance so friends will stay away, others are a bit 
imposing, and you know classically, friends and family want to rescue, they 
want to cure, and they want to diminish it. And what a lot of patients tell me is 
that they never have any fun anymore… 
RESEARCHER: How about the relatives? 
CAM: Well the relatives, I feel that they sometimes have to use humour and that is as 
a coping strategy…Sometimes if someone is dying and they’re in their last 
hours, then you hear relatives reminiscing about times gone by and they’ll have 
a laugh…And what you see is really quite beautiful but very painful, how they 
laugh themselves into crying and then from the crying they’ll pull themselves 
back into laughing and it’s so interesting how those two emotions sit next to 
each other. It’s amazing. It’s amazing. 
PENNY: Oh we use humour bit like nurses humour, outrageous, [laughs] absolutely 
outrageous. If a fly on the wall would hear the conversations and some of the 
things that we laugh at, and they’re not funny, and then we use it quite 
differently, we use it because actually to deal with death and dying you know, 
five days a week and sit with people who are dying if not imminently or people 
who’ve had so much loss and there’s just one more coming and sometimes it, it 
is a burden to carry and it’s a way of trying to shift some of that…And the 
difference in the team is that nobody would ever think that the humour was in 
any way dismissive or unfeeling or not compassionate…it’s a way of coping, so 
you can go back to the next one. And there’s quite a lot of laughter around the 
hospice generally, so you go in the coffee shop and you hear people laughing, or 
walk through the corridor, as we did, or at reception and there’ll be a laugh. And 
people are surprised and actually the clients who talk to me about it will say that 
it’s a really nice atmosphere and they come in and it’s a sigh of relief really that 
there’s somewhere where there’s someone who can look after them, so it’s 
interesting that laughter can be part of that and people will still feel looked after 
and taken seriously and what have you.  
RUPERT: When I’m teaching the same thing will apply, I will often like to start with 
something that will, yes, raise a little bit of a smile. It may not be brilliantly 
funny, but just produces that little bit of relaxation. I think we all relax a little 
more when we are amused.  
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
HUMOUR: I think I’ve had a…what do you call it? A breakthrough? People don’t like 
using me in certain situations, which now I think about it, makes perfect sense. 




Scene 12: ‘Humour in supervision, absolutely!’ 
 
[Lights up stage right – HERMAN, TED, PENNY and CAM, who sit opposite 
RESEARCHER.] 
 
HERMAN: That first client I told you about…it was one of those things I just had to 
take to supervision because what the hell do I do? I had that supervision session 
‘Oh, I don’t know how to handle this, I’m finding it really, really, really quite 
tough’ and very quickly came to realise with a very good supervisor saying 
‘why can’t you just be you, and why can’t you just let him be him? What are 
you worried about, what’s going on?’ 
TED: But as a supervisor, my supervision sessions are always fun because they’ve got 
to be fun because I strongly believe that if people don’t enjoy something they 
won’t learn…When I was training, one of the things that my supervisor at the 
time…who is the supervisor I have now…he said ‘there’s always one thing I 
remembered about you’ he said ‘and that is your use of humour and how 
humour works with your clients’ and I’d completely forgotten about this and he 
said to me…‘I now use it in my training’, and he says it was me that had 
brought that to him as an option. 
CAM: I’ve noticed as well that the students that I supervise, they pick up on the need 
to use humour quite quickly as well. They come here quite seriously but even in 
our clinical supervision, I find that it’s lighter and there’s a bit more banter in it 
than there is in other settings. One student said to me something like ‘and the 
client and I were laughing and the client was joking and it was really funny – is 
that alright?’ and I said to her, ‘clients don’t just come to therapy to be 
miserable’. You can’t just be miserable and therapy’s not just looking at the 
miserable stuff. 
PENNY: Humour in supervision, absolutely. So supervision as a learning environment, 
absolutely that’s a good place to learn and to take that the fact that your client 
laughs from the moment they arrive to the moment they leave, and what’s that? 
 
[Lights down stage right. DEATH, HUMOUR and THERAPIST resume.] 
 
DEATH: I feel like we’ve got quite far today. 
HUMOUR: Yeah, thank you!  
THERAPIST: I feel I ought to be thanking you – there’s quite a lot I’ve learned today 
myself.  
 
Scene 13: ‘My learning is…’ 
 
[Lights up stage right - HERMAN, HELEN, TED, PENNY and CAM, who sit opposite 
RESEARCHER.] 
 
HELEN: You know when someone says ‘don’t look’ and you automatically do, I 
unfortunately can fall into that trap very quickly, so if someone had said ‘don’t 
mention the war’ I can guarantee I’d be saying something about the war, or the 
Germans and England. I don’t know what it is, there’s a part of me that gets 
drawn to it…humour for me, sometimes I can be caught out with it, so I’m very 




nursing [talks in depth about two particular instances, and both Helen and 
Researcher laugh. A lot.] but I like humour, I do use humour every day. 
HERMAN:  I’ll name humour for what it is rather than trying to avoid it. I think it’s 
freed me from the shackles of what we consider to be appropriate or respectful 
or honouring or whatever it may be. It was a big learning curve for me I 
think…and it’s made me more open to it…In all my other work it’s allowed me 
to be that much more open and accessible to the humour…I think that it would 
actually be impossible to do any sort of terminal work without humour. 
Actually, impossible to do anything therapeutic work without humour. It’s an 
important part of therapy I think. Essential part of therapy I think. It reminds me 
of my own therapy with a gestalt therapist where I was allowed to choose toys, 
one that represented myself, one that represented my therapist and one that 
represented the process for me…I wonder, it just strikes me, I wonder how that 
might work in working with a terminally ill client. There’s something about the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of using that perhaps. 
RESEARCHER: That reminds me of how you felt with that first client and humour 
HERMAN: It feels comfortable doing that in a normal session. A normal session? 
They’re all normal sessions, but you know it’s about respect, it’s about 
respecting the end of life. And do toys do that? But why wouldn’t they? It’s an 
interesting question for me to hold. 
TED: I think because of the experience I’ve now got, I understand what people go 
through and I haven’t experienced what people go through, yet, and hopefully I 
won’t…but I’ve seen an awful lot and I’ve heard an awful lot of stories over the 
years, so I think I’ve tended to learn where humour is appropriate and where it 
is not and to be able to pick up um the right time for it or not the right time for 
it. 
PENNY: I’ll probably find now I use it completely differently to how I thought I did. I 
shall be a bit more aware. And noticing that either I do it more than I realised 
and you know I and when I do it. Yeah, I’ll let you know. I’ll be a bit more 
conscious of it. 
CAM: This is the most life affirming place to work, because the people that I work 
with teach me more about life because they’re at the end of life…they do 
inspire. And they’ve got me to change my life. And I think I’m a bit more light-
hearted actually as a result. Um, I think my sense of humour has changed since 
I’ve worked here. I give myself permission. If I was in a room in a hospice and I 
was at the end of life stage, what might I like to hear? And I think I’d quite like 
to hear laughter and music…My learning is don’t take life so seriously, and as a 
result, don’t take death so seriously either. Or be lighter with it. Because you 
can’t do anything about it.  
RESEARCHER: That’s great – thank you! 
CAM: Before we end, let me just go through some of these notes and see if I have any 
examples of jokes for you. [Rifles through files.] You know as I’m going 
through these, I think the last thing to say is that actually a sense of humour is 
not that common. I mean what I’ve been talking about is probably 3 or 4 
patients out of hundreds. It surprises me. Yeah, I’m going to go on record as 
saying that that surprises me. As I go through the files now, sense of humour – 
actually that person’s got a sense of humour. But he’s a personality disorder so 
maybe that’s got something to do with it. No it’s not that common. That’s one 
out of um, two out of a hundred maybe. It’s not that common.  






THERAPIST: With all these examples of therapists, I do wonder what you think has 
been happening in the room here with me, but our time is up. Will I be seeing 
you next week?  







Chapter 7: Analysis 
 
 “In tragedy we cannot imitate several lines of actions carried on at one and the same 
time; we must confine ourselves to the action on the stage and the part taken by the 
players.  But in epic poetry, owing to the narrative form, many events simultaneously 
transacted can be presented”  
- Aristotle (trans. 2003:57) 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to portray an analysis of the findings. With no clear 
guidelines from Bruner as to how to analyse findings, the researcher was free to 
implement a myriad of different methods. After several failed attempts at trying to 
analyse findings without ‘killing the joke’ as it were, the decision was made to focus 
on the key components of narrative, which include character, plot, temporality and 
situatedness. Attention has been paid here to not only the content of the participants’ 
stories, but also how they were told, and in accordance with Polkinghorne (1995:16), 
a “to-and-fro movement from parts to whole that is involved in comprehending a 
finished text”. The ‘whole’ of the stories combined will thus be compared to the 
individual parts of participants’ stories. It is to be acknowledged that what follows is 
only one story, from a multitude that could be told, of a researcher’s re-telling of her 
participants’ stories, as Bruner (2004:709) states, “any story one may tell about 
anything is better understood by considering other possible ways in which it can be 
told”.  
7.1.1  Characters 
The characters of our story are six therapists, the researcher, and also the clients, 
supervisors and work colleagues that are introduced in the vignettes presented by the 
therapists. At times, humour and death also become personified as characters through 
‘death knocking on [clients’] doors every night’ (Cam) and ‘humour…touch[ing] the 




longest standing therapist in the group, and also the only one who identifies himself as 
a counselling psychologist, compared to the other five who consider themselves 
primarily to be counsellors. Next is Helen, who has twenty-five years of experience in 
palliative care, though with only seven of these being a counsellor in this setting. 
Penny and Ted both have approximately ten years of experience, followed by Herman 
with five years, and the ‘youngest’ of the group being Cam, with two years. An 
appreciation of the length of time they have been practicing as palliative therapists 
provides a context to their stories and has potential implications in what meaning they 
make and what they learn from their experiences. 
In narrative tradition, these characters can be seen as heroes, villains and 
victims. In first reading the stories, we might think that it is humour that is the hero, 
backed by the army of supervisors and work colleagues that make his fight against 
death, the villain, an easier one, ultimately to salvage the therapists and clients, both 
of whom appear to be victims. On deeper inspection of each individual story, 
however, we can see that these roles are much more transient. Herman, for example, 
begins his journey with his first client and death being victims of the villainary nature 
of himself and humour, ‘I felt the need to be guarded with my first terminal client, not 
saying anything that might be offensive or make light…the presence of humour 
somehow undermined the seriousness of what [the client was] going through’. In turn, 
his client becomes the hero, allowing him to ‘work through this’ and thus hands over 
the heroic baton to Herman himself, who is able to be more present for his other 
clients: ‘humour helps treat the client like a person, not like a dying person…I can be 
me. And that also I think helps the client to be them’, ultimately slaying the villain, 
death. Ted, on the other hand, could be seen as a hero throughout his story. He starts 




important when I started working here’, eventually arriving at a destination where he 
influences his supervisor’s practice, ‘he says it was me that had brought [humour] to 
him as an option’.  
At times, the researcher is called into position. Though the first person is being 
used in participants’ stories the majority of the time, implying an ownership over their 
experiences, there are also instances when the researcher becomes more than just a 
silent listener and instead, much more a part of the story, interweaving her role of 
being an interviewer or hearer of these stories, a therapist in a palliative care setting, 
and ultimately, the writer of this story. This can be seen in the participants’ use of 
‘you’ or ‘we’. Some examples are Helen’s ‘so just as you’ve laughed there, that was 
the nature of the session’; Herman’s ‘certainly when it comes to the client’s we’re 
talking about’ or ‘what that something is I can’t tell you’; Cam’s ‘you can hear, can’t 
you sometimes, if a laugh is not natural’; and Rupert’s ‘but as we know, that isn’t 
necessarily the case’ or ‘that’s why they’re going to see you or I’.  
There are also those instances when participants use the second person almost 
as an instruction to the researcher: ‘when people are dying, you can’t be humorous’ 
(Herman) or ‘you can’t maintain that…you have to temper it with humour’ (Cam), or  
‘you have to be more cautious’ (Helen). These instances can perhaps be a way of 
participants distancing themselves from their experiences, as is their use of ‘we’, 
implying they feel part of something bigger than themselves. It appears that mostly 
Herman uses ‘we’ in this way: ‘we’re looking to improve a client’s understanding of 
himself’ and ‘we don’t use humour because we think that’s honouring’. Other 
instances of ‘we’ are used only by Ted and Cam, specifically when talking about the 
usefulness of humour: ‘we need to be inclusive of all the client brings’ (Ted) and ‘we 




we treat people as they ought to be, we help them to become what they are capable of 
becoming’ (Cam).  In one interesting moment in Herman’s story, all of these cases are 
apparent in the phrase: ‘you know, humour helps the client live as freely as we 
can…because I’m not dead yet!’ 
The protean roles of the characters potentially demonstrate the complex way 
in which the therapists, through the reflective act of telling their stories, portray their 
sense of self. As Bruner (2004:4) states, “self-making is, after all, our principal means 
for establishing our uniqueness, and a moment's thought makes plain that we 
distinguish ourselves from others by comparing our accounts of ourselves with the 
accounts that others give us of themselves”. 
7.2  Plot 
Harkening back to Aristotle’s depiction of typical Greek tragedies and comedies, 
which was explored in Chapter 2, tragedies were considered to have a particular 
structure in which characters experienced a reversal of fortune, which in turn resulted 
in a combat between two contending forces and ended in a lamentable death, resulting 
ultimately in “a change from ignorance to knowledge” (Aristotle, trans. 2003:33). The 
tragedies were followed in performance by a ‘satyr’, which made fun of the 
seriousness of the three plays that preceded it. Potentially, what is presented in this 
thesis as Chapter 6 could be seen as the ‘satyr’, however there were also instances 
during the interviews in which both researcher and participant laughed, and anecdotal 
stories of clients’ situations. In considering including these into either the findings or 
analysis, it was felt by the researcher that these anecdotes appeared to contain 
information that could potentially compromise the anonymity of the participant due to 




how the therapists in this research experience humour for the anecdotes not to be 
needed, and as such it was felt that they would be alluded to in this chapter instead.  
7.2.1  Reversal of fortune 
The reversal of fortune can firstly be seen in those clients with a terminal diagnosis. 
All the therapists other than Penny refer to the sense of devastation that their clients 
and those around them experience. ‘Client’s gonna die. They know they’re gonna 
die’, Herman hopelessly acknowledges; the clients are ‘deathly sad, sad, desperately 
sad’, says Ted. Herman, Cam and Rupert however are the only three to discuss the 
implications that this has in their therapy, either by calling into question the nature 
and outcome of therapy (for Herman), or by shaping or taking something away from 
the nature of the work that can be done in these circumstances (for Cam and Rupert).  
 There is also the reversal of fortune of those therapists that had certain 
preconceptions of working in palliative care, preconceptions brewed with therapists’ 
training and societal expectations that almost deny humour any invitations when death 
is around; indeed, for Ted, death cannot even be spoken of. These preconceptions, 
which could potentially be seen as the therapist’s hamartia, are later challenged by 
either starting work (for Cam), or those clients that try to use humour and catch the 
therapist off-guard (for Herman), at which point humour permeates and becomes a 
kin, and therapists are unshackled from their preconceptions. Herman, for instance, 
speaks at great length about being guarded with the first terminal client of his who 
used humour, not wanting to offend. A large part of his story is overcoming this 
struggle, and recognising the potentially detrimental effect that his struggle itself has 
on this client, which offers him the learning with which he approaches humour with 
other clients. As his story continues, he uses this client as a benchmark against which 




these thoughts in discussing how, with experience, she is better able to manage the 
‘distraction’ that humour affords. Lastly, Cam, despite being in practice for a 
relatively shorter time, acknowledges that he would not have used humour right away 
but has learned to be lighter.   
This reversal can also be seen in how therapists speak of their first few 
sessions with clients, with Helen and Rupert also joining the conversation. It is here 
that we start to see differences in each therapist’s experience. Helen is quite clear 
about the lack of humour in the first few sessions, which although initially in 
agreement with Herman’s experience, contrasts with what he says about humour 
being present in the ‘very first session’ with terminal clients, albeit to ‘test’ the 
therapist. Rupert’s comments contrast even more with Helen’s in feeling that 
humour’s role is almost to put his clients at ease in the first few sessions, with this 
being less of a necessity as time goes on. Cam’s glib statement of the potential for 
humour to be there at times and not at others is felt to perhaps be the most balanced. 
7.2.2 Struggle between contending forces 
The two forces that are struggled with are most apparent in the battle between humour 
and death. The therapists speaking of their own personal experience of humour is one 
way of exploring this. Cam, Herman and Ted are the only three that discuss humour 
outside of their work setting, and how this impacts on their practice with terminally ill 
clients. Both Herman and Cam’s personal experiences of bereavement in the family 
seem to elicit humour, which in turn helped cope with their feelings of grief, and there 
is acknowledgement from Ted of the helpfulness of his own personality. There is an 
acknowledgement from Herman though, of how working with clients is somehow 




you’re with a client. The prior is fine because that was about me, but with clients, it’s 
constantly being aware of those boundaries and sort of trying to hold them’.   
 This struggle is also apparent in those therapists that speak of their 
experiences of humour with terminally ill clients compared to those in other settings. 
Helen stands alone in this discussion, not noticing humour’s presence elsewhere, but 
also believing that her work in palliative care was less formal. This is in contrast to 
Ted, who feels that working with terminally ill clients is in fact more controlled, and 
is certain that humour was present in other settings. Herman agrees with the presence 
of humour in other settings and goes as far as to say that he works at introducing it 
with his other clients, despite having discussed his immense struggle of using humour 
when it is in the room with death. Cam, Penny and Rupert’s comment are almost 
identical in not necessarily noticing a difference in the amount of humour that is 
present with terminally ill clients, but noticing substantial differences in the type of 
humour that is around. 
 There is also a notable struggle between client and therapist in initiating 
humour. Helen, Herman, Ted and Rupert appear certain that it ought to be the client 
that initiates the humour. Penny stands aside in some ways; not being able to say 
categorically whether she initiates humour or waits for a client to, although she is 
certain that she might say something humorous before the session formally starts. 
Cam’s comment is the most different in acknowledging the context of culture and 
class, with an implication that he might perhaps use humour to break the guardedness 
of some of his clients.  
 The struggle between therapist and death, or client and death, is also prevalent 
in the therapists’ stories, in speaking of how they and their clients experience humour 




environments being consumed by a very private sense of laughter, almost as a 
necessity to help cope with the nature of working in terminal care. Penny also 
comments on how this could potentially be distracting or avoiding an issue, whereas 
Cam feels that the humour also acts as a way of acknowledging the reality of the 
situation his colleagues find themselves in. Ted and Rupert both highlight their 
experience of humour with the client outside of the consulting room and how this 
humanises the therapist or helps the client to relax.  Herman and Cam are the only two 
to talk in detail about their clients’ experiences of humour outside of the therapeutic 
space, both sensing that clients with terminal illness are potentially disallowed from 
being humorous. For Herman, this mirrors the sense of disrespect he felt when 
considering humour with his first terminally ill client. Similarly, Herman, Ted, Cam 
and Penny all acknowledge a strong presence of humour in supervision, and speak in 
different ways of how supervision ‘allows’ humour to be present with clients. 
Particularly for Herman, supervision gives him permission to be himself and let the 
clients be themselves; and, for Ted, his own use of humour not only influences 
himself as a supervisor, but made a lasting impact on his own supervisor.  
7.2.3  The death 
The ‘deaths’ that occur in these therapists’ stories could be interpreted as the death of 
death, in which humour is the killer; the death of humour, in deathly situations; and 
the death of therapists’, particularly Cam’s, views regarding the prevalence of 
humour. In considering the death of death, all the therapists speak of those moments 
where humour was a positive experience. Herman, Ted, Cam and Rupert all agree that 
acknowledging humour in sessions is acknowledgement of the ‘whole’ of the client, 
and the humanness of both client and therapist. All six participants speak 




that are discussed in Chapter 2, such as relieving tension, means to communicating 
something which is otherwise difficult to communicate, encouraging an empathic 
relationship, engendering trust, recognising absurdities.  
 The death of humour occurs when all six of the participants are able to 
identify experiences of struggling with humour. They each speak of knowing when 
not to use it, and in Penny’s case, knowing what humour is not. There is a sense in 
Rupert’s experience of needing to ‘take control’ of humour at times, and of clients 
feeling obligated to ‘look after’ the therapist. The participants experience humour as 
distracting, insulting and defensive. 
 Lastly, Cam reports on how his sense of humour with clients has changed his 
sense of humour as a person. He’s learned not to take life or death too seriously, but 
most surprisingly of all, he spends the majority of his interview discussing how 
prevalent humour is, at the end to land with a bump and realise that out of around a 
hundred clients, only two clients could be identified as using humour.  
7.2.4  Revelation and recognition 
Having fought the battle, the therapists, in telling their stories, arrive at a place where 
they seem to summarise what they have learned as therapists in palliative 
environments and as a result of being interviewed, and where this might take them 
next. Helen ends her interview with the beginning of her experience of working with 
terminally ill clients, with two examples of how she caught herself out with humour – 
not being allowed to say or do something, and finding herself doing exactly that, and 
how she has learned to be careful with that now. Herman speaks of feeling ‘freed 
from the shackles’, and as a result, more open to using humour, not just with 
terminally ill clients but others too. Interestingly, he still seems to keep his terminal 




not to be ‘normal’ in some way, and not being able to use the same sorts of 
interventions that he might with others. Ted has learned from his experiences when to 
use humour and when not to, and whilst Penny becomes very certain in her interview 
of what humour was not, or when she might not use it, she acknowledges that as a 
result of being interviewed, she would be more conscious of her use of humour.  
7.3  Temporality 
Temporality is a significant feature of the therapists’ narratives, which feels 
particularly apt given the nature of humour, as Penny states, ‘it’s in the moment isn’t 
it? It’s in the moment’, and the finitude that clients with terminal illness are 
confronted with. Considering the temporal dimensions in which the participants speak 
potentially provides an insight into how they experience humour with clients 
diagnosed with a terminal illness.  
Throughout their stories, the therapists mention time in terms of their 
employment history, their early experiences of working in a hospice, the amount of 
sessions they might have had with a client, humour in early sessions compared to 
humour as the therapeutic relationship is developed, and the temporality that is 
terminated with a terminal diagnosis with particular exploration of clients’ changing 
sense of time. Looking at the transcripts overall, the stories appear linear, describing 
therapists’ personal experiences of humour prior to working in a terminal care setting, 
followed by the preconceptions that being a therapist in such a setting might bring, to 
how their experiences have altered the preconceptions, and finally their learnings. 
This perceivably ordered chronology highlights participants’ sense of objective time, 
with stories that are almost exclusively located in the present, giving the sense of a 




In looking at individual stories, however, there are distortions to the 
chronology in their stories of anticipations, events and memories which provide a 
complexity to each therapist’s subjective sense of time without perhaps the narrator 
having any direct responsibility for any of them, since they are, in a way, already part 
of the story. Helen’s interview, for example, ends at the beginning of her experiencing 
where she tells stories of humour whilst working with terminally ill patients prior to 
being a therapist. Her ending statement is ‘those were obviously past events when I 
was doing my nursing, but I like humour, I do use humour in the every day.’  
Interestingly for the researcher, Herman’s discussions about the future are 
very much located in the present tense, for instance, ‘it’s the lack of hope that you 
have in terms of someone being able to go on and live a full life…a full life for me is 
hopefully another 10, 20, 30, 40 years…that isn’t the way for the client…they may 
have 6 months or whatever it may be, so that longevity isn’t there’ and ‘he’s also very 
aware of protecting his wife from her impeding loss, it’s not just his loss of his life bit 
it’s her loss of him as well as his children’s loss.’ There are also instances where 
Herman is very much in the present moment, ‘now it feels more genuine’, as well as 
conveying his client’s immediate consciousness about the fragility of their existence: 
‘you reach a certain age in life, you know and you suddenly say ‘I can say whatever I 
like because I’ve earned the right to do it’’.  
Ted shows similar distortions of past, present and future when he remembers 
working with clients: ‘I’d been seeing him for 18 months now…he was beginning to 
get there now’ as well as, ‘once you’ve talked about it a few times and he starts to see 
how silly it is, he can see and then he will bring me humour’. There’s also the 
instance when Ted describes working with his supervisor which on first listening to 




I was training, one of the things that my supervisor at the time, um is the supervisor I 
have now, I went back to him, um, in the mean time as a volunteer for 7/8 years 
before I was employed which was three years ago December, um…um, um and one 
of the things I went back to my supervisor when I was employed here so I’ve been 
seeing him for nearly three years again now. He said to me, he said ‘there’s one thing 
I remember about you’ coz obviously this is sort of 2003, so we’re talking 8/9 years 
before, he said…’.  
For Cam, the few instances where he does use the past tense refer to clients’ 
stories, early preconceptions about working in palliative settings or his personal 
experiences of death. The future in Cam’s text however, can be seen in instances 
where Cam ‘breaks’ his story by almost suddenly realising the immediacy of his 
position as a therapist being interviewed by the researcher. For instance, ‘…the more 
guarded a person, and that can, actually, I’m going somewhere and no, I’m going to 
change my mind’ and later, ‘I am going to give you specifics so you will need to edit 
it’. Penny can be seen to do something similar when she dances between past and 
present in conveying her interpretation of the interview: ‘what I didn’t want to put 
across was that either I use humour as a way of kind of wanting to be buddies, 
because it isn’t that, or that I used humour as a way of lightening the mood because 
actually it was too heavy to hold, I don’t mean that either’. This is in contrast to 
Rupert’s story which uses future tense more than any other participant’s: ‘I will 
always try with people to put them at their ease by being as friendly and relaxed as I 
possibly can’, ‘it will have got things to think about and they will have perhaps things 
to do that are quite challenging’, ‘we will also see these people going through quite 
these significant mood swings’ and ‘you will start to worry whether the session has 




The distortions of time in participants’ narratives disrupt the uniformity of 
direction. In those instances where the stories are straightforward, the hearer is 
completely informed of the progress of therapists’ experiences to the extent that in 
reading the transcript, the researcher’s interpretations were projected to the future 
with a sense of suspense. However, when the chronology is complicated or confusing, 
the suspense, for the researcher at least, is paired with a curiosity as to how the nature 
of the past might reveal the present, and how the past and present come back on 
themselves and reveal how they have a hold on the future.  
7.4 Situatedness  
Participants’ stories are grounded in the specific contexts in which their stories occur, 
which in turn provide context to their experiences of humour with terminally ill 
clients, and are worthy of consideration given the contextual nature of humour.  
The ‘situation’ that participants refer to include their situation as therapists 
working for terminally ill clients compared to being in other settings. For Helen, for 
example, the palliative setting, which affords her the ability to see clients in their own 
home, feels less formal and hence contains more humour than her previous experience 
of being a counsellor in a GP surgery. Ted, on the other hand, spent the first 130 lines 
of his interview speaking about how he became situated as a counsellor in his 
palliative care setting, and felt that working there was more ‘controlled’ because 
‘generally speaking, you know what you’re gonna get.’ Herman refers to his client’s 
experience of his situation as a counsellor who, at least initially, felt unable to respond 
to the humour in the room: ‘he said ‘I wanted it to be slightly more light-hearted’, he 
said ‘and I kept trying’, you know, bless him [laughs] you know, ‘and then I thought 
to myself, ‘god, you’re the bloody therapist here not me!’’. This can also be seen in 




people they don’t understand the boundaries or the um where a line might be drawn or 
if they’ve crossed it’. This brings in the situation of being in a therapeutic 
relationship, where all participants agreed that the stronger the relationship, the more 
able they felt to use humour and respond to it appropriately. Related to this are the 
situations of humour for the therapist and client both inside the therapy room, outside 
the therapy room, and separated from each other such as with colleagues (for the 
therapist) or family and friends (for both therapist and client); and, situations where 
the therapists were new in palliative settings with all the anticipations that brought to 
them, compared to being experienced therapists and what they have learned as a 
result.  
There is also the ‘situations’ that clients find themselves in. There are 
numerous anecdotes that the therapists refer to in which clients find themselves 
physically in awkward situations, which Ted refers to as ‘absurdities’, however also 
the situation they find themselves in as a result of their diagnoses. Physically, 
participants referred to clients being bed bound, or having labile emotions as a result 
of a particular diagnosis. However the therapists also explored clients’ emotional 
response to where they found themselves as a result of being confronted by death, and 
others’ reaction to this: ‘I won’t say anything I’ll stay away, I won’t say anything I’ll 
stay over here’ (Ted).  
There is also the cultural situation that the therapists are speaking from, 
though only Ted, Herman and Cam refer to this. Ted and Herman both experienced 
the British culture in which they practice to have not only expectations for people 
diagnosed with terminal illnesses, in which both humour and death are taboos, ‘the 
vitality gets buried’ (Herman) and neither patient nor therapist might feel free to 




his experiences ran deeper. Although he is hesitant in disclosing his observations, he 
eventually portrays the classist deviations of humour between those of an upper class 
who have a ‘stiff upper lip’ and with whom it is harder to gather information from, 
‘you really have to pull it out of them’, and the lower classes, where ‘humour is part 
of their everyday’. Cam also refers to the historicity of this observation, laying it 
down to the ‘blitz spirit’: ‘but that must have been awful! You’re having bombs 
dropped on your head night after night. And I wonder if that’s similar, that it’s a 
survival technique, a coping mechanism to be bright and breezy and rally round’.  
Lastly, there is the situation in which the therapists are participants of a 
research project being interviewed. There are several occasions in which their stories 
are halted by a realisation of this. Helen for example, after being asked if she had 
anything to add, laughingly responded: ‘I don’t know. Have I still got a job?’. This is 
the most apparent in Cam’s interview when half way through, he asks what the title of 
the thesis will be in order to see if he can think of any further examples, and when he 
realises he is about to make a generalisation, such as with his comment about the class 
system and stops himself, as well as toward the end when he looks through his client 





Chapter 8: Critique  
 
“DEATH stands for ‘don’t expect a tragedy here’” 
   - Busey (2014) 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
 The aim of this research was to explore psychological therapists’ experiences of 
humour in sessions with clients diagnosed with a terminal illness through exploring 
how tragedy and comedy present themselves in the therapeutic space. With the vast 
body of work carried out on death and humour, this thesis begins with one history - of 
many that could be told - of societal attitudes and the situatedness of each of these 
two phenomena in society today, together with the implications this has on therapists 
working with terminally ill clients. With previous literature providing a context, 
Bruner’s (1991, 2004) narrative method was utilised as a vehicle of exploration, the 
effectiveness of which will be evaluated below. This is followed by a discussion 
regarding possible future research.  
 
8.2  What was gained and what was lost? 
 
In answering the question of what is the relationship between humour, terminal illness 
and psychological therapy, the literature search illustrated that the phenomena of 
humour and death provide a vast area of potential exploration through which there are 
many stories that could have been told. It therefore became necessary to establish 
what this thesis is a story of, what was meant by comedy, what was meant by tragedy, 
and to locate them in the psychological therapies. In doing so, each of these different 
aspects were examined in the literature review by looking at what was already 
established in current research, which in turn served to justify this thesis. Whilst there 




and psychological therapy, as well as on the relationship between any two of them, 
what was found to emerge when the three were placed together as a triad was 
something very different and underreported. Considering the literature in this 
hermeneutic way harmonised with the narrative tradition by examining how each of 
the individual parts informed the whole, and in turn, how the whole informed each of 
the parts, for the whole story never coherently tells the story of the individual parts 
just as the parts never tell the story of the coherent whole (Gadamer, 1975). Further, 
in considering the psychoanalytic stronghold over existing literature, and attempting 
to tell a more ‘existential’ story, this thesis builds on yet is distinct from research that 
already exists.  
So what is the story that has been told here? Firstly, it is a story rooted in 
Western culture and a specific point in history. Further, the majority of previous 
stories looking at humour, death and therapy have been told through a psychoanalytic 
lens.  Whilst there was a desire here to step aside from that and tell a new story, the 
dominance of the psychoanalytic story could not be ignored. Therefore what is told is 
a story that maintains the existential tenets of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The 
springboard of exploration has been Aristotle’s depictions of Ancient Greek tragedy 
and comedy that show the human propensity to combat the tragic with the comic. 
Tragedy, potentially as a means through which to explore man’s limitations such as in 
Prometheus’s story, is mirrored particularly in Herman’s use of metaphors in 
describing his terminal patients as having ‘chains of expectation’ and himself being 
‘shackled’ when he was face-to-face with a funny, dying client. The idea of comedy 
freeing one from limitations is reflected in all the participants who compellingly put 
forward the benefits of humour in their practice. This in turn supports the plethora of 




Bader, 1993; Stephenson, 1993; Erdman, 1994; Goldin & Bordin, 1999; Oritz, 2000; 
Fabian, 2002; Newirth, 2006a; Lothane, 2008b). Participants’ experiences before 
starting work with terminally ill clients are also supportive of what previous literature 
has said about the preconception of therapy being ‘serious’ (e.g. Lemma, 2000).   
However, the enormous body of literature exploring death and humour implies 
that maybe this topic is too big: in earlier versions of this thesis, some of what was 
noticed was that the researcher’s voice was missing, which leads to the possible 
interpretation that there is something about this subject that feels bigger than just one 
person. On one extreme, humour is subjective and death is the only thing we go 
through completely on our own. On the other hand, death is the one thing that 
everybody will experience, and humour too is universal, dialogic and relational. What 
has been attempted through approaching this through a narrative research method is to 
put a voice to these. Choosing narrative then, with the focus being on one person’s 
story – in this case, the author’s - makes the enormity of the topic with the 
individualism of experience difficult to reconcile.  
In attempting to find a ‘voice’ through which to tell the story that has been 
told here, the author kept returning to the metaphor of a journey, the seeds of which 
were implanted when she heard the Rolling Stones song ‘Laugh, I nearly died’ (for 
instance, participants telling the researcher of their credentials could be likened to 
‘checking into the flight’; their difficulties of working with terminal clients could be 
likened to ‘turbulence’; and, their experiences of supervision could have been 
‘assistance from the steward’). What became apparent in attempting to write first the 
findings and then the analysis in this way was that this was a metaphor superimposed 
upon the transcripts by the author. There was nothing in participants’ stories that 




realised that although narrative research allows for the researcher to be placed in the 
research as a hearer of the stories and subsequently a narrator, the voices merge and 
get lost. At what point is the researcher’s voice distinct from the participants? And to 
what extent is it possible to maintain the participants’ voices through the narrator 
telling her story?  
It felt as though, from not having a voice at all, the only voice that began to 
come through was the author’s own, almost as an over-compensation. Whilst 
narrative acknowledges that the listener is also the narrator, how much is it really 
possible to incorporate other peoples’ stories in one’s own? Others’ stories may 
indeed inform our own, however considering the subjective experience of death, can 
we ever really write somebody else’s story of death? Or tell anyone else’s joke? Both 
humour and death are so personal, therefore is it ever possible to – and should we 
even pretend that we are trying to – step outside of the subjectivity? Related to this 
are the cautions that were raised and discussed in Chapter 2 about researching humour 
(e.g. Dixon, 1980), as well as the extent to which participants’ answers are confined 
by the interview context. Not all psychological therapists that were approached agreed 
to be interviewed, which potentially confirms Baker’s (1993) statement that “this is an 
area where analysts prefer privacy, as in other areas where they might attract criticism 
from their colleagues” (Baker, 1993:952). Having said that, the relationship between 
humour, terminal illness and psychological therapy remains under researched, and 
perhaps it is studies such as this one that can inform the thoughtful practice of other 
therapists. After all, each of the six participants compellingly spoke of what they had 
learned and whilst these cannot be extrapolated to a larger population, they are 




 One attempt to combat the difficulties of distinguishing the author’s voice 
from participants’ was firstly to present the findings as a play and further to analyse 
the stories with the frame of reference drawn from Aristotle’s notions of Ancient 
Greek Theatre. Bruner’s approach to narrative is one through which there is no one 
correct way of either displaying the research results or analysing them. Therefore, 
whilst the findings were grounded in narrative theory through maintaining the key 
components of plot, character and time, the manner in which the findings are 
presented is one way of preserving the distinction between the author’s voice and that 
of the participants, and is hence an attempt to sustain the ‘verisimilitude and 
plausibility’ of the research. Further, in straying authentic to Bruner’s key tenets and 
at the same time presenting the findings and conducting analysis in a new way could 
be seen as a methodological advancement of Bruner’s work.  
This raises the further question of what else has been missed with the research 
having been conducted in this way. With humour and death being so personal, what 
could have been learned if the research had not been conducted from a narrative 
perspective? Using another method such as discourse analysis for instance, could 
potentially have revealed more than this study has, societal and cultural influences on 
the therapists’ experiences of humour in their palliative care settings. This feels 
particularly pertinent considering the participants’ claims of the assumptions placed 
upon them as therapists by society regarding the nature of humour, palliative work, 
and the social constraints faced by those diagnosed with terminal illnesses.  
Further, a method such as discourse analysis could consider in a different way 
one key aspect that has potentially not been given enough consideration here: the 
reification of humour. Both previous literature and the participants of this study speak 




What comes to mind is the Association for Applied and Therapeutic Humour’s 
official definition of therapeutic humour described in Chapter 1: “Therapeutic humour 
is any intervention that promotes health and wellness by stimulating a playful 
discovery, expression or appreciation of the absurdity or incongruity of life’s 
situation. This intervention may enhance health or be used as a complementary 
treatment of illness to facilitate healing or coping, whether physical, emotional, 
cognitive, social or spiritual” (www.aath.org). Humour, in society today, appears to 
be a ‘thing’ to be applied as a salve or Band-Aid to make the journey to death more 
pleasant. To what extent, therefore, is humour being ‘used’ as Foucault’s ‘ship of 
fools’ was? And related to this, to what extent is narrative as a method doing the 
same?  
In considering these questions, we have on one hand Chapter 6, which 
indicates how humour can usurp death, take away his power, and potentially affords 
both therapist and patient membership of the ‘collectively mad’ society Becker (1973) 
speaks of. This is most apparent if we look at the ‘causality’ inferred by participants. 
For instance, participants spoke of a better therapeutic relationship resulting in the 
easier application of humour; their experience of working in palliative care settings 
allowing them to feel more comfortable with the presence of humour; the nature of a 
terminal diagnosis taking humour away from the client; and so on.  Thinking about 
humour as ‘causal’ has the flavour of “the logical-scientific heritage of the natural 
sciences aiming to fulfil the ideal of a formal system of prediction” (Elliott, 2005:98), 
which the author was trying hard to avoid through using narrative. The saving grace 
perhaps, is that the ‘causalities’ that participants speak of appear to remain rooted in 
the particular context of the story being told and perhaps establish a means through 




inferred in participants’ stories then, should be done tentatively in attempt to apply the 
ideal ‘necessity and verisimilitude’ called for by Bruner. Further, given what 
participants have spoken of, perhaps it is crucial that humour takes the role of a 
healthy defence mechanism, allowing access to that which might otherwise be 
unbearable.   
Overall, telling the story as it has been in this thesis portrays the subjective 
experience the researcher had of being an audience to participants’ stories. This 
maintained the requirement for valid research to have the sensitivity to context, 
commitment, rigour, transparency, coherence, impact and importance that were 
discussed in the Method Chapter. However, the very reason that narrative lends itself 
as the most obvious choice of method for the topic of humour and death, with 
concerns of time and subjectivity, at the same time also potentially yet immediately 
limit the story that is told. To a certain extent, the narrative model channels too much 
what is heard in the stories by looking for the features of plot, character, contextuality 
and so on. Setting the results out as they have been here, with stage directions and so 
on, could be said to be too ‘directive’, disallowing the reader of the thesis to get a 
sense of their own experience of participants’ experiences. Approaching the research 
from this starting place hence takes away the possibility that perhaps there is no 
narrative to be told. Potentially then, using narrative here, just as humour has been 
criticised of doing, could be said to be an attempt to make sense of death, an attempt 
to make order out of chaos. Through the lens of looking at how narratives make sense 
of existence, the researcher runs the risk of superimposing a coherent story onto 
something where one does not exist. Perhaps creating a narrative out of that which 
cannot be faced is yet another denial against the unknown mess that death inhabits. 




8.3  Future research 
 Telling this story as it has been told here takes away the possibility to tell a different 
story. There are a myriad of possibilities for future research in which a larger sample 
size, for instance, would provide more insight into psychological therapists’ 
experiences, though possibly by risking the quality of the research by bolstering 
quantity. In considering what emerged from the findings and subsequent analysis 
there were four key areas that are thought to be worthy of further exploration.  
 The first is that this research was very much rooted in Western culture. Future 
research exploring concepts of humour and death in palliative counselling and 
psychotherapy in other cultures would not only widen the depth of experiences, but 
provide an avenue of thoughtful practice to therapists working either with patients 
from those cultures, or in palliative care settings in other countries.  
 The second is that the participants of this research were largely practicing 
from a person-centred framework, with the exception of Rupert who described 
himself as a cognitive behavioural therapist. Future research exploring the differences 
of the experiences of humour from the perspective of other theoretical practices 
would explore what space did not permit here.  
 The third is that each of the participants spoke of the differences in their 
experience of humour that the length of being a therapist in a palliative care setting 
gave them. Future research comparing the experiences of ‘new’ therapists in this field 
to ‘seasoned’ therapists would potentially inform the training of therapists in not just 
the use of humour, but in working with terminally ill clients.  
 Lastly, the stories told here are of therapists telling clients’ stories. Research 
could be conducted in terminal clients’/patients’ experiences of humour in therapy to 




provide a therapist working in such a setting with insight as to what might be 




Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
 
“I don’t want to achieve immortality through my work, I want to achieve it through 
not dying” 
        - Allen (1993:259) 
 
The story told here is one in which a researcher embarks on a journey to explore how 
other psychological therapists experience humour when working with terminally ill 
clients.  She has shifting roles between researcher, audience, narrator and author. Her 
hamartia is potentially her propensity to cover up negative emotions with positive 
ones, and her reversal of fortune occurs when she realises how much of this thesis is 
about her. The contending forces she thus struggles with include the need to accept 
and acknowledge her voice, and at the same time allow for others’ voices to emerge. 
The death (of the journey), and the revelation and recognition, come for her here, in 
this final chapter.  
 The story told here is also one of six psychological therapists, each of whom 
go on their own individual but interconnected journeys, from never having worked in 
palliative care settings and being wary of the seriousness that this work inhabits, to 
allowing themselves some freedom and accepting humour as having a presence in 
therapy – a presence that is potentially helpful but potentially also harmful.  
 The story told here is also one of a PsychD thesis, in which chapters of 
empirical research attempt to examine phenomena which are perhaps only possible to 
keep in the confines of a particular time and place. The thesis begins with a statement 
from the researcher questioning authenticity, but to what extent can this research be 
deemed authentic? Whilst ‘authenticity’ is a topic that could occupy another doctoral 




On one hand, the ‘verisimilitude and plausibility’ supported so strongly by 
Bruner has been maintained as much as possible through not only a prologue that 
elucidates the researcher’s starting block, but also presenting the findings in a manner 
which captures the essence of what participants were saying, and also allows the 
reader to ascertain some of the researcher’s subjective experience of being an 
audience of that story and conveying the atmosphere in the room during the 
interviews. However, to what extent is the style of narrative used here too directive 
and disallows space for another subject, the reader, to interpret it differently? That 
being said, the reader was not present at the interviews, and what has been offered 
here is a conveyance of what was experienced, which can only ever be subjective to 
the one that experiences.  
Further, a key aspect of narrative research is ‘truth’ and ‘fiction’. Whilst an 
attempt has been made here to avoid presenting an ultimate ‘truth’, it has also tried to 
maintain the ‘truths’ of the participants. However, to what extent is research ever 
true? Can it be more than just another story? To that end, is the use of humour, either 
as an individual or as therapists working with terminally ill clients ‘true’? Or is it a 
way of falsely covering up what is difficult to bear? Alternatively, does humour help 
access a ‘truth’ that is otherwise too difficult to speak of?  
What emerges from this study is that the relationship between humour, 
terminal illness and psychological therapy is complicated, powerful and visceral. 
Humour, and indeed death are fundamental to us as human beings; laughter, after 
crying, is one of the first things we do with the world to engage with it as a human 
being. Other than the physiological needs of safety, warmth and nourishment, our 
propensity to look for humour and find something funny is almost what makes us 




never more human than when we are dying. Thus, what is appropriate and what is not 
when it comes to humour with the terminally ill client in therapy almost becomes 
irrelevant when humour is a means by which we hang on to our humanity in one last 







What now of Gauri’s story? I began this research process, first from a place of 
misgiving and doubt regarding humour, to then being absorbed by the enormity of 
literature supporting the relevance of humour in palliative care. Re-reading this thesis 
several months after completion, I am struck by how I have been blinded by my own 
‘use’ of ‘humour’ throughout my life, the extent to which both ‘terminal illness’ and 
‘humour’ are potentially signifiers or metaphors for something other than just the 
dictionary definition of these terms, and the manner in which this thesis potentially 
speaks to the nature and purpose of therapy. It is perhaps then not surprising that my 
own personal therapy lately has been much deeper and much more meaningful than I 
have ever let it be. 
At times it feels as though humour has hindered me from doing all the things 
the literature review claims it helps with – meeting resistances, for example. Am I 
employing humour as a decoy? A deflection? Has humour provided for me, what is 
referred to on page 34 as ‘a momentary anaesthesia of the heart’? Or have I been 
laughing at myself to avoid analysing conflicts – to ‘avert madness’ (p. 45)? I also 
refer to research which claims that humour ‘awakens peoples’ disillusionment’, but to 
what extent have I disillusioned myself through humour? Has humour been my 
opiate? Related to this is potentially the question of the purpose of my research – have 
I just wanted to provide an answer that in some way confirms that it is indeed okay to 
maintain my happy façade and not confront my horrors? Did I want participants’ 






There is no doubt that this research has interrupted a certain complacency 
within me, forcing me to look at how I am in this world, how I relate to others, how I 
feel about my own finitude, and how I derive meaning. By so doing, in some ways it 
has confirmed my pre-established views, but has also opened up contradictions. This, 
I think, is a poignant reflection of Bruner’s claim that the nature of language in telling 
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Appendix 2:  Invitation Letter 
 
 
        





I am looking for participants to interview for my doctoral research with the University 
of Roehampton. I am exploring psychological therapists’ experiences of humour in 
sessions with clients diagnosed with a terminal illness.  
 
I thought that the following information would be helpful to you when making your 
decision regarding participation:  
 
 
Purpose of the study: 
This is a qualitative research inquiry that aims to explore ‘the experience of humour 
in sessions with clients diagnosed with a terminal illness’ and I intend to recruit 6 - 8 
participants for this study. 
 
Expectation of participants: 
You will be invited to participate in an audio-recorded interview lasting approximately 
60 minutes.  The interview will take place at an appropriate location convenient for 
you.  This semi-structured interview will focus on your experience of humour in 
sessions with terminally ill clients.  
  
Confidentiality: 
If you agree to take part in the study you will be required to sign the attached consent 
form indicating approval to the recording of the interview and participation in the 
research.  
 
All your personal details will be anonymised and you, the clients you discuss and 
your organisation, will not be personally identifiable. I will also respect confidentiality 
and will ensure that information or data collected about individuals are appropriately 
anonymised and cannot be traced back to them by other parties, even if the 
participants themselves are not troubled by a potential loss of confidentiality. All 
collected data will be securely stored at all times and kept for a maximum of ten 
years for the purpose of publication.   
 
Although you will be asked to draw on your experiences of working as a therapist 
with clients with terminal illness, you will be asked not to reveal any confidential or 
identifying details about your clients/patients. 
 
 
Right to withdraw: 
All participation is voluntary.  Should you wish to withdraw from the study, you are 
free to do so at any time (however, as it may not be possible to remove data from a 





Findings and publication: 
You may request from me a summary of the study’s findings by providing your 
contact details.  The findings of the research project may be published in journals but 
anonymity and confidentially will be upheld at all times. 
  
Reimbursement:  
Unfortunately, no costs related to the participation will be reimbursed. 
 
Risks: 
You are entitled to decline to answer any interview question and may take short 
breaks during the interview process if required.  To ensure the safeguarding of your 
well-being, both you and I, reserve the right to terminate the interview at any point 
should you become excessively distressed during the interview. 
 
Should you experience unwanted distress as a result of participation you may refer to 
contact details for help-lines and therapeutic services which will be supplied in the 
debrief information sheet.  
 
Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any 
other queries please raise this with the investigator. However, if you would like to 
contact an independent party please contact the Head of Department (or if the 
researcher is a student you can also contact the Director of Studies.) 
 
Director of Studies:     Head of Department: 
Professor Del Loewenthal    Dr Diane Bray 
Department of Psychology    Department of Psychology 
Whitelands College     Whitelands College 
University of Roehampton    University of Roehampton 
Holybourne Avenue     Holybourne Avenue 
London      London 
SW15 4JD      SW15 4JD 
d.loewenthal@roehampton.ac.uk    d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3:  Risk Assessment 
 
 
Ethics Risk Assessment 
 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT FORM 
Description of 
activity 







Name Job Title Signed 
Gauri Chauhan Doctoral student  
Prof Del 
Loewenthal 
Director of Studies  
   
   
 
Hazards  
1. Emotional distress 
2. Discomfort at being audio recorded 
3. Lone worker safety at interviews 
4. Travelling to and from interviews 
5. Electrical equipment/recording equipment/tripping on cables 
6. Confidentiality/anonymity 
7. Data storage 
 
Who can be harmed? Participant and researcher 
How can someone be 
harmed? 
1. Content brought up in the interviews may cause distress to both 
parties 
2. Participants may feel discomfort at being audio recorded 
3. The researcher is at risk of danger when lone-working, 
particularly if travelling to an unknown location with people not 
previously known to the researcher 
4. Travelling to and from interviews may be dangerous in the 
event of a car accident or breakdown, for instance 
5. Either participant or researcher may trip on cables that may be 
attached to audio-recording equipment, or any bags that may 
be in the area 
6. Confidential information will be discussed at the interview 
7. Confidential information will be recorded at the interview  
Number of people 
affected 
2 Rate   H=Hourly, D=Daily, W=Weekly, M=Monthly, 
Q=Quarterly, S=Six monthly, A=Annually H 





2. The participant may show signs of discomfort with the prospect 
of being audio recorded and thus find it difficult to continue the 
interview 
3. The researcher or participant may get lost or find themselves in 
an unsafe location, where their personal safety may be 
threatened 
4. The researcher or participant may have an accident travelling to 
the interview, or break down. 
5. The researcher or participant may trip on any items on the floor 
and hurt themselves as they fall 
6. The information discussed is confidential in nature and requires 
anonymity so that it is not mishandled by someone not involved 
in the research.   
7. Confidential and sensitive information will be recorded and 
requires security so that it is not mishandled by someone not 





1. Participants are trained therapists and will be in supervision. 
The consent form will highlight the nature of the interview and 
participants will be aware that they can withdraw from the 
research at any stage. The researcher is in weekly personal 
therapy and weekly supervision and is aware from the offset of 
the nature of information that might arise from the interviews.  
2. Participants are aware before the interview commences that 
they will be audio-recorded and can stop the recording if 
necessary.  
3. The research will be carried out in an area familiar to the 
participant, so they are unlikely to get lost or find themselves in 
an unsafe location. The researcher is choosing her own 
participants and is therefore unlikely to choose someone that is 
not safe or works from an unsafe area.  
4. Usual transport safety measures are followed. The researcher 
has insurance on her vehicle and breakdown cover. 
5. The recording equipment that will be used is wireless.  
6. The researcher, as a practicing therapist, is familiar in 
maintaining confidentiality  
7. The researcher is adept and experienced at making client notes 
and storing them securely 
 




Risk rating M VH=Very High, H=High, M=Medium, L=Low, VL=Very Low 
Further possible control 
measures 
1. Participants will be reminded in the interview of their right to 
withdraw at any point during the interview. Regular breaks can 




seek support from her supervisor or therapist. 
2. Regular breaks during the interview can be taken if needed, and 
participants will be reminded that they are free to withdraw 
from the study whenever they wish.  
3. University of Roehampton's 'Lone Working Policy' will be 
adhered to by telephoning someone before and after 
interviews; having a contingency plans in place for what 
happens if no call is made after the interview, and ensuring 
mobile phone is charged and working. 
4. Ensure usual transport safety procedures are followed. 
5. Check room before interviews; remove/tidy any hazards where 
possible. 
6. Confidential data handling; use codes for each participant's 
interview and disguise their clients' names. Secure storage of 
audio recordings and transcripts. 
7. Secure storage of electronic interview transcription on a 
password protected computer; data backed-up on a USB stick. 
Any hard-copy transcripts will be kept in a locked box. 
 
 
Any further actions required 




Date  Completed 
     
     
     
     
     
     
 







Print Name and Date  
 
11/06/14 
Signed (Lead Assessor, 
if different from 
applicant) 












       Participant Code…………… 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Research Project: 
 
‘Stories of Comedy and Tragedy in Therapy: Psychological therapists’ experiences of 
humour in sessions with clients diagnosed with a terminal illness’ 
 
Brief Description of Research Project:  
 
This research project is interested in exploring the experiences of humour in 
sessions with clients diagnosed with a terminal illness. Interview questions will be 
used to ask therapists about their experiences of humour with such clients. 6 – 8 
participants will be recruited.  
 
Participants will take part in a single audio-recorded interview lasting approximately 
one hour. Participants will be asked if they would want to be interviewed at the 
university or their place of work, for convenience reasons.  The interviews will be 
transcribed and analysed; the data will be included in the thesis. 
 
Investigator  Contact Details: 
Gauri Chauhan 
Psychology Department, Whitelands College, Roehampton University, Holybourne 
Avenue, SW15 4JD 
chauhang11@roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel: 07837 205 318  
 
Consent Statement: 
I agree to take part in this research, and am aware that I am free to withdraw at any 
point without giving a reason, although if I do so I understand that my data might still 
be used in a collated form. I understand that the information I provide will be treated 
in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected in the 
publication of any findings, and that data will be collected and processed in 
















Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any 
other queries please raise this with the investigator. However, if you would like to 




Director of Studies Contact Details:  Head of Department Contact Details: 
 
Prof Del Loewenthal    Dr Diane Bray 
Department of Psychology   Department of Psychology 
Whitelands College    Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue    Holybourne Avenue 
London     London 
SW15 4JD     SW15 4JD 
d.loewenthal@roehampton.ac.uk  d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
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